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Abstract 
This thesis consists of four papers studying endogenous technical change (TC) in climate 
policy analysis. The first paper (Chapter 2) provides a conceptual framework of the 
mechanism through which TC can be induced by climate mitigation policies. The second 
· paper (Chapter 3) develops a computable general equilibrium (CGE) numerical model to 
quantitatively analyze the effect of endogenous TC on the timing and cost of carbon 
abatements. The third paper (Chapter 4) develops a multi-region CGE model to examine the 
mechanism of international technology diffusion and its effect on domestic carbon savings. 
The fourth paper (Chapter 5) analyzes the mechanism of international technology 
coordination resulting from reciprocal cross-nation knowledge spillovers and its implication 
for global climate governance. 
The first paper, "Revisiting the mechanism of endogenous technical change for climate 
policy analysis", aims to reconcile the diverging specifications of -endogenous TC in existing 
climate policy modeling literature. Drawing on the theory of R&D-induced TC, I provide a 
generalized framework to analyze the mechanism through which TC can be induced by 
climate mitigation policies. In the presence of emission control measures raising the costs of 
using fossil energy, the price signal induces profit-seeking private firms to undertake 
purposeful R&D investment (R&D inducement). As a result, the stock of economically useful 
knowledge is augmented by this purposeful R&D (knowledge creation) . The accumulated 
knowledge capital is finally applied in a production process for technical upgrading, with an 
outcome of shifting out production possibility frontier and substituting knowledge for costly 
energy i:fol.puts (production TC). 
The second paper, "Can ·technological innovation help China take on its climate 
responsibility? A computable general equilibrium analysis", examines the effectiveness of 
China's indigenous R&D and technological innovation to cut its carbon emissions. The 
. 
mechanism of endogenous TC is incorporated into a CGE numerical model. R&D investment 
and knowledge creation is modeled as the endogenous behavior of profit-seeking private 
firms. The accumulated stocks of knowledge are applied in the production process to induce 
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TC. Results show that: 1) While China's indigenous R&D play a significant role to curb its 
carbon emissions, sole dependence on R&D may be far from sufficient to achieve China's 
pledged Copenhagen climate target, with complementary policies required to reinforce 
private R&D efforts; 2) Innovation policies including public R&D subsidy and intellectual 
property protection can help strengthen economy-wide R&D investment and further reduce 
emissions, but this complementary effect is still minor and insufficient to meet the stipulated 
emission cuts target; 3) Carbon taxation can create significant carbon-saving benefits and 
fulfill the pledged climate target, but this achievement is at the cost of economic losses. 
Induced technical upgrading, however, can partially mitigate the deadweight losses incurred 
by carbon tax distortion. 
The third paper, "Can China harness globalization to reap domestic carbon savings? 
Modelling international technology diffusion in a multi-region framework", aims to examine 
the effect of globalization, particularly international technology diffusion, on reducing 
China's domestic carbon emissions. The single-country CGE model is extended into a 
multi-region framework, where both indigenous R&D and foreign technology diffusion (TD) 
are explicitly considered as two sources of endogenous TC for domestic carbon savings. The 
model systematically describes foreign TD through three diffusion channels of trade, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and disembodied knowledge spillovers, with an elaborate treatment 
of local knowledge absorptive capacity. Results show that: (1) Foreign TD complements 
China's indigenous R&D to help reduce domestic carbon emissions, with the leading 
diffusion channel being disembodied spillovers in the short run and embodied diffusion (via 
import ~d FDI) in the long run; (2) Trade and FDI liberalization (economic globalization) 
facilitates economic integration and production growth, yet at the cost of higher emissions 
levels vyithout carbon savings (scale effect); (3) Removal of foreign TD restrictions (knowledge 
globalization) can help China reap the benefits of domestic carbon savings (technique effect); 
(4) Domestic climate regulation can create the composition effect by inducing indigenous R&D 
and foreign TD to shift domestic economic composition, hence helping partially mitigate 
climate compliance cost. 
The fourth paper, "International knowledge spillover and technology externality: Why 
multilateral R&D coordination matters for global climate governance", investigates the 
mechanism of international technology cooperation and its effect on lowering global climate 
mitigation cost, with an aim of exploring the possibility of complementing international 
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emission-based agreements with technology cooperation in the post-2012 climate regime. For 
that purpose, this paper firstly presents an analytical framework that describes how the 
mechanism of international R&D coordination can work for climate change mitigation. This 
mechanism is then quantitatively examined in a multi-region global numerical model that 
explicitly considers multilateral reciprocal knowledge spillovers and resulting technology 
externality. Results show that: (1) By internalizing the reciprocal externality of knowledge 
spillover, multilateral R&D coordination, as compared to non-coordinated innovation, can 
induce more R&D efforts of individual countries and hence global provisions of knowledge 
(public goods) that favor innovation across countries; (2) Enhanced innovative efforts under 
international R&D coordination facilitate accumulation of knowledge assets, which stimulate 
higher potentials of economic growth and carbon savings in all participating countries; (3) 
Multilateral R&D coordination (international technology-oriented agreements) can synergize 
with conventional emission-based climate agreements to help lower climate compliance 
costs, hence raising the participation incentives of major carbon emitting countries and the 
environmental effectiveness of their collective efforts in global climate mitigation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Motivation 
The threat of climate change, potentially caused by the growing atmospheric buildup of 
greenhouse gases (CHG), has led to an increasing number of numerical models for climate 
policy analysis. Numerous modeling studies have shown the sensitivity of the projections of 
climate mitigation cost and benefit to assumptions about technology, with the treatment of 
technical change (TC) being a key determinant of the simulation results in terms of the likely 
timing and cost of carbon abatement (Carrara and Siniscaico, 1994; Grubb, 1997; Carrara, 
1998; Grtibler and Messner, 1998; Grtibler et al., 1999; EMF, 2004; Gillingham et al., 2008). 
Generally, TC can be understood as an alteration in the character of production activity 
to enable more outputs to be produced with the same quantities of inputs through the 
process of invention, innovation, and diffusion of technologies. However, the complex 
mechanisms underlying this process are not appropriately captured in climate policy 
modeling framework, creating difficulties to determine the effect of emission control policies 
that is inevitably intertwined with technologies used in energy systems and the broader 
economy (Nordhaus, 2002; Sue Wing, 2006; Gillingham et al., 2008). 
To incorporate the mechanism of TC into climate policy models, endogenous treatments 
choose specifying a feedback mechanism by which climate mitigation policies can induce TC 
biased toward carbon saving. This feedback may occur through the channels such as changes 
in the relative prices of inputs, research and development (R&D), and learning through 
production experience accumulation (learning-by-doing). This contrasts with exogenous 
treatments on the rate and bias of TC, which are unresponsive to the impact of climate policy 
regulations (Loschel, 2002; Gillingham et al., 2008). 
While existing climate policy models have contributed to representing TC via various 
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endogenous channels, their specifications tend to diverge with little consensus on the 
process of innovation. The main reason for this divergence is perhaps a lack of deep 
understanding of the mechanism of endogenous TC for climate mitigation. Therefore, the 
goal of the first paper is to elucidate, in a conceptual framework, how emission control 
policies induce TC, and how these in turn influence the economic costs of emissions controls. 
By doing that, I aim to reconcile the disparate efforts of modeling TC in the existing literature, 
and provide methodological guidance to modelers who are looking to either incorporate 
endogenous TC or refine existing TC specification in climate policy modeling. 
While providing intuitions to understand the process of endogenous TC in climate 
mitigation, the simple analytical framework presented in the first paper is not well suited to 
quantitatively examine the endogenous TC and its effect on the cost and benefit of carbon 
emissions abatement. Since carbon abatement policies not only generate direct adjustments 
within energy markets, but also induce indirect general equilibrium effects on other markets 
which in turn have subsequent feedback effects on energy markets and the overall economy, 
a realistic climate policy model should feature a general equilibrium framework explicitly 
considering the price-dependent interactions between energy system and the rest of the 
economy. The method that serves this purpose is called a Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model. In the spirit qf the Arrow - Debreu model that captures the interactions of 
microeconomic agents in a decentralized market, the CGE models have become a standard 
tool for analyzing the economy-wide impact of climate mitigation policies (Goulder and 
Schneider, 1999; Sue Wing, 2001, 2003; Otto et al., 2008; Loschel and Otto, 2009). 
In this context, the second paper is motivated to incorporate the mechanism of 
endogenous TC into a numerical CGE model, so that the effect of endogenous TC on the cost 
and benefit of emission abatement policies can be quantitatively examined. In particular, the 
focus of my investigation is on the effectiveness of China's technological innovation to curb 
its carbon emissions. This is primarily because China has become the world's largest carbon 
emitter, and its emission levels will continue t_o rise rapidly in line with its industrialization 
and urbanization. If the goal of global climate stabilization is to be achieved, China's carbon 
emission levels should be stabilized, which necessitates massive reductions in uses of energy 
commodities through raising the costs of fossil energy inputs. This implies potentially high 
economic costs in adjustment to the shock of emission control policies, so the extent to which 
R&D investment and technology innovation can be induced is critical to the economic costs 
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of complying with climate commitment. 
While indigenous innovative efforts are critical to domestic technology development 
and carbon savings, foreign technology diffusion also plays an important role to complement 
indigenous R&D in accelerating low-carbon innovation. This is particularly relevant to China 
in the current context of globalization. China's integration into the world economy through 
trade, FDI, human capital mobility, and technology cooperation provides various channels of 
foreign knowledge diffusion to favor domestic innovation, which further creates significant 
opportunities for improving China's environmental performance. 
More importantly, with the issue of international technology transfer placed high upon 
climate negotiation agenda (IPCC, 2000), there is a pressing need in our research community 
to investigate the scope, potential, and method of international technology diffusion for 
low-carbon innovation (Grubb et al., 2002; Philibert, 2004; Popp, 2006a). Modeling 
international technology diffusion thus becomes a fruitful avenue for future climate policy 
analysis (Popp, 2006a; Gillingham et al., 2008; Popp, 2009; Popp et al., 2010b). 
Therefore, the third paper is motivated to advance the existing studies that only model 
indigenous innovation within a closed economy. It extends the single-country model into a 
multi-region global framework, where the mechanism of international technology diffusion 
is incorporated. Based on this extended framework, the potential of international technology 
diffusion to complement domestic innovation for climate mitigation can be quantitatively 
examined. 
Building on the multi-region global model developed in the third paper, the final paper 
aims to articulate the positive technology externality resulting from cross-country reciprocal 
technology diffusion, and explore the mechanism of international technology coordination 
for global climate governance. Such an attempt is particularly important, because current 
climate regimes that solely rely on international emission-based agreements (e.g., the Kyoto 
Protocol) become increasingly flawed, it is necessary to consider whether international 
technology cooperation can complement the conventional emission-based agreement for 
lowering climate compliance costs in the post-2012 climate architecture (Aldy et al. , 2003; 
Barrett, 2003; Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Newell, 2008). 
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1.2 Thesis Structure 
With the aim of studying endogenous TC in climate policy analysis, the thesis is organized 
as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a conceptual framework of analyzing the mechanism through which 
TC can be induced by climate mitigation policies. 
Chapter 3 incorporates the mechanism of endogenous TC into a CGE numerical model, 
based on which the effect of China's indigenous R&D and technological innovation on the 
cost and benefit of carbon emissions abatement is quantitatively examined. 
Chapter 4 extends the single-country model into a multi-region global framework which 
fully describes international technology diffusion through various channels in the context of 
globalization. This extended model is then employed to analyze the effect of foreign 
knowledge inflows on China's technology innovation and domestic carbon savings. 
Chapter 5 investigates how international technology cooperation works to internalize 
the reciprocal technology externality in global climate governance, both analytically and 
numerically, with an emphasis on whether international R&D coordination can be harnessed 
to synergize with traditional emission-based agreement for lowering climate compliance 
costs . 
Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the main findings concerning the endogenous TC 
in climate policy analysis, and discussing future work to be undertaken. 
13 
Chapter 2 
Revisiting the Mechanism of Endogenous Technical 
Change for Climate Policy Analysis 
Abstract: Numerous climate policy studies that model endogenous technical change (TC) 
have emerged in the literature, but their endogenous specifications tend to diverge with little 
consensus on the underlying process of innovation and TC. To reconcile disparate modeling 
methods, this paper revisits the mechanism of endogenous TC in climate policy analysis by 
developing a conceptual framework that captures three endogenous processes: R&D 
inducement, knowledge creation, and production TC. I also provide methodological 
implications on how to incorporate this mechanism into a multi-sector computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, particularly the treatment of cross-sector knowledge spillovers 
and R&D crowding-out. Building on this generalized conceptual framework, climate policy 
modeling that seeks to incorporate endogenous TC can hopefully be supported in future 
studies. 
Keywords: Endogenous Technical Change; R&D; Climate Policy Model 
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2.1 Introduction 
One of the important yet complex questions in modelling climate policy is the appropriate 
treatment of technical change (TC). The approach used in modeling TC is a key determinant 
of the results of climate policy analysis, particularly the likely timing of carbon abatement 
and associated cost and benefit. Generally, TC can be understood as an alteration in the 
character of productive activity to enable more outputs to be produced with the same 
quantities of inputs through the process of invention, innovation and diffusion of new 
technologies (Nordhaus, 2002; Sue Wing, 2006; Gillingham et al., 2008) . Unfortunately, the 
underlying complex mechanisms are not readily captured in the existing modeling studies, 
creating difficulties to comprehend the potential role of TC in climate change mitigations. 
Until recently, the widespread methods of modeling TC in climate policy analysis were 
to consider it as an exogenous variable. A simple approach is to assume a Hicks-neutral 
productivity growth that governs the overall rate of TC, but this method fails to capture TC 
that is potentially directed towards energy savings. An easy modification that reflects an 
energy-saving bias of TC is to include autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI) 
parameters that govern changes in energy use efficiency as a function of time horizon (e.g., 
Nordhaus, 1994; Bohringer, 1998; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999; MacCracken et al., 1999). 
This approach, however, is also challenged for the AEEI parameters not being "deep" 
structural with its unresponsiveness to climate policy intervention. 
Development of alternative treatment of exogenous TC has been driven by the demand 
for normative analysis of climate technology strategies that should appropriately consider 
TC. This necessarily requires the basic positive questions to be answered unequivocally: 
what induces innovation and technological progress, and which endogenous processes are 
involved in the process of TC (Loschel, 2002; Sue Wing, 2003; Clarke et al., 2008; Gillingham 
et al., 2008). Only by comprehending the underlying mechanism of TC, numerical modeling 
studies can ensure a mature treatment of endogenous TC in statements about the likely 
timing and cost of carbon abatement. 
Generally, there is a wide literature acknowledging that TC is a complex process that 
does not just depend on the passage of time. This view has motivated considerable works on 
modeling the feedback mechanism through which the rate and bias of TC are affected by a 
15 
variety of factors - current and expected energy price, R&D, or learning through production 
experience accumulation (Arrow, 1962; Newell et al., 1999; Azar and Dowlatabadi, 1999; 
Grubb et al., 2002; Jaffe et al., 2003; Bahn and Kypreos, 2003; Manne and Barreto, 2004). 
A relatively straightforward method is direct price-induced TC, which suggests that 
changes in the relative prices of production inputs would induce TC that lowers the use of 
factors that become relatively expensive - the induced innovation hypothesis (Hicks, 1932). 
In explicit, this approach captures this phenomenon by specifying a production function in 
which factor inputs are augmented by technical coefficients.1 As Fig. 2.l(a) illustrates, a 
unique final good Y is assumed to be made by combining carbon-intensive "dirty" input D 
with carbon-free "clean" input C. The AEEI method treats TC by specifying (exogenously) 
input-augmentation coefficients as an autonomous function of time. In contrast, the method 
of price-induced TC specifies (semi-endogenously) input-augmentation coefficients as ad hoc 
functions of changes in the relative prices of inputs, reflecting the TC directed at lowering 
the uses of "dirty" inputs that become relatively expensive under emissions control policies 
(Jacoby et al., 2003; Jackman et al., 2004; McFarland et al., 2004). 
The direct price-induced TC does have merit as a partial expTanation: higher prices of 
fossil energy would induce a shift to energy-efficient technological alternatives that use less 
fossil fuel. However, like the AEEI, it is still challenged for not being a "deep" . structural 
formulation. From a perspective of microeconomic foundation, TC per se is a reconfiguration 
of production factors as an outcome of applying new knowledge in production (Caulder and 
Schneider, 1999; Sue Wing, 2001). The energy-saving effect of raising fossil fuel price is not 
directly on· technology, but on stimulating the innovative incentives of private firms to create 
new knowledge. Accordingly, the price-induced TC still fails to unveil the black box of 
technology, obscuring some important details of the underlying mechanism by which 
emission control policies induce TC. Meanwhile, the lack of empirical foundation for the ad 
hoc functional forms of price-induced input augmentation also stifles its wide application, 
and it has been passed over to the next-generation method: R&D-induced TC. 
1 The consequence of is that the physical quantities of production inputs remain unchanged, but 
the efficiency of input use cause its contribution to alter according to the value of augmentation 
factors, giving rise to different levels of output. 
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Figure 2.1: Exogenous and endogenous methods of representing technical change (TC) in climate policy models: 
Y(t ) "" Q(oc(t)C(t) , 1,>o(t) IJ(t)) 
Production 
Technical change 
L.-------
(a) 
Carbon 
-Abatement 
Y(l ) .-. Q(r.rc(l )C(t ), c1o{t)D(i}) 
wi r.h 6;(1) = 1/J(pc(l),pr., (t)) i EC, D 
Direct price-ind uced TC: changes in input-
augmentation coefficients as a function of 
relative prices of inputs 
Energy Price 
Changes 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-------' 
Production 
Technical Change 
(C) 
Emission 
Reduction 
Knowledge 
Creation 
(b) 
Carbon 
Abatement 
(B) R&D 
Inducement 
Energy Price 
Changes 
(A) 
Note: (a) Exogenous methods of AEEI and direct price-induced TC. A unique final good Y is produced by combining" clean" 
input C and "dirty" input D. TC is represented by changes in input-augmentation coefficients ac,aD as a function of either 
time tor input prices Pc, PD. Both exogenous (or semi-endogenous) methods treat the mechanism of TC as a black box; (b) A 
process-based representation of the endogenous TC mechanism based on the endogenous economic growth theory. 
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The method of R&D-induced TC has theoretical origins in the second-generation 
endogenous growth literature, which demonstrates the link between R&D and technology 
progress (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Acemoglu, 
2002; Heutel and Fischer, 2013). Along this direction, this is a growing trend in climate policy 
modeling that represents technology using the method of R&D-induced TC (Goulder and 
Schneider, 1999; Nordhaus, 2002; Buonanno et al., 2003; Popp, 2004; Sue Wing, 2006; Loschel 
and Otto, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2009; Jin, 2012). It is also recognized that the method of 
R&D-induced TC appears better suited to the top-down modeling framework that includes 
Ramsey growth model and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. 
Economic dynamics in the Ramsey growth model are characterized by a social planner 
who chooses the levels of R&D investment for knowledge accumulation in an aggregate 
production function. 2 In contrast, the disaggregated CGE structure endogenously represents 
TC by explicitly considering R&D investment and knowledge creation at the sector level, 
which facilitates a faithful representation of the unique characteristic of knowledge including 
intersectoral knowledge spillovers and R&D crowding-out. Although there exist numerous 
CGE modeling that analyze the effect of R&D-induced TC (e.g., Goulder and Schenider, 1999; 
--
Sue Wing, 2003; Otto et al., 2008; Loschel and Otto, 2009), model assumptions and 
specifications of the innovation proces·s vary substantially among these studies, leading to 
diverging conclusions about the effect of endogenous TC on climate mitigation. 
In sum, there is a growing trend in climate policy modeling that uses the R&D-induced 
TC to represent the innovation process, but their specifications tend to diverge with little 
consensus. Therefore, our motivation is to revisit the underlying mechanism through which 
TC can be induced by climate mitigation policies. By doing that, I aim to help reconcile the 
disparate efforts of modeling TC, and provide methodological guidance to modelers looking 
to either incorporate endogenous TC or refine the existing TC specification in climate policy 
modeling. 
2 Examples of the Ramsey growth model include ETC-DICE (Buonanno et al., 2003), R&DICE 
(Nordhaus, 2002), ENTICE (Popp, 2004), and WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2007). As an extension, some 
theoretical studies represent endogenous TC by increases in the variety of intermediate goods 
through R&D (van Zon and Yetkiner, 2003), or by improvement in the quality of intermediate 
goods through R&D (Smulders and de Nooij, 2003). Acemoglu (2009) presents a theory of 
directed TC towards clean technologies. However, these theoretical models with an abstract 
representation of the variety and quality of intermediate goods are not well-suited to the 
real-world technology that most numerical models attempt to specify. 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents a conceptual framework of 
endogenous TC in the context of climate mitigation, with an emphasis on three consecutive 
processes: R&D inducement, knowledge creation, and production TC. Section 2.3 provides 
methodological implications on how to incorporate the endogenous TC mechanism into a 
multi-sector CGE modeling framework. Section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework of Endogenous TC 
In the spirit of Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Sue Wing (2001), the conceptual basis of 
modeling endogenous TC is to treat technology as an accumulated stock of economically 
useful knowledge, which is augmented by R&D investment in the process of innovation. The 
created knowledge capital is then applied in the production process together with tangible 
physical inputs (e.g., labor, physical capital), which induces a reconfiguration of production 
factors for production TC. 
To elaborate this intuition, I formulate a process-based representation of the mechanism 
by which climate policies induce TC. As illustrated in Fig. 2.1 (b), capping or taxing carbon 
emissions raise the cost of fossil energy inputs, and the signal of higher energy price not only 
generates substitution among production inputs in a traditional manner, but also induces 
private firms to undertake innovative activities in the form of R&D investment (Process A). 
As an outcome, knowledge stock is augmented by the purposeful R&D investment (Process 
B). Finally, the accumulated knowledge capital is applied in a production process for 
technical upgrading, with an outcome of shifting out production possibility frontier and 
substituting knowledge for costly energy inputs (Process C). 
The .remainder of this section provides a detailed exposition on the three consecutive 
endogenous processes, including: (a) Why increases in fossil energy price induce private 
firms' incentives of R&D investment; (b) How knowledge is created as an outcome of R&D 
investment; and (c) What's the effect of applying knowledge on production TC. 
2.2.1 Inducement of R&D 
Before turning to the formal analysis of R&D incentives, it is necessary to distinguish the 
driving forces of innovation between scientific breakthroughs and economic incentives. 
From a "science-driven" perspective, macro-level innovations are mainly driven by the 
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exogenous breakthrough of scientific and engineering knowledge in a particular field, with 
an emphasis on the autonomous progress taking place as scientists build on each other's 
work, rather than the opportunities of profit. In contrast most economists believe that 
economic profitability plays a more important role in stimulating technological innovation. 
At the micro levet in hundreds of cases the stimulus of innovation was the recognition of a 
costly problem to be solved or a potentially profitable opportunity to be seized. Since our 
purpose is to endogenize the innovation process in the economic context, I hence model TC 
as a consequence of purposeful economic activities by profit-seeking firms. 
Drawing on the intuitions from Acemoglu (2009), I introduce an analytical framework 
that investigates the inventive response of private firms to fossil energy price increase in the 
Process A. Consider that in a partial equilibrium environment, there are a large number of 
competitive firms in an industrial sector, with access to an existing technology that enables 
firms to produce output at marginal cost, MC>O. The demand side of this industry is 
modeled with a downward-sloping demand curve, D= D(P), where P is the product price 
and D is the market sale at that price. Assume that the demand function is strictly decreasing, 
continuously differentiable and satisfies the following conditions: 
D(MC) > O, so = dD(P)/ D(P) 
dP/P 
P -D' (P) > l 
D(P) 
(2.1) 
where the first term in Eq. (2.1) describes that there is a positive demand when prices equal 
to the marginal cost, and the second requires that the price elasticity of demand So is 
greater than unity which ensures the existence of a well-defined monopoly pricing rule. 
Since there is a large number of competitive firms with the same level of technology, one 
of these firms in this industry, say fir~ i, should charge a price that equals the marginal cost, 
E = MC in the equilibrium without innovation. Thus regardless of its product sale, the profit 
of the firm i in this equilibrium will be zero, IL = Di . (E - MC)= 0. 
Now turn to analyze the incentives of this firm to undertake innovation for profit gains. 
Suppose that this firm has access to R&D activities for product innovation. It innovates by 
reducing the marginal cost of production from MC to J.. -MC by a factor A. = A.(Rit once it 
spends a R&D cost Ri > 0. The marginal cost reduction factor is a function of R&D 
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investment, which satisfies the following conditions: 
cU(Ri)/ l(Ri ) _ 
dRi / Ri 
(2.2) 
where the first term in Eq. (2.2) expresses decline in the marginal cost of production A as 
an outcome of R&D expenditure Ri . The second defines the R&D elasticity of innovation 
success SR (R, ) that indicates the uncertainty associated with research activities. That is, a 
higher value of SR (R.) implies a higher probability of innovation success, where the 
marginal cost of production is more likely to decline once private firms invest in R&D.3 
Consider that intellectual property protection (patenting systems) exists to ensure the 
excludability of innovation, thus the innovator will enjoy ex post monopoly power after 
innovation success. In other words, if individual firm i undertakes a successful innovation 
and has better technology than other firms, the ex post monopoly power will enable this firm 
to earn monopoly profits as, n =D(F1 )·(F1 - l -MC)-R. Maximization of this profit yields the 
standard monopolistic pricing rule as follows:4 
(2.3) 
where the monopoly price charged by the innovating firm is a constant markup over the 
reduced marginal cost l-MC. Assume that the innovation is drastic with a sufficiently low 
value of A, so that the firm can set an unconstrained monopoly price P, < MC and capture 
the entire market. Given the condition of so > 1, the monopoly price charged by the 
innovating firm is higher than the marginal cost of production P, > A.Mc , creating positive 
sales revenue D(PJ- (E - A-MC) > O. In that case, the sales revenue is likely to exceed R&D 
expenditure R,, creating a positive profit gain TL > o. As compared with zero profit in the 
equilibrium without innovation, the firm has an incentive of undertaking R&D. 
3 A normal distribution SR - N (J,i ,a2 ) can be used to represent the uncertain innovation. The 
lower bound SR _, o means R&D failure: no response of innovation success (marginal cost 
reduction) to R&D investment. The upper bound SR _, 00 means technological breakthrough: a 
drastic cost decline as an outcome of R&D expenditure. The central value SR = fl represents the 
average efficiency of R&D in a deterministic case. 
4 First order condition of profit maximization yields D' (R )-(R - A- MC)+ D(R) = O, from which the 
monopolistic pricing rule can be derived. 
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If there are positive R&D expenditures, the free entry condition (FEC) of research can be 
used to pin down the sector-wide R&D investment in equilibrium as follows: 
R = D(P)-(P-l-MC) = <I>(D,P,l,MC) (2.4) 
where the equilibrium level of R&D investment R is expressed as a reduced-form implicit 
function, with four arguments: market price P, market demand D, marginal cost reduction 
factor A, and the marginal cost of production MC. Given that climate mitigation policies 
raise the price of fossil energy PE, its effect to induce R&D investment can be characterized 
through the following expression:5 
(2.5) 
(1) (2) (3) 
where in a partial equilibrium environment, the inducement effect of climate mitigation 
policies on R&D investment depends on the interactions of four factors: 
1) Input cost effect (first term): Carbon taxation, by raising fossil--energy price, imposes a 
higher marginal cost of production, 8MC/8PE > 0. As the production cost increases, the 
profit-seeking firm faces a reduction in profit and hence shrinking resources available for 
R&D investment, 00>/8MC < 0 - the negative effect on R&D inducement. 
2) Output price effect (second term) : Higher marginal cost of production incurred by carbon 
taxation would translate into a higher monopoly pricing charged by the innovator, 
8P/8PE > 0. As the price of its produced product rises, the innovating firm can gain more 
sales revenues and profits, creating more resource available for R&D investment, 
8<t>/8P > 0 - the positive effect on R&D inducement. 
3) Market demand effect (third term): Due to a downward-sloping demand structure, the 
higher charged price is accompanied by a falling market demand, 8D/8P < 0. As the 
market size shrinks, product sales revenues and profits decline, precipitating a reduction 
in resources for R&D investment, 8<P/8D > 0 - the negative effect on R&D inducement.6 
5 For the derivation from Eq. (2.4) to Eq. (2.5), see Appendix 2.A. 
6 Market demand effect, combined with the following innovation risk effect, provides an 
explanation to the traditional "technology-push/market-pull" interaction in the process of 
innovation (e.g., Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Jaffe et al., 2005; Taylor, 2008) 
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4) Innovation uncertainty effect (fourth term): A higher value of SR implies a higher 
probability of innovation success, where the marginal cost of production is more likely to 
decline as an outcome of R&D. Once the production cost falls, the firm can gain more 
profits and hence the resources available for R&D, 8<P/8A < 0 - the positive effect on 
R&D inducement.7 
2.2.2 Knowledge Generation 
Upon understanding the inducement of R&D in the process (A), the next issue is to examine 
how the induced R&D investment augments the stock of knowledge capital - the process (B). 
In general, the knowledge creation process can be characterized as the R&D investment 
augments the knowledge stock according to a perpetual inventory assumption. However, to 
put this intuition into a specific modeling framework, I need to make an assumption about 
the characteristics of knowledge spillovers, which involves a methodological taxonomy as: 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
where Eq. (2.6) describes the process of knowledge creation without cross-sector R&D 
spillovers, where the knowledge stock specific to an individual sector a is augmented by 
sector-specific purposeful R&D investment R i. This specification assumes that knowledge 
created by R&D is an asset with heterogeneous characters across sectors, so the knowledge 
created in different sectors is completely different entities that are not mobile across sectors 
(no R&D spillover). This is implied by the excludability of innovation: The innovating firm 
can completely appropriate the benefit from creating a better technology. 
In contrast, Eq. (2.7) represents the process of knowledge creation with cross-sector R&D 
spillovers, where the knowledge stock specific to an individual sector a is augmented by 
economy-wide R&D investment R ~ :Z:::: i Ri. This treatment assumes that knowledge created 
7 Climate economists recently began to investigate the role of uncertainty in modeling TC. For a 
survey, see Baker and Shittu (2008). For the studies on the effect of uncertainty on technological 
innovation and climate policy design, see Basetti and Tavoni (2009), Blanford (2009), Held et al. 
(2009). For using an expert elicitation method to quantify the relationship between R&D cost and 
innovation success, see Baker et al. (2009). 
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by R&D is a publicly accessible good with homogenous characteristics across sectors, so the 
knowledge created in one sector are general-purpose that can freely spill over to other 
sectors. This is implied by the non-rivalry of knowledge: the general-purpose knowledge is 
characterized by its potential for pervasive use in a wide range of sectors, with spillovers and 
wide applicability as its general attribute (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Helpman, 1998; 
Clarke et al., 2006). s 
Basically, these two alternative specifications represent different views about the 
characteristics of knowledge: the excludability of innovation vis-a-vis the non-rivalry of ideas. 
On the one hand, specification of Eq. (2.6) tends to reflect the heterogeneity of sector-specific 
knowledge - the "economics" property of knowledge. That is, technology innovation in an 
economic setting is largely an economic behavior which, like other economic activities, takes 
place for the purpose of pursuing profitability. To design new "blueprints" and appropriate 
resulting economic benefits, profit-seeking firms will spontaneously create tacit and specific 
knowledge that is largely distinct and excludable to its competitors. On the other hand, the 
specification of Eq. (2.7) suggests the wide applicability of general-purpose knowledge - the 
"science" property of knowledge. That is, given that the non-rivalry and spillovers are the 
general attributes of basic scientific knowledge, the general-purpose knowledge embodied in 
the invented "blueprints" can be re-used directly in different contexts. 
With a view of science, it is appropriate to think of the non-excludability as the general 
attributes of knowledge - the inventor of a new "blueprint" can't prevent others from 
enjoying the benefits of this idea (the positive externality of knowledge spillover). But in an 
economic sense, it is more plausible to think of the idea as an economically useful knowledge 
that is largely excludable to competitors. That's because while the ideas by their nature may 
be freely accessible, intellectual property protection (patenting system) in the real-world 
economy is present to ensure the de facto excludability of innovation. In this case, the 
developed technologies should be specific to the needs and competencies of innovating 
sectors, and the knowledge created in one field of specialization tend to be poor substitutes 
for those in other - the sector-specific characteristic of economic knowledge. 
Therefore, to combine the best features of both alternative specifications, I highlight the 
8 In explicit, knowledge is characterized as non-rival in the sense that the marginal costs for 
additional users are negligible. Intangible knowledge distinguishes from tangible physical factors 
input like physical capital that is fully rival and appropriable (Romer, 1990; Rosenberg, 1994). 
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central role of sector-specific purposeful R&D as well as the potential complement of 
external knowledge spillover from other sectors in the process of knowledge creation. A 
consistent framework can be formulated as follows: 
H (t + 1) = Ri (t) + yi ·( 8-I:;,,,j Ri(t)) + (1 -6)· H(t) (2.8) 
where Eq. (2.8) is an innovation possibility frontier (IPF) that describes the process of 
knowledge creation. That is, for any given sector i, the accumulation of its knowledge stock 
a is primarily driven by sector-specific purposeful R&D R; . Knowledge spillovers 
resulting from R&D in other sectors L;.,, j R; also contribute to knowledge accumulation in 
sector i. 6 is the depreciation rate of knowledge obsolescence. Yi is a fraction of 
knowledge in the public domain that can be assimilated by sector i, representing the sector's 
knowledge absorptive capacity. The degree to which knowledge created by one sector may 
spill over to the public pool accessible to other sectors is governed by 8, which denotes the 
externality of intersectoral R&D spillovers in the imperfect innovation market.9 
The additive formulation of IPF implies that external R&D spillovers, corrected by local 
knowledge absorptive capacity, are a perfect substitute for in-house R&D. In particular, 
sector-specific purposeful R&D reflects the "no free rider" assumption: to gain economic 
benefits of innovation, firms should commit to undertake own R&D efforts and not free ride 
on external knowledge spillovers. Meanwhile, intersectoral R&D spillover reflects the 
"public good share" assumption: any sector can benefit from the positive externality of 
knowledge . spillovers from innovation in other sectors through sectoral linkages along the 
supply chains (Popp, 2006; Clarke et al., 2008). 
9 The value of 8 is determined by patent policy. A value of one means that the benefits of 
research can fully spill over to a public pool that is potentially available to all other sectors. A 
value of zero means that the benefits of research are exclusively appropriated by the innovating 
sector that undertakes research. 
25 
Tier 1 
I 
I 
~i-
' Tier2 
I 
I 
_ _:t_ 
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Note: (a) two-tier KLEM-H nested production technology used in conventional 
non-energy sectors, where knowledge H is used to combine with physical input 
composite Q. (b) two-tier KLM-EH nested production technology used in energy 
generation sectors, where knowledge H is used to combine with fossil energy E. 
2.2.3 Production Technical Change 
Upon understanding the process of knowledge creation, the next issue is to examine what's 
the effect of knowledge application on production TC. In nature, TC is a reconfiguration of 
production factors as an outcome of applying knowledge in production. Hence, an explicit 
representation of knowledge as a production input can give insights into its effect on TC.10 
Consider a simple KLEM-H two-tier nested CES production technology.11 As Fig. 2.2(a) 
shows, for a given sector i producing output Yi, knowledge capital H; substitutes for a 
composite· of physical inputs Q , with the first-tier substitution parameter af . The 
composite Q is in turn made up of physical capital X iK , labor X iL , energy X iE , and 
10 The literature models the effect of knowledge application on TC through three routes: a direct 
impact on the carbon emission intensity (Nordhaus, 2002; Buonanno et al., 2003); a reduction in 
the mitigation cost function (Goulder and Mathai, 2000); knowledge substitution for physical 
inputs (Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Sue Wing, 2003; Popp, 2004). 
11 The KLEM-H production technology is commonly used in a CG modeling framework that 
explicitly represents multiple disaggregated physical inputs, where knowledge is treated as a 
general-purpose input combining with multiple physical inputs in production (Goulder and 
Schneider (1999), Sue Wing (2003), Otto et al. (2008), 
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material x ,M, with the second-tier substitution parameter a~: 
l/a; (2.9) 
Q i =A;- ~ aii· X/ 
j= K,L,E,M 
consider that, private firms are induced to shift the technology alternative by applying new 
knowledge in production, the input of knowledge into in the production technology would 
increase H > H. To characterize the effect of knowledge application on the rate and bias of 
production TC, I decompose the TC into a Hicks-neutral productivity progress and changes 
in technical coefficients of production inputs as follows:12 
_ [ 1 - a']l/a; - [ 1 1 ]1/a; Yi =Af. aiQ 0 Q t 1 + aiH-Hi. = Af- CliQ"Qja, +aiH 0 H t 1 
with (2.10) 
where in the case of applying new knowledge in production H > H , there is an increase in 
the Hicks-neutral productivity parameter Al > A;, implying an outward shift of production 
possibility frontier and factor productivity growth (the rate of production TC). Meanwhile, 
there is also a uniform reduction in the technical coefficient of each physical input C!ij < aii 
(j = K, L, E, M) and a rise in the technical coefficient of knowledge aiH > aiH . 13 It suggests a 
decline in the cost share of physical inputs and a rise of knowledge (the bias of production 
12 For the details of decomposition of TC, see Appendix 2.B. 
13 Knowledge and physical inputs are gross substitutes with an elasticity of substitution sf > 1, 
which translates into the CES substitution parameter a;= (s; -1)/s; > O, we hence have CTiQ < a;Q. 
Given that the cost share of each physical input at the second tier remains unchanged, a reduction 
in the cost share of physical composite at the first tier will eventually lead to a uniform reduction 
in the cost share of each physical input aii < aii (j = K , L, E, M). Using constraint on the technical 
coefficients of inputs L j llij + aiH = L j aij + a;H = 1, we have aiH > aiH given aij < aij . 
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TC). Therefore, the effect of knowledge application on TC can be characterized as knowledge 
substitution for physical inputs with a uniform saving of them. 
In general, the above conclusions hold for conventional production sectors, but it may 
not apply to fossil energy sectors. That's because creating energy-related knowledge is more 
relevant to innovation and TC in fossil energy sectors, where the energy-related knowledge 
is normally embedded in specific fossil energy to embody the purpose of energy efficiency 
improvement. This differs from the general-purpose knowledge that can be combined with 
various physical inputs as the case in conventional production sectors. Fig. 2.2(b) illustrates 
the case of fossil energy sectors, where the input of knowledge is only used to combine fossil 
energy rather than all physical inputs. This alteration enables more energy services to be 
supplied with the same quantities of physical fossil energy.14 In that case, the production 
function in Eq. (2.9) becomes a different two-tier nested CES structure as: 
1/a; 
(2.11) 
where in the first-tier KLEM combination, X iEH represents the knowledge-embodied energy 
inputs rather than physical fossil energy. At the second tier, XiEH is a CES aggregate of 
physical fossil energy Ei and energy-related knowledge g. I firstly capture the effect of 
knowledge application on the second-tier production function as: 
_ [ 2 _ a2 jl/a; - [ 2 2 ]1/a; 
XrnH = A; . am . Et' + am. }:Ii ' =A;. aiE. Et' + am. Ht' 
Af = A/· am + a"' [:J >/•C => A/ > A/ 
with 
ll;c = a;c ti r => ll;c < am (2.12) 
",n = a;n [1; r [ ::r =} ll;tt > a;tt 
14 The KLM-EH structure is mostly applied in Ramsey growth models (e.g., WITCH, DICE). For 
example, Popp, (2004) models the effective inputs of energy as a CES aggregate of fossil fuels and 
energy-related knowledge. 
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where in the case of applying new knowledge, there is a reduction in the technical coefficient 
of physical fossil energy a;E < aiE and a rise for knowledge input CliH > aili. This effect then 
transmits into the first-tier production function, raising the inputs of knowledge-embodied 
energy X iEH > XiEH. Hence, TC is characterized as changes in both Hicks-neutral parameter 
Al and technical coefficients of production inputs a;i (j = K, L, M), CliEI-I: 
l/a; 
=A;- ~ {lij · X/; + {liEH 'X rnHa; 
j= K,L ,M j= K,L ,M 
with (2.13) 
where applications of new knowledge would eventually lead to a higher total factor 
productivity Al > Al (the rate of production TC). In addition, there -is a uniform reduction in 
the cost share of capital, labor, and materials {lii < aii (j = K, L, M) and a rise for the 
knowledge-embodied energy input arnH > aiEH (the bias of production TC) . 
Therefore, it is found that knowledge application in energy sector can create total factor 
productivity growth and lower cost shares of non-energy physical inputs (e.g., capital, labor 
and materials) - the same as in conventional non-energy production sectors. The difference, 
however, lies in whether there is an energy-saving effect (a reduction in the cost share of 
physical fossil energy input). To investigate this issue, I use Eq. (2.12) and Eq. (2.13) to 
describe the cost share of fossil energy input as: 
(2.14) 
> l <l 
where the cost share of fossil energy is a product of the cost share of knowledge-embodied 
energy aiEH (at first tier) and that of physical fossil energy a rn (at second tier). As Eq. (2.14) 
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shows, the energy-saving effect of knowledge application depends on a variety of factors, 
not necessarily implying a reduction in the cost share of fossil energy input. Therefore, the 
general conclusion about the energy-saving effect of knowledge application may not always 
hold across sectors within an economy. For example, development of extraction and drilling 
technologies in oil and natural gas industries actually requires more inputs of fossil energy 
to complement the use of these new technologies, without an energy-saving effect. Therefore, 
different production technologies (e.g., how knowledge substitute for physical inputs) used 
in different sectors may generate a diverging effect on carbon savings from applying new 
technologies.1s 
Moreover, the previous analysis on TC is within a single-sector framework. However, in 
realistic models where the supply side of an economy consists of multiple sectors, TC in a 
given sector should depend on not only knowledge substitution for physical inputs within 
this sector, but also the general equilibrium effect of cross-sector knowledge interactions. 
Therefore, to faithfully represent the intersectoral knowledge interaction and its effect on TC, 
I should develop a disaggregated framework that explicitly considers multiple production 
sectors. 
2.3 Implications for Multi-sector Modeling 
So far the mechanism of endogenous TC has been analyzed in a single-sector partial 
equilibrium framework, which consists of three consecutive processes: R&D inducement, 
knowledge creation, and production TC. In this section, I aim to provide methodological 
guidance on how to incorporate these three processes into a multi-sector CGE framework. 
As shown in the area (I) in Fig. 2.3, the supply side of an economy has been extended to 
multiple disaggregated production sectors. For the representative firm in each individual 
sector, it would undertake purposeful R&D investment as an inventive response to input 
price changes in pursuit of profit maximization (microeconomic foundation of innovation). 
Hence, the decision problem facing . private firms is to optimally choose various production 
15 Some empirical studies also reach such a finding. For example, Baker et al. (2008) argue that 
different representations of technology lead to different results in terms of the effect of TC on the 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) of carbon emission. Under certain conditions it is possible for 
knowledge application to increase the MAC. van der Werf (2008) also find the evidence that 
different nesting structures of production function may generate diverging effects of TC on the 
cost of climate policies. 
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inputs for profit maximization.16 By solving the problem of profit maximization, interactions 
among the four effects associated with R&D inducement (see Section 2.2.1) can be captured. 
The induced R&D investment accumulates the stock of knowledge according to the 
innovation possibility frontier (see Section 2.2.2). In the area (II), within the disaggregated CGE 
framework that represents multi-sector economic transactions and linkage along the supply 
chains, a portion of outputs produced by conventional production sectors will be used (as 
intermediate inputs) by a R&D sector. The R&D sector then produces and supplies raw R&D 
goods to satisfy the demand for R&D good by conventional production sectors for 
knowledge accumulation.17 
In the area (III), the demand and supply interacts in the market of R&D good, which 
determines the equilibrium level of R&D resources allocated across sectors. In general, the 
crowding-out effect may occur in the R&D market, where climate mitigation policies that 
induce energy-related R&D may reduce the availability of R&D resources in other sectors of 
the economy, potentially driving down aggregate economic outputs. This implies that the 
opportunity cost of carbon abatement may be higher with the inclusion of R&D-induced TC, 
rather than presumptively leading to lower abatement costs ( e.g., Goulder and Schneider, 
--
1999; Nordhaus, 2002; Popp, 2004; Pizer and Popp, 2008). In the area (IV), the knowledge 
stock specific to each individual sector is augmented by the R&D goods invested in that 
sector, combined with the potential complement of R&D spillovers from other sectors in the 
economy (positive externality of technology spillover). 
Accordingly, the three endogenous processes of TC can be located in the Fig. 2.3. First, 
R&D inducement results from the inventive response of private firms to input price changes 
for avoiding higher cost burdens. Second, knowledge creation emanates from sector-specific 
purposeful R&D and intersectoral knowledge spillovers. Third, production TC is due to 
applications of knowledge in a production process, with an outcome of shifting out 
production possibility frontier and substituting knowledge for costly physical inputs. 
16 As compared to myopic recursive-dynamic framework (Sue Wing, 2003), an intertemporal 
model appears better suited to representing the problem of intertemporal profit maximization 
(Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Otto et al., 2008; Loschel and Otto, 2009). 
17 Provided that a portion of produced goods are consumed for R&D, this treatment reflects a 
trade-off between output production and knowledge generation, which provides an avenue to 
explore whether there is substitutability or complementarity between conventional production 
and innovation activities (Gillingham et al., 2008). 
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Figure 2.3: Incorporating the endogenous mechanism of R&D-induced TC into a 
multi-sector general equilibrium modeling framework. 
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Note: Three endogenous processes underlying TC are highlighted by red arrows. 1) R&D 
inducement results from the inventive response of private firms to input price changes in 
pursuit of economic profitability; 2) Knowledge creations are driven by sector-specific 
purposeful R&D investment and intersectoral knowledge spillovers; 3) Production TC is due 
to the applications of augmented knowledge asset in a production process. 
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2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter revisits the mechanism of endogenous TC for climate change mitigation by 
providing a conceptual framework that captures three underlying processes: R&D 
inducement, knowledge creation, and production TC. In the presence of climate mitigation 
policies that raise the cost of using fossil energy, the profit-seeking firms are induced to 
undertake innovative activities in the form of purposeful R&D, which further augments the 
stock of economically useful knowledge. Finally, the newly created knowledge is applied in 
the production process to affect the rate and bias of production TC. 
Based on this conceptual framework, I provide the methodological guidance on how to 
incorporate the three endogenous processes of TC into a multi-sector CGE framework, 
particularly the treatment of cross-sector knowledge spillovers and R&D crowding-out. 
Hopefully, our efforts in articulating the mechanism of R&D-induced TC can facilitate 
climate policy modeling that seeks to incorporate endogenous TC in future studies. 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
2.A Derivation of R&D inducement by raising fossil energy price 
For the implicit function Eq. (2.4), taking a derivative with respect to PE, I capture the 
response of R&D investment to fossil energy price changes as: 
R = D(P) -(P- .A-MC) = <1>(.A,MC,P, D) 
(2.A.1) 
8R 8<1> 8.A 8<1> 8MC 8<1> 8P 8<1> 8D 
⇒-=-·-+--·--+-·-+-·-8PE 8.A 8PE 8MC 8PE 8P 8PE 8D 8PE 
Recall that, reductions in marginal cost of production depend on R&D investment l = l (R), 
and market demand satisfies a downward-sloping curve D = D (P), I hence capture the 
responses of both variables to energy price changes PE as: 
8.A 8.A 8R 8D 8D 8P 
Substitute (2.A.2) into (2.A.1) and yield Eq. (2.5) as follows: 
aR . (i -o<I>. a.A) = o<I> . aMc + a<I>. aP + a<I>. aD 
oPE al aR aMC oPE aP oPE aD oPE 
⇒ aR -( a<I> . aMc a<I>. aP + a<I> . aD J. (l -a<I> _ al )-1 
aPE - aMc aPE + aP aA . aD oPE al aR 
- ( a<I> . aMc + a<I>. aP + a<I>. aD. aP J. (l -a<I>. al )-1 
aMc oPE aP aPE aD aP oPE al aR 
= ( o<I> . aMc + 8<1>. aP + a<I>. aD. aP )· (1 + 0<1> -~- sR)-1 
. aMc oPE aP aPE aD aP oPE al R 
■ 
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(2.A.2) 
(2.A.3) 
2.B Decomposition of produciton technical change 
~Ai a,Q·Q(.' + a., [:J H(.' l /a; 
Define the new Hicks-neutral productivity parameter as follows: 
[
- la/ 1/a; 
- 1 1 Hi 
Ai = Ai · aiQ + ail-I · Hi 
Substitute (2.B.2) into the last expression in (2.B.1) and yields: 
(2.B.1) 
(2.B.2) 
(2.B.3) 
where new technical coefficients become CliQ = aiQ · (Af/ Af ra! for physical inputs composite 
for knowledge input. 
■ 
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Chapter 3 
Can Technological Innovation Help China Take on Its 
Climate Responsibility? A Computable General 
Equilibrium Analysis* 
Abstract: This chapter examines the effectiveness of China's indigenous R&D investment 
and technological innovation to curb its carbon emissions. The mechanism of endogenous 
technical change (TC) is incorporated into an intertemporal computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model. R&D investments and knowledge creations are modeled as the endogenous 
behaviors of private firms. The accumulated stocks of knowledge are applied in the 
production process to affect the rate and bias of TC. Simulation results show that: 1) While 
indigenous R&D play a significant role to curb carbon emissions, sole dependence on R&D 
may be far from sufficient to achieve China's pledged Copenhagen climate target, with 
complementary policies required to reinforce existing private R&D efforts; 2) Innovation 
policies including public R&D subsidy and intellectual property right protection can help 
strengthen economy-wide R&D investment and reduce emissions, but this complementary 
effect is still minor and insufficient to meet the stipulated emission cuts target; 3) Carbon 
taxation can create significant carbon-saving benefits and fulfill the pledged climate target, 
but this achievement is at the cost of economic losses. The induced technical improvement, 
however, c·an partially mitigate the dead weight losses incurred by carbon tax distortion. 
Keywords: CGE Model, Endogenous Technical Change, R&D, Climate Policy, China. 
• This chapter is based on the paper published in Energy Policy as Jin, W., (2012). "Can 
technological innovation help China take on its climate responsibility? An intertemporal 
general equilibrium analysis." vol. 49, 629-641. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Since launching the "open-door" policy in the late 1970s, China has experienced a profound 
transformation from a rural agricultural-based to an urban industrial-focused society. As one 
of the fastest growing economies, China is expected to continue its growth path and overtake 
the U.S. to become the world's largest economy by 2030 (World Bank, 2011). While rapid 
economic growth has created tremendous wealth and prosperity, China's development 
pattern, with enormous resource depletion and environmental degradation, is becoming 
unsustainable, putting this country at the center of international debates on energy 
governance and climate mitigation (IEA, 2010; EIA, 2010). 
While a country's economic size generally reflects its energy demand and carbon 
emissions, China's appetite for energy and emission is unsurprisingly mammoth. During the 
period 1990-2005, China's total primary energy demand grew by 4.7% annually from 874 to 
1742 Mtoe, and its CO2 emissions grew by 5.6% per year from 2244 to 5101 Mt (IEA, 2007). In 
a global context, China had overtaken the U.S. in 2010 to become the world's largest carbon 
emitter, and its emission levels will continue to rise rapidly in line with its industrialization 
-
and urbanization (IEA, 2010; BP, 2011). Without a significant policy regulation, this growth 
trend is likely to offset climate mitigation efforts elsewhere. In the global collective efforts of 
tackling climate change, there is no disagreement that China needs to take on a growing 
responsibility of carbon abatement. 
To stabilize the rising emission trend, China would have set a daunting challenge of 
cutting its carbon intensity given a large demographic base and rapidly rising consumption 
levels (Kaya, 1990; IPCC, 2000). In the minds of the leadership in Beijing, the key to handling 
this challenge is to decouple carbon emissions from economic growth through technological 
innovation. This is true for China where the growth story, beyond global manufacturing 
engine, is increasingly about innovation. In the course of building a "harmonious society" 
through "scientific development", Beijing has begun to raise awareness of the pivotal role 
that technological innovation plays in sustaining long-term quality and sustainable growth.1 
1 This is reflected by a commitment to create an "innovation-oriented" society made by Chinese 
President Hu at the National Science and Technology Conference in January 2006, an occasion 
which also saw the unveiling of the 2006-2020 Medium to Long-term Plan for the Development of 
Science and Technology (MOST, 2006b). 
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In a changing landscape of global innovation, the emergence of innovation hubs in 
China is underpinned by the strong growth of R&D investments in indigenous innovation. 
While the U.S. and Japan remain leaders in science and technology innovation, they face 
increasing competition from emerging markets, notably China - the world's third leading 
R&D investor at $100 billion in 2010 (OECD, 2010).2 In a transition to an innovation-oriented 
society, Beijing is expected to boost future investments in indigenous innovation. This is 
reflected by the government's spending target of 2.5% of GDP on R&D by 2020, translating 
into a tripling of R&D investment over the next decade to $300 billion (MOST, 2006b). 
In a context where climate change mitigation and technological innovation are closely 
interconnected, it is vital to investigate the effectiveness of China's indigenous R&D efforts 
to achieve its carbon reduction commitment. I thus aim to address the following four issues: 
1) How substantially can R&D investment and TC reduce China's carbon emissions; 2) Can 
these emission cuts driven by R&D guarantee the achievement of Beijing's pledged climate 
target; 3) Do innovation policies like public R&D subsidies provide significant aids to 
enhance innovation and cut carbon emissions; 4) Is it necessary to introduce climate policies 
to complement innovation policy to achieve the pledged climate target. 
To handle these issues, I put the mechanism of R&D-induced TC into a multi-sector 
CGE model. The theory of R&D-induced TC has its origins in the second-generation 
endogenous growth literature, which highlights the role of R&D and knowledge in boosting 
technology progress and endogenous growth (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; 
Acemoglu, 2009a; Heutel and Fischer, 2013). In climate policy analysis, the mechanism of 
R&D-induced TC is also adopted to represent the endogenous process of TC (Nordhaus, 
2002; Popp, 2004; Sue Wing, 2006; Bosetti et al., 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2009b). In particular, 
within a CGE framework, the representation of disaggregated sectors provides a useful 
platform te examine the general equilibrium effect of intersectoral knowledge interactions, 
including cross-sector knowledge _spillover and R&D crowding-out, which have a significant 
impact ori the timing and costs of carbon abatement (Loschel, 2002; Popp, 2006; Clarke et al., 
2006, 2008; Gillingham, 2008). 
2 R&D spending in China grew by about 20% per year over the last decade. Average R&D 
investments in G7 markets, by comparison, have grown by 3.2% annually during the same period. 
R&D intensity remained flat across G7 markets over the past decade at 2.1 %. In China it has 
double as a share of GDP since 1999, reaching 1.5%, leaving room for potential improvement by 
international standards (OECD, 2008, 2010). 
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To our knowledge, few CGE studies that feature the R&D-induced TC have appeared in 
climate policy literature. Caulder and Schneider (1999) investigate the attractiveness of the 
U.S. climate policies in the presence of induced TC. Sue Wing (2003) examines the impact of 
induced TC on the U.S. macroeconomic cost of carbon taxation. Wang et al. (2009) analyze 
the role that TC could play in designing China's climate mitigation targets. Bye and Jacobsen 
(2011) scrutinize differentiated R&D subsidies across general and carbon-saving TC and its 
impacts on the Norwegian economic cost of carbon tax. Investigations of R&D-induced TC 
also include studies that model interactions between R&D subsidies and carbon constraints 
in the presence of technological externality by Otto et al. (2007), Otto et al. (2008), Otto and 
Reilly (2008), and Loschel and Otto (2009). 
As a needed complement to the existing literature, this paper contributes to advancing 
modeling methods in the following ways: 1) Instead of using recursive-dynamic modeling, I 
develop an intertemporal optimization framework for incorporating more macroeconomic 
elements into the micro-founded CGE core; 3 2) I fully represent the mechanism of 
R&D-induced TC within a multi-sector CGE structure, with special treatments on innovation 
externalities including R&D crowding-out, intersectoral knowledge-spillovers, and the dual 
faces of R&D in knowledge absorption. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a detailed description of 
modeling framework. Section 3.3 discusses model implementation, with an emphasis on 
knowledge accounting for calibrating a model with R&D-induced TC. Simulation results and 
discussions under various scenarios are presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Model Description 
3.2.1 Basic Framework 
Fossil energy is an indispensable input into every industry in the Chinese economy. A model 
3 This differs from recursive-dynamic ·models that solve for a sequence of static equilibrium in a 
Slow-Swan formulation, where capital accumulation is based on an exogenous saving rate with 
myopic expectations. In contrast, optimization models endogenize the intertemporal behavior of 
economic agents, with current decisions depending on expectation about future economic 
prospect (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1990; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 
1999; Dixon et al., 2005). As modern macroeconomic elements (e.g., expectation, assets) play an 
important role in China's market-oriented economt, intertemporal modeling frameworks that 
incorporate macroeconomic elements are more applicable to our study for China. 
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encompassing multiple industries and commodities is thus required to capture the full 
general equilibrium effect of policy shocks.4 In this model framework, the Chinese economy 
is represented by multiple economic agents, including: Twelve production sectors, an 
investment (producing physical capital goods), a R&D sector (producing R&D goods), a 
representative household, and a government. To be relevant to climate policy analysis, the 
twelve production sectors consists of five energy sectors and seven non-energy sectors.5 
Carbon emissions are calculated based on carbon intensities of fossil fuel inputs (coal, oil and 
natural gas) in intermediate production and final use. 
In the spirit of the G-Cubed model (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999),6 our modeling 
framework describes the economic behaviors of multiple agents within a general equilibrium 
structure, which outlines the input-output (IO) circular flows of commodities and primary 
factor inputs within an economy (see Fig. 3.1). There are 12 commodities and corresponding 
production sectors, indexed by the row subscript j U=l,2, ... ,12) and the column subscript i 
(i = 1,2, ... , 12); 3 types of primary factors (labor, physical capital, knowledge capital), indexed 
by the subscript f (f =L,K,H); 5 types of final uses (consumption, investment, R&D, 
government, export), indexed by the subscript d (d = C,I,R,G,X) . Intersectoral interactions 
in intermediate production transaction are represented by the j x i matrix X; Inputs of 
primary factors into production are indicated by the f xi matrix V; Final uses of produced 
commodities are represented by the jxd matrix G. 
To develop a numerical model, I describe the decision problems of economic agents and 
characterize their economic behav1or in a decentralized equilibrium. 7 To represent the 
mechanism of R&D-induced TC, I extend the traditional framework by incorporating R&D 
investment and knowledge input. This will be articulated in the following section. 
4 The multi-sector specification differs from Ramsey growth model where the supply side of an 
economy i_s represented as a single producer of unique final goods. The economic dynamics are 
captured by a social planner choosing the optimal level of inputs into an aggregate production 
function, e.g., R&DICE (Nordhaus, 2002), ENTICE (Popp, 2004), and WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2008). 
5 For the model sectoral classification and mapping by reference to the GTAP, see Appendix 3.A. 
6 The G-Cubed model introduces macroeconomic elements into micro-founded CGEframework. 
including: interactions between real and financial sides; intertemporal dynamics of physical asset; 
the neoclassical optimizing and liquidity-constrained behavior of consumers; imperfect capital 
mobility and adjustment costs; intertemporal equilibrium with rational expectation. 
7 A thorough description of the specification and characterization of the decision problem faced 
by each economic agent are provided in Appendix 3.B. 
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Figure 3.1: Input-output circular flows of commodities and primary factors 
within an economy, with an explicit representation of R&D investment (R) as a 
final use category and knowledge inputs (H) as a primary factor input 
Industries i Final Demand d Total Output 
1 i 12 C I G R X 
1 X1,1 X1,; X1,12 C 1 / 1 G 1 R 1 X 1 Y 1 
Commodities j 
j Xj,1 Xi,i Xj,12 Ci Ii Gi Ri )0 '0 
12 X12,1 X12,; X12,12 C 12 112 G 12 R 12 X 12 Y 12 
K K1 K; K 12 
Primary Factor f L L1 L; L12 
H H 1 H; H 12 
Imports M M 1 --M; M 12 
Total Outlays Y 1 Y; Y 12 
3.2.2 Endogenous Technical Change 
TC in itsel( is a reconfiguration of productive factors as an outcome of applying new 
knowledge (e.g., technique, know-how, managerial skills) into a production process, thus a 
representation of intangible knowledge asset as a production input can give insights into its 
effect on production: TC (Caulder and Schneider, 1999; Sue Wing, 2006; Bosetti et al., 2008) . 
In this direction, our model incorporates the mechanism of R&D-induced TC. That is, R&D 
investme~ts are modeled as endogenous behaviors of profit-seeking private firms, which 
augment the economically useful stock of knowledge. The accumulated stocks of knowledge 
are then applied in a production process to facilitate a reconfiguration of production inputs 
for productivity growth (the rate of production TC). Simultaneously, the use of knowledge 
inputs leads to a substitution for physical inputs such as labor, energy and materials (the bias 
of production TC). 
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Figure 3.2: KLEM-H three-tier nested CES technology in production sectors 
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To model the mechanism, we specify the production technology__as a separable KLEM-H 
nested CES function. As Fig. 3.2 shows, for any given sector i producing output Q i , 
knowledge capital H substitutes for the composite of physical inputs Zi, which is in turn 
made up of primary factor inputs of physical capital Ki and labor x iL , as well as 
intermediate inputs of energy bundle XiE and material bundle XuVI . XiE comprises five 
energy goods Xq, and xiM is composed of seven non-energy goods xtr' . Given this 
production technology, the producer problem in each individual sector i is formulated as: 
s.t. IL (t) = (1-TQ) · [P; (t) · Qi (t) - P;L(t) · x iL (t) - (1 + Tc )· HE(t)· XiE (t) - PiM (t) · XuV! (t)] 
-(1 - r r)· Pu(t)· L(t)-(1-rR)· PiR (t)· Ri (t) 
r< (t) = Ji (t) - oK. Ki (t) 
t(t)=cpi [L(t),Ki(t)]=Ji(t)- 11+ 1P. L(t) I 
2 Ki(t) 
43 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
where the firm's objective is to optimally choose the inputs of labor X;L , energy X;E, 
material X ;,v1 , physical investment L and R&D investment Ri to maximize an 
intertemporal profit stream Vi, subject to the technology constraints. In Eq. (3.1), ~ is 
formulated as a discounted present value of future profit streams from time t to an infinite 
future, with real interest rate r as discounting factor. In Eq. (3.2), current profit flow IL 
equals output revenues minus input costs, with TQ , Tc , Tr , TR being corporate income tax, 
carbon tax on fossil energy inputs, investment tax credit and R&D tax credit, respectively. 
Eq. (3.3) specifies the law of motion of physical capital stock K, its accumulation 
depends on fixed capital investment L and the rate of capital depreciation 8K. Following 
the model of investment adjustment cost (e.g., Lucas, 1967; Treadway, 1969; Goulder and 
Schneider, 1999; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999), Eq. (3.4) models the investment process that 
is subject to imperfect capital mobility and rising marginal costs of capital installation. That 
is, in order to install J; unit of capital, a firm must buy a larger amount of investment goods 
L that depends on the rate of investment J./K; and adjustment cost coefficient 1P. 
Eq. (3.5) is the innovation possibility frontier (IPF) that describes the process of knowledge 
--
creation, where the accumulation of sector-specific knowledge stock }{ depends on R&D 
investment Ri , existing knowledge stock H , and intersectoral R&D spillovers 
(R;/L iRi )·(8· L iRi -R;). The additive IPF specification implies that external R&D spillovers, 
corrected by local knowledge absorptive capacity, are perfect substitutes for in-house R&D.8 
f/ is knowledge creation efficiency. 8H is the depreciation rate of knowledge obsolescence. 
The conditions O <rt < l, 0 < a+~ < 1 implies diminishing returns to R&D in innovation 
(Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Popp, 2004; Bosetti et al., 2008) . 
Note t~at, the specification of the IPF highlights the technology externality generated by 
inter-industry knowledge spillovers.9 It postulates that each individual sector is exposed to 
8 In the specification of IPF, the addition between sector-specific R&D and intersectoral spillovers 
is based on the seminal work by Cohen and Levinthal (1989). For an alternative of multiplicative 
specification, see Bosetti et al. (2008). 
9 I draw on the intuitions from the seminal work of Schmookler (1966), Terleckyj (1974), Scherer 
(1982), and Griliches (1992). That is, due to the imperfect appropriability of knowledge, physical 
goods produced by individual sectors partially embody intangible knowledge created by its 
purposeful R&D investments. Other sectors, in the multi-sector economic transaction, can benefit 
from these external knowledge spillover through sectoral linkages along the supply chains - the 
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a public pool of intersectoral R&D and absorbs a fraction of this public good for building its 
in-house knowledge stock. In explicit, for any given sector i, the accessible R&D pool is 
created by the gap between sector-specific R&D and economy-wide one: B· :Z::::iRi - Ri . e 
denotes the technology externality resulting from intersectoral R&D spillovers, of which the 
value is determined by exogenous factors such as intellectual property protection system.1° 
Knowledge absorptive capacity is expressed as the ratio of sector-specific R&D relative 
to economy-wide one R/:Z::::iRi, suggesting that an individual sector's capacity of absorbing 
external knowledge depends on its indigenous R&D effort. Hence, specification in Eq. (3.5) 
suggests that indigenous R&D not only directly generates in-house know-how, but also 
enhance indigenous ability to absorb knowledge created elsewhere - the dual faces of R&D 
in knowledge creation (Nelson and Phelps 1966; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Keller, 1996). 
Note that, the specification of IPF underlines three key factors in the process of 
knowledge creation: 1) purposeful R&D investment - the "no free lunch" assumption (to 
gain the economic benefits of innovation firms should commit to undertake own R&D efforts 
and not free ride on external knowledge spillovers); 2) current st9ck of knowledge - the 
"standing on the shoulders of predecessors" assumption (the more existing stocks of 
knowledge a sector has, the easier it is to create and apply new knowledge); 3) intersectoral 
R&D spillovers - the "pubic good sharing" assumption (any sector can benefit from the 
positive technology externality resulting from knowledge spillovers from other sector). 
3.3 Model Implementation 
To calibrate and implement the theoretical model in a numerical simulation, I construct a 
consistent benchmark dataset for model calibration. First, the year 2004 IO table of China is 
collected from the GTAP 7 Data Base (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) .11 Second, I adopt 
the GTAP data to our model structure by aggregating the 57 sectors into 12, and the 5 
primary factor inputs into labor and physical capital. Finally, the 2004 IO table is scaled to 
so-called intersectoral R&D spillovers (Clark et al., 2006, 2008). 
10 A value of one means that the benefits of research can fully spill over to a public R&D pool that 
is potentially available to all other sectors. A value of zero means that the benefits of research are 
exclusively appropriated by the sector undertaking research. 
11 The original GTAP data records intermediate production flows associated with 57-by-57 
sectoss, 5 categories of primary factors (land, unskilled labor, skilled labor, capital and natural 
resources), and 4 components of final use (consumption, investment, government, and export) . 
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approximate the Chinese economy in the year 2005 (the base year of simulation) using the 
2005 growth rate of real GDP (9.1 percent). 
These aforementioned steps produce a stylized IO table of China, which records the 
input flows of multiple commodities and primary factors into intermediate production and 
final use. However, as a departure from traditional calibration, this IO table is not well suited 
to calibrate a CGE model that features the R&D-induced TC, because it does not separately 
record the economic flows associated with R&D investment and knowledge inputs. To 
transform this stylized IO data, I need to undertake knowledge accounting to capture 
intangible knowledge flows. To this I now turn. 
3.3.1 Knowledge Accounting 
In the System of National Accounts, the stylized IO table treats corporate R&D expenditures as 
the current cost of production along with intermediate inputs, implying that only a portion 
of each intermediate transaction reflects the value of pure physical flows, with the remainder 
being the value of intangible knowledge flows embodied in that intermediate transaction 
flows (BEA, 2007; SNA, 2008). 
In line with this principle, knowledge accounting can be conceptualized as follows: in a 
stylized IO table, the intangible knowledge flows matrix Q = [ widi=l,. ,n;i=l, ,n is embodied in 
the intermediate transactions matrix X = [xidi=l, ,n;i=l, ,n . The row sums of Q represent 
sector-specific R&D investment, Ri = I:; Wji , and the column sums of Q denote the 
remuneration of knowledge capitaI as primary factor inputs into production, H; = I: . w ii . 
J 
Based on the embodied technology hypothesis, the intangible knowledge flows embodied in 
the intermediate transaction can be estimated as: 12 
Ci)jl (i)ji (i)jn ~ Ci) Ri X i J1 
=} Cu·· = _JI . R (3.6) 
Xjl Xji Xjn ~x - xj JI x . J i JI J 
Embodied techno logy hypo thesis 
12 Embodied technology hypothesis claims that intangible knowledge inputs must be embodied in 
specific tangible physical materials in order to manifest their economically useful characteristics. 
The knowledge accounting technique used in our work builds on the seminal work of Terleckyj 
(1974), Scherer (1982) and Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), which used IO-based technology flow 
matrices to measure the intersectoral technology flows in an economic system. 
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where Xji is the G,i) cell of the intermediate transaction matrix X in the stylized IO table, 
representing the intersectoral transaction of intermediate inputs from sector j to i. wii is the 
intangible knowledge flows embodied in that transaction. Ri,Xi denote R&D investment 
and intermediate production specific to sector j, respectively. The embodied technology 
hypothesis claims that, for any given commodity j, the knowledge embodiment ratio wii /x ii 
is invariant across sectors ( i = 1, 2, ... , n ) in intermediate production. 
Given the available data of sector-specific R&D expenditure R i and the product sales 
shares in intermediate transaction Xji/Xi ,13 I use Eq. (3.6) to estimate intangible knowledge 
flows wii embodied in the intermediate transaction Xji, and hence capture all the entries in 
the knowledge flows matrix. Then, I vertically aggregate this knowledge flows matrix to 
create an additional row of knowledge inputs in the primary factors matrix V, with each 
element being the value of knowledge input into production sector. Finally, the knowledge 
flows matrix is horizontally aggregated to generate an additional column of R&D 
investments in the final use matrix G, with each element being the value of sector-specific 
R&D investment. This procedure hereby constructs a modified IO dataset with an explicit 
representation of R&D investments and knowledge inputs (see Fig. -3.1), based on which our 
CGE model with R&D-induced TC is calibrated. 
3.3.2 Parameterization and Solver 
The GEMPACK is used to solve the intertemporal optimization model.14 The GEMPACK 
solver requires an initial equilibrium data as the benchmark point to calibrate the model. 
From this benchmark calibration point, the solver computes deviation of economic system to 
a new policy equilibrium as a response to a particular policy shock. For an intertemporal 
dynamic 1:1odel, this benchmark equilibrium data is required to record the values of 
economic variables at each time point over the simulation periods, which is a time-series IO 
dataset (one for each time point) consistent with both intratemporal and intertemporal 
13 The sector-level R&D data are collected from the OECD ANBERD database. For our model 
sectoral mapping by reference to the OECD ANBERD sectoral classification, see Appendix 3.A. 
Product sale shares are calculated based on the intermediate transaction matrix in the available 
stylized IO table. 
14 GEMP ACK is a suite of general-purpose CGE modeling software, which is more efficient than 
CAMS to solve an intertemporal optimization model (Codsi et al., 1992; Harrison and Pearson, 
1996; Horridge and Pearson, 2011). For the GEMPACK codes of the model, see Appendix 3.C. 
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equations in the model. 
To obtain such a full time-series dataset, we collect the available initial period (base year 
2005) dataset and replicate it in future years over the period 2005-2030. Next, the Homotopy 
treatment is used to generate a non-steady-state baseline equilibrium dataset for model 
calibration.15 Based on the consistent time-series benchmark dataset and model parameters 
(see Tab. 3.1), the theoretical model can be numerically simulated by the GEMPACK. 
3.4 Results and Discussions 
3.4.1 Alternative Scenario Settings 
Recall that, I am motivated to examine the effectiveness of China's R&D investment and 
induced technology progress to curb its carbon emissions. To do that, I design and simulate 
two different scenarios, including: 1) Reference scenario: the innovative incentives are not 
factored into the decisions of private firms, with R&D investments and knowledge inputs are 
set to null in simulations. Without knowledge creation and TC, this scenario represents the 
baseline growth path; 2) R&D scenario: the mechanism of R&D-induced TC is incorporated 
into the producer problem, where R&D investment and knowledge creation are modeled as 
endogenous behaviors of profit-seeking firms. Its comparison with the reference scenario 
reflects the effect of R&D-induced TC. In Sections 3.4.3-3.4.4, I will consider additional policy 
scenarios (innovation and climate policies) and their impacts on reducing carbon emissions. 
15 Normally, the initial period is not in a steady-state (SS) equilibrium, the dataset created by 
replicating initial period data into future periods thus can't be used as a baseline to calibrate 
intertemporal equations (e.g., Eq., (3.3), Eq. (3.5)). To remedy this problem, we add a Homotopy 
term into each intertemporal equation and carry out a simulation where the Homotopy variables 
are shocked. This simulation then generates a non-SS time-series dataset that can be used a 
baseline to calibrate both intra- and inter-temporal equations in our model. The Homotopy 
treatment is automated by the TABLO program in GEMPACK. For the details, see Codsi et al. 
(1992), and Wendner (1999). 
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Table 3.1: Substitution elasticity and other parameters values 
(YQ O'z (Y E (YM (Y A (YT 
Production sectors 
Electric utility 1.0 0.8 0.2 1.0 2.8 1.0 
Gas utilities 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.2 2.8 1.0 
Petro refining 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 2.1 1.0 
Coal mining 1.0 1.7 0.2 0.5 3.0 1.0 
Crude oil & gas 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.2 5.0 1.0 
Agriculture 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.8 0.9 1.0 
Forestry 1.0 1.3 0.6 1.7 2.5 1.0 
Mineral mining 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.2 2.5 1.0 
Durable 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.2 3.0 1.0 
Non-durable 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 3.0 1.0 
Transportation 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.9 1.0 
Services 1.0 0.3 0.3 3.0 1.9 1.0 
TQ Corporate short-run profit tax rate 0.1 
l:1 Investment tax credit 0 
LR R&D tax credit 0 
l:c Carbon tax imposed on fossil fuel input 0 
a Elasticity of knowledge creation to R&D investment 0.2 
~ Elasticity of knowledge creation to existing knowledge stock 0.55 
I] Sector-wide efficiency of knowledge creation 1 
r Real interest rate 0.05 
◊K Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.05 
◊tt ' Depreciation rate of knowledge cap1tal 0.1 
lV Investment adjustment cost coefficient 4 
e Externality of intersectoral R&D spillovers 1 
a-Q: Elasticity of substitution between knowledge and physical input composite 
aZ: Elastidty of substitution among capital, labor, energy, material (KLEM) physical inputs. 
crE: Elasticity of substitution among intermediate energy goods. 
a-M: Elasticity of substitution among intermediate material goods. 
a-A : Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods varieties . 
a-T: Elasticity of output transformation between domestic and exported goods varieties. 
Note: Fm the substitution elasticity, twelve production sectors have sector-differentiated 
parameter values. For other parameters, the twelve production sectors are assumed to have 
the same parameter values in baseline simulation. 
Source: McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999); Goulder and Schneider (1999); Popp (2004); Sue 
Wing (2006); Bosetti et al. (2008); Wang et al. (2009); Narayanan and Walmsley (2008); Otto et 
al. (2008). 
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3.4.2 Impacts of R&D-induced TC 
For insights into the effect of R&D-induced TC, I simulate economic and emission growth 
paths under the two aforementioned scenarios. As Fig. 3.3(a) shows, GDP in the reference 
scenario is projected to grow by 6.3% annually from $2327 to $9650 billion dollars between 
2005 and 2030. In contrast, GDP in the R&D scenario rises by 5 folds from $2327 to $11182 
billion dollars during the same period, with an annual average growth rate of 7.6%.16 This 
suggests a stronger growth with the stimulus of R&D investment and induced innovation. 
Climate repercussions resulting from the R&D-induced TC are shown in Fig. 3.3(b) . The 
reference scenario exhibits a rising trajectory of carbon emissions that grow by 4.2% annually 
from 5100 to 13800 Mt. In comparison, carbon emissions in the R&D scenario are set to rise 
from 5100 to 12300 Mt between 2005-2030 - an average annual growth rate of 3.5%. In terms 
of percentage change, R&D-induced TC is seen to drive China's absolute emissions below its 
projected baseline levels by 8.5% in 2020 and 11.2% in 2030. As a result, cumulative emission 
cuts relative to the reference level are estimated to reach 22 gigatons over the period 
2005-2030, indicating that technological innovation has a notable effect to curb the baseline 
(no-innovation) emission levels. It is also shown that the reference ~scenario projects a path 
where China's carbon intensity is likely to fall from its 2005 level of 2.2 to a 2030 level of 1.4 
tons per thousand dollars.17 In contrast, that intensity in the R&D scenario will be cut deeper 
to 1.1 tons per thousand dollars at the end of the simulation. 
Furthermore, the multi-sector CGE framework is employed to investigate the effect of 
R&D-induced TC on emission abatement potential at the sector level. This is done by 
examining the sector-specific cumulative emission cuts relative to the reference levels . As Fig. 
3.4(a) shows, the sectors of durable manufacturing, electricity and transport accommodate 
higher abatement potential from innovation. This is because current production recipes of 
these sectors rely on intensive inputs of fossil fuels . Once R&D investment is undertaken for 
knowledge creation, production technologies in these sectors have a large room of applying 
knowledge to substitute for physical inputs. For example, R&D in the electric utility sector 
can foster development of low-carbon energy technology like wind and solar and produce 
"green" electric power, satisfying electricity demand without increasing carbon emissions. 
16 All measurements of output values are real GDP (constant price estimate) in unit of 2005 U.S. 
dollars (year 2005 is the base period). Differences in real GDP reflect changes in output volume. 
17 China is normally using carbon intensity targets to bind its climate responsibility . 
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Figure 3.3: China's GDP and carbon emissions growth paths 
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Note: (a) China's GDP growth paths under four scenarios (reference, R&D-induced 
TC, innovation policy, carbon tax); (b) China's CO2 emissions growth paths under 
four scenarios (reference, R&D-induced TC, innovation policy, carbon tax) . 
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As one of the driving forces of the aforementioned changes, the changing trend of R&D 
investment is shown in Fig. 3.4(b). Between 2005 and 2030, the economy-wide R&D 
investments are expected to grow by 12% annually from $31 to $335 billion dollars. The 
strong growth in R&D is spread across industrial sectors, with manufacturing, agriculture, 
electricity, and transportation making up the bulk (almost 80%) of aggregate R&D.18 As a 
result, R&D intensity is projected to rise from 1.3% to 3.2% as a share of GDP, which 
basically coincides with China's R&D intensity target by 2020 (2.5% of GDP) in its transit 
towards a knowledge-based economy (MOST, 2006b). 
To explain the causal relationship between R&D investment (cause) and economic and 
emission growth (consequence), I elucidate the process of R&D-induced TC as follows. The 
stimulus of R&D investment improves innovative capacity and creates a stock of knowledge 
assets (e.g., technique know-how, managerial skills). Once applied to the production process, 
the knowledge assets facilitate a reconfiguration of production factor inputs for productivity 
gain (the rate of TC) - an explanation for the stronger economic growths in the R&D scenario. 
Simultaneously, due to knowledge substitution for physical inputs, production technology 
experiences a decline in the input share of physical inputs and a rise for the knowledge input 
(the bias of TC), which gives rise to a reduction in the intensity of fossil energy use - an 
explanation for the lower carbon intensity in the R&D scenario. 
While the emission cuts driven by R&D-induced TC is notable, international climate 
concerns are calling for China' s commitment to deeper carbon intensity cuts ( or even hard 
emission caps). This then raises two issues: 1) On the basis of absolute emission levels, does 
the R&D-induced TC enable an effective stabilization of China's rising emission trends; 2) In 
terms of relative carbon intensity, do technological innovations guarantee the achievement of 
climate target that is officially set out. 
Firstly, as Fig. 3.3(b) shows, China's carbon emissions are still on a climbing trajectory, 
even if the intensity level has been cut as a result of R&D-induced TC. While knowledge 
substitution for fossil energy inputs can bring about a reduction in carbon intensity, fuelling 
China's rapidly expanding economy still entails mammoth uses of physical factor inputs. 
18 The reason is that, R&D investments in these sectors have a higher level of marginal benefit 
due to higher innovation efficiency and marginal products of knowledge input. Given a certain 
level of marginal cost of R&D (the purchase price of raw R&D goods), producers in these sectors 
would hence rationalize their economic behavior by undertaking more R&D investments. 
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This unsurprisingly leads to a continuous increase in the absolute levels of fossil energy uses 
and carbon emissions, without a significant effect to stabilize the emission growth trend.19 
Secondly, at the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, China unilaterally pledged to cut its 
carbon intensity by 40-45% below its 2005 levels by 2020, and this target is likely to aim for a 
60-65% carbon intensity cut by 2030 relative to its 2005 levels. However, simulation results 
show that the R&D-induced TC will only drive down China's 2005 carbon intensity level by 
about 35% by 2020 and 50% by 2030, which is well below the pledged target. Moreover, if the 
uncertain nature of innovation is taken into account, massive R&D investment can't fully 
translate into new knowledge creation and application in production to substitute for fossil 
energy inputs, China's carbon intensity level will still remain high and fail to fulfill the 
climate target.2° In this regard, there is a growing need for China to call for additional efforts 
on top of the existing private R&D investment in order to meet the pledged climate target. 
In this context, China's technology strategy is likely to be far from sufficient to realize 
climate-friendly "green" innovations. The main reasons are as follows. From the perspective 
of microeconomic foundation, R&D investment is an innovative incentive of private firms to 
pursue economic profitability. If the externality costs caused by environmental damages are 
not fully internalized, the individual micro-level firms have no incentive to reduce fossil fuel 
uses and carbon emission in the pursuit of profitability. As a result, China's innovation 
pattern tends to focus on pushing domestic industries upstream in global value chains 
through developing competitive general-purpose technologies, without the motivation to 
capture the small niche market of low-carbon energy supply technologies. Obviously, this 
innovation pattern is "normal" with carbon neutrality, rather than a carbon-saving "green" 
innovation (Nordhaus, 2011).21 
19 This may reflect the reason why Beijing has repeatedly rejected the calls to commit to an 
emission peak year. China's fast expanding economy will consistently reinforce the increases in 
its emissions (IEA, 2007). 
20 For a detailed discussion about the uncertainty in climate policy design, see McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen. (2009). 
21 While China is now gaining speed as a world leader in the production of renewable energy 
technology, the bulk of these capacities are used for exports instead of domestic deployment. A 
inhibiting factor is the problem of grid integration of renewable energy (e.g. Kahrl et al., 2011; de 
la Tour et al., 2011). Basically, China maintains its focus on key research areas and enabling 
general-purpose technologies like biotechnology, nanotechnology, · pharmaceuticals, large-scale 
IC manufacturing, telecommunication, large aircraft and aerospace projects (MOST, 20066). 
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3.4.3 Innovation Policy Scenario 
The results in Section 3.4.2 reveal that, while China is becoming increasingly committed to 
R&D, the nation still confronts a gap between achieving emissions cuts and expected climate 
targets. To bridge this gap, complementary policies are needed to create additional emission 
reductions. In this section, I examine the effect of innovation policies including public R&D 
subsidies and intellectual property right (IPR) protection. Climate policy (e.g., carbon tax) 
will be examined in the next section. 
Recall that, in the R&D scenario the R&D investment spending is fully financed by 
output sales revenues of the private firms, but broader R&D investments can be stimulated if 
public R&D support is in place, where the government can use tax revenues to subsidize 
private R&D and hence encourage more innovative activities .22 Moreover, public R&D 
subsidy should be biased towards innovation in the non-fossil fuel sectors (electricity and 
seven non-energy sectors), so that their reliances on fossil fuel inputs can be reduced. To 
represent this type of innovation policy, I impose a policy shock of raising the R&D subsidy 
rate TR = 0.3 in all non-fossil fuel sectors, which means 30% of R&D spending is financed by 
government fiscal revenues (OECD, 2008). 
Simulation results show that, in the presence of public R&D subsidy, private firms have 
stronger innovative incentives, where R&D L11.vestment will continue to rise to 385 billion 
dollars in 2030 - a level that is 14% higher than that without that subsidy. As a result, GDP is 
projected to grow by 7.7% annually from $2327 to $11381 billion dollars between 2005-2030 
(see Fig. 3.3), which features a stronger economic growth path than that in the R&D scenario. 
Meanwhile, carbon emissions are likely to rise from 5100 to 12019 Mt, with a growth rate of 
3.4% tliat is slightly lower than the rate in the R&D scenario (3.5 %). This is due to more 
knowledge available to substitute for fossil energy uses in the production process. 
In addition to the economy-wide effects, I further examine the effect of the biased R&D 
subsidy on cumulative output changes at the sectoral level. As Fig. 3.5 shows, fossil fuel 
· sectors are likely to suffer from output losses under the innovation policy intervention, while 
22 From government budget constraint, it is clear to observe that in equilibrium the government 
will target part of the existing tax revenues (e.g., corporate profit tax, household income tax) as 
well as additional tax revenues (e.g., carbon tax in the climate policy scenario), so that the public 
R&D subsidies to support private innovation can be financed. 
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outputs in other sectors will continue to grow. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, with public 
R&D subsidies biased towards the non-fossil fuel sectors, the expansion of R&D resources in 
these sectors will reduce (crowd out) that is available to fossil fuel sectors due to the supply 
Figure 3.5: Effect of biased R&D subsidy on cumulative outputchanges 
at the sectoral level 
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Note: Public R&D subsidy is set to be biased towards innovation in eight non-fossil 
fuel sectors, so that their reliances on fossil fuel inputs can be reduced. The effect is 
measured as the percentage changes of cumulative output levels driven by the R&D 
subsidy policy shock relative to the output levels without that subsidy. 
constraint of R&D goods.23 Knowledge creation and production TC are hereby inhibited in 
fossil fuel sectors, generating the crowing-out effect in the R&D pool. Secondly, the biased 
R&D subsidies serve to encourage non-fossil fuel sectors to innovate and apply knowledge 
in production, which substitutes for the use of fossil fuels. As a result, the declining demand 
will automatically drive down the output supply of fossil fuel sectors in order to clear the 
market, which represents the opportunity cost of this biased R&D subsidy. However, the 
productivity growth in non-fossil fuel sectors under the biased R&D supports can partially 
23 On the general issue of crowding out of R&D, see Hall and van Reenen (2000), Hall (2002a,b), 
David and Hall (2000), David et al. (2000). 
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offset the output declines in fossil fuel sectors, without a potential loss of aggregate outputs. 
Put another way, the R&D subsidies biased towards non-fossil fuel sectors, by restricting 
innovation and TC in fossil fuel sectors, can diminish the contribution of fossil fuel industries 
to aggregate production outputs, which may be one of the appealing technology strategies to 
restructure a carbon-intensive economy into a low-carbon one. 
Now turn to the other type of innovation policy: IPR protection. In principle, due to the 
positive technology externality resulting from knowledge spillovers, innovators can't fully 
· appropriate the benefits of innovation with private returns to R&D usually below the social 
returns, leading to private R&D investments less than the socially optimal levels (Nordhaus, 
1969; Mansfield, 1996; Popp, 2006). Hence, the imperfect appropriability of innovations gives 
rise to the sub-optimal provision of R&D and knowledge goods in an equilibrium without 
external corrections of the imperfections. Accordingly, The role that government regulation 
(stringent IPR) plays is to correct for the imperfections in innovation market by improving 
the appropriability and excludability of innovation, so that the incentives of undertaking 
R&D and innovation can be stimulated by private firms, making private R&D investments 
reaching the socially optimal levels. 
To represent a stringent IPR protection in the model, I scale down the values of 8 by 
half 8=0.5, which means that the benefits of innovation are largely appropriated by the 
sector undertaking R&D, without fully spilling over to the public knowledge pool (a lower 
level of intersectoral knowledge spillover). Simulation results show that, the stringent IPR 
protection strengthens R&D investment and innovation, which pushes the growth of GDP to 
11509 billion dollars by 2030 - an additional 1.1 % increase on top of the GDP levels achieved 
by public R&D subsidies. -Carbon emissions are likely to drop further to 11892 Mt by 2030 -
an additional 0.8% reductions relative to the emission levels under public R&D subsidies. 
The reason for this improvement is that, IPR protection serves to eliminate intersectoral 
knowledge spillovers in the imperfect innovation market, so that the benefits of R&D and 
knowledge creation are largely appropriated by the innovating sector, with a lower level of 
R&D spillover into public knowledge pool. Accordingly, to gain the benefits of innovation, 
private firms need to undertake more purposeful R&D, without the incentive of free riding 
on external R&D spillovers. Given that more R&D efforts are taken by individual sectors, the 
accumulated knowledge is more likely to substitute for fossil fuel in production and hence 
further lower carbon emissions. 
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In summary, innovation policies including public R&D subsidies and IPR protection 
enable a further reduction in China's carbon intensity, but the effect is relatively minor, with 
only 1-2% additional cuts on top of the intensity level achieved in the R&D scenario. 
Consequently, the joint effect of private R&D efforts and public R&D supports is to cut 
China's carbon intensity by 38% by 2020 (1.36 tons per thousand dollars) and 53% by 2030 
(1.03 tons per thousand dollars) relative to its 2005 levels, which still fall short of the pledged 
climate target (40-45% cuts by 2020, 60-65% cuts by 2030). The ineffectiveness of innovation 
policies as the sole strategy of carbon abatement is primarily due to the diminishing return to 
R&D investment in innovation.24 At the same time, stringent IPR system serves to protect 
innovation excludability ex post, which is ancillary to the ex ante incentive of R&D investment, 
that is, the inventive response of profit-seeking firms to input price changes. 
3.4.4 Climate Policy Scenario 
As argued previously, the emission cuts achieved by R&D investment and innovation may 
fall short of the pledged climate target. To bridge this gap, an emission-based direct climate 
regulation (e.g., carbon tax) should be thought of as necessary. On the one hand, as the 
-
transition to a hard cap on long-run absolute emission levels,25 carbon taxation provides a 
market-based solution to help handle ·the challenge faced by China's current administrative 
measures on emission abatement.26 On the other hand, as private agents have the ex ante 
innovative response to input price change, a carbon price signal can induce private firms to 
undertake carbon-saving innovation. 
I thus introduce a carbon tax of $20 dollars per ton of carbon dioxide from 2012, rising at 
24 Worries also exist at the central leadership level about whether massive public R&D can bear 
productive and sustainable innovations. Reportedly, many Chinese R&D activities have been 
plagued Sy research fund waste, haste and shoddy workmanship, and low quality standards. A 
political . culture of corruption, prestige projects and top-down obedience could hinder the 
efficient use of public R&D funds (e.g., Shi and Rao, 2010). 
25 China's share of historical cumulative emissions between 1900-2030 is expected to rise to 16%, 
approaching that of the U.S. (25%) and the E.U. (18%). China's per capita emission in 2030 is 
projected to approach that of OECD Europe. Provided that developed countries have make 
concrete efforts of absolute emissions cuts, China will lost its ground not to take on hard emission 
caps, even if it remains on a climbing trajectory (IEA, 2010). 
26 This is reflected by China's difficulty in achieving its energy saving target during the 11th five 
year cycle. Local governments conducted forceful administrative measures, such as power plant 
shutdown, electricity and vehicle use control. As abatement levels become more stringent, such 
measures will become costly to achieve climate targets (Zhang, 2011). 
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a rate of 5% to $50 dollars per ton by 2030.27 As Fig. 3.3(b) shows, the carbon tax generates a 
notable effect to stabilize the emission growth path, pushing down the emission levels by 25 % 
to 8702 Mt by 2030. As a result, carbon intensity falls by 47% in 2020 and by 65 % in 2030 
relative to the 2005 levels, reaching a level of 0.78 tons per thousand dollars at the end of 
time frame. Put differently, on top of private R&D investment and public innovation policies, 
climate policy creates additional carbon intensity cuts of 9% in 2020 and 12% in 2030. This 
translates into additional absolute emissions cuts of 21 % in 2020 and 28 % in 2030. Over the 
period 2005-2030, carbon tax reduces the cumulative emission levels by about 22%, of which 
the sectoral composition is shown in Fig. 3.6(a). Coal sectors have the highest level of 
cumulative emissions cuts (50-60 % ), followed by oil, natural gas and electric sectors (20-30 % ), 
with a modest level of cumulative abatement (10-20 %) occurring in non-energy sectors. 
It comes as no surprise that the environmental benefit of deeper emission cuts achieved 
by carbon taxation is at the cost of production output losses. As Fig. 3.3(a) reveals, putting a 
carbon price on the economy incurs a growth slowdown in the near term (2012-2020) . After 
that, the economy will absorb the price shock and continue its normal growth path without 
compromising long-run economic prospect. This simulation result basically coincides with 
other climate policy modeling studies ( e.g., McKibbin, 2008; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2004, 
2009). In explicit, GDP is likely to grow by 6.8% annually to $11153 billion dollars in 2030. 
Over the period 2005-2030, the present-value cumulative GDP losses reach a level of $2981 
billion dollars (2.1 % GDP losses), of which the sectoral composition is displayed in Fig. 3.6(b). 
Non-energy sectors have cumulative output losses of less than 5%, and the carbon-intensive 
fossil fuel sectors suffer precipitous output declines of roughly 15-25%. 
We also look at the impact on prices. It is simulated that, as carbon tax raises the costs of 
using fossil energy that is a component in household consumption bundle, the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) will slightly rise by 0.5 % in the short run (2010) and reach the highest level 
(by 1.2%) by 2015, when the policy shock of carbon tax is imposed by 2012. After the peak 
year 2015, CPI will increase by a moderate range of 0.6-0.8 % in the long run (2020-2030) . In 
terms of changes in relative prices of energy goods as compared to others, we look at the 
price ratio of energy relative to non-energy (material) goods bundle. It is simulated that this 
27 The timing and level of carbon tax are set according to the shadow carbon prices calculated by 
IEA (2010), which represents a hypothetical policy experiment. With regard to the recycling of 
carbon tax revenues, I assume that the revenues collected from carbon taxation directly flow into 
the government revenues side, and are used to balance government's budget constraint. 
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price ratio will increase by 5% in the short run and reach a peak level of about 11 % around 
the year 2015, when the carbon taxation immediately drives the price divergence between 
energy and non-energy goods. However, changes in this price ratio will return to a lower 
range of about 4-7% between 2020-2030, suggesting a price convergence between energy and 
non-energy goods in the long run. That's because in a multi-sector general equilibrium with 
intersectoral linkages, energy goods (as intermediate production inputs) are intensively used 
in non-energy sectors for producing non-energy goods, particularly for an energy-intensive 
economy like China. Accordingly, in the presence of intersectoral linkages, price changes in 
energy goods can eventually pass through into productions in non-energy goods sectors, 
making non-energy goods prices moving in the same direction with energy goods prices. 
In addition to the economic costs (output losses) and environmental benefits (carbon 
savings), stringent climate regulation can create the other benefit: innovation inducement. 
Provided that private firms tend to advance production techniques as their inventive 
response to input price changes, putting a price on carbon-intensive fossil fuels can induce 
private firms to create and apply knowledge in production, so that the higher cost burden 
can be avoided. This phenomenon is demonstrated in Fig. 3.6(c), although reductions in 
production output incurred by carbon tax would diminish output sales revenues and hence 
the absolute levels of R&D spending, R&D intensity (R&D-output ratio) does not necessarily 
drop across sectors. The decline in cumulative R&D spending exceeds the loss in cumulative 
output in fossil fuel sectors, but falls short of those in other sectors. Consequently, the R&D 
intensity rises slightly across a range of less carbon-intensive industries like manufacturing, 
transport, and electric utilities, indicating that innovation is induced by carbon taxation in 
these sectors. 
Changes in knowledge-output ratio (the input share of knowledge in production) also 
appear to coincide with the phenomenon of innovation inducement. As Fig. 3.6 (d) shows, 
knowledge-output ratio falls sharply in fossil fuel sectors but rise slightly in non-fossil fuel 
sectors, suggesting that knowledge are reallocated from fossil fuel sectors to non-fossil fuel 
sectors that accommodate the higher potential of knowledge substitution for fossil fuel 
inputs. This finding is basically consistent with the induced innovation hypothesis: changes in 
the relative prices of production input are in itself a spur to a technological alternative that 
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lowers the use of that relatively expensive factor (Hicks, 1932).28 
In summary, emission-based climate regulation through carbon taxation can generate 
one cost (production output losses) and two benefits (carbon saving, innovation inducement) . 
In particular, the inducement of innovation and TC can partially mitigate the deadweight 
losses incurred by tax distortion, making possible the process of transition into a low-carbon 
economic growth pattern. 
28 For theoretical expositions of the induced innovation hypothesis, see Kennedy (1964), Kamien 
and Schwartz (1968), Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Sue Wing (2006) . For empirical evidences, 
see Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002). 
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Figure 3.6: Effect of carbon taxation on environmental benefits, economic costs, and innovation inducement 
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Note: (a) Effect of carbon tax on sector-level cumulative emission cuts; (b) Effect of carbon tax on sector-level 
cumulative production output losses; (c) Effect of carbon tax on sector-level R&D intensity (R&D-output ratio); 
(d) Effect of carbon tax on sector-level knowledge-output ratio (input share of knowledge in production). 
62 
3.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Tab. 3.2 provides the results of sensitivity analysis (SA) for key technology parameters in the 
CGE model with R&D-induced TC. The SA is implemented by lowering and raising these 
exogenous parameters by 25% relative to their original values (see Tab. 3.1). I then compare 
new simulation (parameters take new values) with regular simulation results (parameters 
take original values), and report the SA results as the percentage change between them. 
The results of SA (see the last column of carbon intensity cuts in Tab. 3.2) suggest that 
the basic findings from Sections 3.4.1-3.4.4 are robust to changes in exogenous technology 
parameters. That is, sole dependence on R&D investment and innovation is not sufficient to 
achieve the pledged carbon intensity target, and an emission-based climate regulation is 
necessary to fulfill the climate target. 
Turn to the specific technology parameters, in the case of lowering the parameter ~ 
by 25%, a lower possibility of knowledge substitution for physical inputs translates into 
lower incentives of private firms to undertake innovation and prod_uction TC. As a result, the 
less knowledge asset is created and applied in production to stimulate productivity growth 
and substitute for fossil energy inputs. Accordingly, GDP and R&D investment falls, and 
carbon emissions rise. The opposite holds if the parameter a Q is raised by 25 %. 
Lowering the parameter 6tt by 25 % translates into less knowledge obsolescence and 
more knowledge accumulation. Applying a higher level of knowledge stock in production is 
more likely to enhance productivity growth and substitute for fossil fuel inputs. Accordingly, 
GDP and R&D investments rise, and carbon emissions fall. The opposite holds if the 
parameter Ott is raised by 25 % . 
For the IPF parameters a,r,11, lowering their values by 25 % translates into a lower 
efficiency of knowledge creation in the process of innovation. As a result, the lower level of 
knowledge capital, once applied in production, is less likely to boost productivity growth 
and substitute for fossil energy. Accordingly, GDP and R&D investments fall, and carbon 
emissions rise. The opposite holds when these parameters are raised by 25 %. 
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Table 3.2: Results of sensitivity analysis 
GDPa Carbon Emissions b R&D Investment c 
• Scenario e 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
(JQ 
Lowf -0.72% -0.53 % -1 .31 % 1.94% 1.62% 2.51 % -3.48% -3.15% -4.51 % 
High 0.54% 0.27% 1.75% -1.73 % -1.27% -2.65 % 3.81 % 3.52% 4.76% 
Low 0.43% 0.32% 0.79% -1.16% -0.97% -1.51 % 2.09% 1.89% 2.71 % OH 
High -0.32% -0.16% -1 .05% 1.04% 0.76% 1.59% -2.29% -2.11 % -2.86% 
Low -0.29% -0.21 % -0.52% 0.78 % 0.65% 1.00% -1 .39% -1.26% -1.80% 
a 
High 0.22% 0.11 % 0.70% -0.69% -0.51 % -1.06 % 1.52% 1.41 % 1.90% 
Low -0.36% -0.27% -0.66% 0.97% 0.81 % 1.26% -1.74% -1 .58 % -2.26% p 
High . 0.27% 0.14% 0.88 % -0.87% -0.64% -1.33% 1.91 % 1.76% 2.38% 
Low -0.50% -0.37% -0.92% 1.36% 1.13% 1.76% -2.44% -2.21 % -3.16% 
11 
0J9% High 0.38% 1.23% -1.21 % -0.89% -1.86% 2.67% 2.46% 3.33 % 
a Percentage change of cumulative GDP in new simulation relative to that in regular simulation. 
b Percentage change of cumulative carbon emissions in new simulation relative to that in regular simulation. 
c Percentage change of cumulative R&D investment in new simulation relative to that in regular simulation. 
d Year 2030 carbon intensity cuts relative to the year 2005 carbon intensity level. 
e Scenario 1,2,3 refer to R&D-induced TC scenario, innovation policy scenario, and carbon tax scenario, respectively. 
Carbon Intensity Cuts d 
1 2 3 
45.6% 48.2% 60.8% 
54.7% 57.5% 68.5 % 
52.1% 55.3% 67.3 % 
47.2% 50.8% 62.8% 
48.5% 52.2% 63.7% 
50.9% 53.9% 65.2% 
47.2% 51.5% 62.8% 
51.7% 54.2% 66.5% 
46.9% 49.6% 62.7% 
52.6% 55.2% 67.7% 
f Low and High refer to lowering and raising exogenous parameters, by 25 % relative to their central case values, respectively. 
c,0 : Elasticity of substitution between knowledge and physical input 
oH : Depreciation rate of knowledge capital 
a : Elasticity of knowledge creation to R&D investment 
p: Elasticity of knowledge creation to existing knowledge stock 
11 : Efficiency of knowledge creation 
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3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter incorporates the mechanism of R&D-induced TC into a CGE model to represent 
the endogenous process of technological innovation, which is used to quantitatively examine 
the effectiveness of China's indigenous R&D and innovation to curb its carbon emissions. 
The results provide various implications for China's strategy to address climate mitigation: 1) 
Technological progress induced by R&D commitment has a notable effect to curb China's 
carbon emissions levels, with the sectors of manufacturing, electricity, and transport having 
the highest carbon abatement potential from innovation; 2) Indigenous R&D investments are 
important as the technology strategies to address climate change mitigation, but the sole 
dependence on R&D is far from sufficient to achieve the pledged climate target, because 
China's innovation pattern is basically "normal" with a focus on productivity improvement 
rather than carbon saving; 3 Innovation policies (public R&D subsidy and stringent IPR) can 
strengthen R&D investment and further reduce carbon emissions, but this complementary 
effect is still minor and insufficient to meet the stipulated climate target; 4) Emission-based 
climate regulation through carbon taxation are necessary to fulfill the emission reduction 
target, but achieving this carbon-saving benefit is at the cost of sizable production output 
losses; 5) Stringent climate regulations induce the incentive of private firms to innovate and 
technical upgrading, which can partially mitigate the deadweight losses incurred by carbon 
tax distortion. 
Needless to say, a number of model extensions are needed in future works. In particular, 
the current modeling framework only focuses on indigenous innovation within the single 
economy, putting aside the potential foreign knowledge diffusion. As China is increasingly 
integrat~d into the globalized world economy through trade, FDI, human capital mobility, 
and reseq.rch cooperation, foreign knowledge diffusion may become increasingly important 
to complement indigenous R&D in innovation. It is thus needed in future studies to examine 
the mechanism of international technology diffusion and its effect on low-carbon innovation 
and climate change mitigation. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
3.A Model sectoral classification and mapping by reference to the GTAP 
and OECD ANBERD 
Sector number/ name GTAP OECDANBERD 
in our mode sector numbers sector number 
1. Electric utilities 43 40 
2. Gas utilities 44 41 
3. Petroleum refining 32 23 
4. Coal mining 15 10 
5. Crude oil & gas extraction 16-17 11 
6. Mineral mining 18 12-14 
7. Agriculture 01-12, 14 01, 03-05 
8. Forestry & wood products 13,30 02,20 
9. Durable manufacturing 34-42 26-37 
10. Nondurable manufacturing 19-29, 31, 33 15-19, 21-22, 24-25 
11. Transportation 48-50 60-64 
12. Services 45-47, 51-57 45, 50-59, 70-99 
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3.B Structure and Specification of Theoretical Model 
3.B.1 Production 
1) Production technology 
The representative firm in each production sector has a separable KLEM-H nested CES function, 
with the following production technology: 
aQ 
Qi =A?•l(o~)af .z~:t +(o~)af .H~:tr·-l 
ll 1 a2 -11 1 u2 -1)a:~1 z = AZ. ~ (o!,)af . X 'af + (oz )af . K 'uf ' 1 1 Uj= L,E,M lj lj iJ< 1 
I 1 a~ -11a~1 E E a~ ET 1 x E = A . ~ (o ) • . (x ) • 1 1 L..., j = l, ... ,5 IJ IJ 
I _2.__ a;" -llar l M M a~1 M a~ xiM = A . ~ (o ) · . (x ) · 1 U j= 6, .. . ,12 IJ lj 
By the principle of duality, the dual cost functions corresponding to each quantity variable 
are derived as follows: 
1 
pi = (A? r1 · [ 0~ · (PiZ )1-aP + 0~ · (Pu-1 faP ]l-aP 
piZ = (Af r1. {[ Lj= L ,E:M off. (Pij r ar l +of. (PiK )1-ar } l~ar 
1 
( E )-1 [ E E 1-af ]1-af PE = A · · ~ o · (P ) 
1 l L..., j= l, ... ,5 I) IJ 
1 
( M)-1 [ M · M 1-af"J l-u;" PiM = A · ~ o ·(P ) 
•
1 L..., j= 6, ... ,12 I) lj 
where Q;,Pi are the quantity anc;l price of domestically-produced good, zi,Piz are the quantity 
and price of physical inputs composite, Xi= [X;LtX iE ,XiM,K;, HJ, Pi = [PiL, PiE ,PiM, PiK,PiH] are 
quantity and price of labor, energy bundle, materials bundle, physical capital and knowledge 
capital. X~ ,Bf are the quantity and price of iµtermediate energy commodities, xr ,If are the 
quantity and price of intermediate material commodities. 
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2) Producer Problem 
For each production sector i, the problem of a representative producer is specified as. 
max v';(t) = J'"' exp[-J\(s')-ds·]·fl(s) -ds 
s.t. IL (t) = (1 - rQ) · [Pi(t) · Qi (t) - PiL(t) · x iL (t)-PiE (t) · x iE(t) - piM(t) · XiM (t)] 
- (1 - r r) · Pir (t) · Ii(t) - (1 - r R) · PiR (t)· K(t) 
r< ( t) = L ( t) - aK • Ki ( t) 
( ) 1P Mt)2 Ii(t) = cpi L(t),Ki(t) =L(t) + 2 · Ki(t) 
• a p Ri(t) [ ""'"' l H i(t) = 17 · Ri(t) · H ;(t) + ~ Ri(t) · 8 -L.., iR/t) - K (t) - 6w H i(t) 
J 
The dynamic optimization problem is solved by using the current-value Hamiltonian formulas: 
qt) = (1 - rQ) · [PJt) · Qi(t) - piL (t) · x iL (t) - piE(t) · x iE (t) - piM (t) · Xuv1 (t)] 
( 1P Mt)2) - (l -r1)·Pi! (t) · L(t) + 2 -Ki(t) +,\ K(t)· [L(t) - 6K ·Ki(t)] 
-(1 - , , l P,, (t) R,(t) + A,H(t) [ ~ R,(t)" H,(t)' + z',~'.\,) -[0 L , R,(t) - R,(tl] -oH H,(t)] 
We first optimally solve for the demand for labor XiL( t) , energy bundle XiE (t) and 
materials bundle XiM (t) from the F.O.C. with respect to x ii (t) for j = L,E,M . 
of'.(t) =P(t) · oQi(t) _P(t) = 0 
oX/t) · aXi/ t) •i 
1 1 
⇒ P/ t) = oQ.(t) = oQ.(t) . oZi(t) = ' 5Q ·(AQr P-1 . Qi(t) ] "-? ·[Oz ·(Az)',';'-1 . Zi(t) lc,,Z 
Pi(t) ax ij (t) azJt) oX/ t) l 12 • zJt) '1 • x ij (t) 
where we further use the optimality condition at tier one in the nested CES structure - the value 
of marginal product of physical input composite z, (t) should equal its cost, and obtain the 
optimal l~vel of demand for physical input composite as follows: 
P (t) · oQi ( t) - P (t) = 0 
I az i(t) ,z ⇒ Z (t) = (AQ)O'P-i · 5Q · ( pi (t) J(J''Q . Q. (t) I I IZ PiZ (t) I 
By substituting out z i , we derive the optimal level of demand for Xii as function of Q i : 
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In the second step, we solve for the optimal level of demand for raw investment goods Ji 
and R&D goods Ri, and obtain the following optimality conditions for investment and R&D: 
afi(t) =-(1 - r )·P (t)·(l + m• L(t) J+ ,\ . (t) = 0 
8L(t) I 11 ' Ki(t) iK 
⇒ L(t) = r AiK (t) l l· Ki(t) 
(l - r 1)-Pil (t) l/J 
arJt) =-(1 - r )·P (t) + ,\. (t) · a ·Yf·R(t)"-1 ·H(t)0 + e - 2Ri(t) 
8Ri(t) R ii 1H l l L jRi(t) 
·⇒ (1 - rR)·Pil(t) = ,\ iH(t)· a·Yf·Ri(tY-1 -Hi(ti +e- fRJt) 
iRi(t) 
where the above equations are static form of optimality conditions, the truly intertemporal part of 
this problem is solved by optimally choosing the dynamic paths for the shadow price of physical 
and knowledge capital AiK AiH : 
where the expression denotes an implicit arbitrage condition for physical capital investment: LHS 
denotes the shadow rate of return from an extra unit of investment in physical capital, including: 
the increase in the shadow price of physical capital, marginal product of physical capital, and the 
adjustment cost saving. RHS represents the cost of physical capital investment, including the 
market interest rate and the capital depreciation rate. Hence, in determining the optimal path of 
,\ iK , the firm is guided by this impficit arbitrage equation. In a similar way, we can solve for the 
optimal dynamic path for the shadow price of knowledge asset ,\ iH. 
3) Characterization of Producer Problem 
• For any production sector i (i = 1, ... , 12), the optimal level of demand for labor, energy 
bundle and materials bundle are characterized as follows: 
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where the optimal demands for energy bundle x iE and materials bundle xiM are further 
disaggregated into demand for each energy commodities x 5 and material commodities x ~' as: 
• Investment behavior of producer is characterized by the following conditions: 
L(t) =[ -\dt) - 1] , Ki(t) 
(l - r 1)-Pi1(t) lfJ 
i,._ . (t) + (l - T )·P(t)· -[JQ_i(_t) + (1 - T )·P (t) · lp ·(_L(_t) )
2 
U< Q 1 8Ki(t) r iI 2 Ki(t) 
----------------~-~ = r(t) + DK 
t.. U< (t) 
I (t) = J. (t) + lfJ · L(t)
2 
I I 2 Ki(t) 
i<(t) = Ji(t)-6K ·K;(t) 
where the first term is the static optimality conditions for investment determined by the shadow 
price of physical capital. The second is the implicit arbitrage condition that determines the time 
path of the shadow price of physical capital. The third denotes the actual purchases of investment 
goods with adjustment cost .function. The fourth is the law of motion of physical capital stock. 
• R&D behavior of producer is characterized by the following conditions: 
p 2Ri (t) (1 - r R)·PiR (t) = i\iH(t) · a-17-Ri(t)"-1 -Hi(t) + B L · 
iRi(t) 
. j.,_ iH (t) + (l-rQ)·Pi(t)-:~:~:~ + t..m(t)·17 -~- Ri(t)" ·Hi(tf1 
r(t) + DH 
AiH(t) 
Hi(t) = 17 ·R;(t)" -Hi(t/ + i i~~~t) ·[B· LjR/t) - R;(t)] - 6H ·H;(t) 
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where the first term is the optimality conditions for R&D investment determined by the shadow 
price of knowledge stock. The second is the implicit arbitrage condition that determines the time 
path for the shadow price of knowledge asset. The third denotes the innovation possibility frontier 
for knowledge creation. 
3.B.2. Consumption 
1) Structure of Consumption 
In each economy, we assume a representative household owns all factors of production and all 
shares in firms, and determine the consumption which is a CES aggregate of individual 
consumption goods: 
The dual cost functions corresponding to each above variable are as follows 
1 
~ = ['\""' 5.0 . (~ . )1-crg ]1-crg 
C U j=E,M CJ CJ 
1 
PcE = [L j=l, ,5 8 ~j . (rqr"~ Jl-cr~ 
where C,Pc are aggregate consumption and consumer price index, Xe= [XCE ,Xcrvrl , 
Pc = [PcE ,PcM l are the consumed quantity and consumer price of energy bundle and materials 
bundle. X~ ,P~ are the consumed quantity and consumer price of energy commodities, Xq1,Pq1 
are the consumed quantity and consumer price of material commodities. 
2) Consumer Problem 
The consumer problem is to maximize an intertemporal utility subject to the budget constraint 
and transversality condition: 
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max U(t) = J: 00 InC(s)-exp [-p•(s-t)]·ds 
s.t. Pc(s) · C(s) + A(s) = r(s) · A(s) + w(s) · L(s) 
l~A(s)-exp[-Js r(s' )·ds'] = 0 
By integrating the static budget constraint over an infinite time horizon, we can derive a lifetime 
budget constraint where the discounted present value of future consumption expenditure is 
financed by the sum of human wealth and financial wealth: 
J
00
Pc(s) · C(s)-exp[- Js r(s' ) · ds '] · ds = Hc(t) + Ac(t) 
with Hc(t) = J
00
(1 - r w) ·w(s)-L(s)·exp [-J\(s' ) ·ds·]· ds 
Ac(t) = I: i[ AiK (t) · Ki (t) + AiH (t) · H i (t) l 
where C,Pc are aggregate consumption level and consumer price index, respectively. H e denotes 
the human wealth as the discounted present value of future income stream. The labor income is 
made up of after-tax wage earnings (1 - r w) · w(s) · L(s). The financial wealth A c (t) involves the 
equity values hold by the representative household, equaling the stock market value of physical 
assets AK. K and know ledge assets Att. H. 
The consumer problem can be solved by constructing the Lagrangian as follows: 
L(t) = J00 InC(s)· exp [- p· (s - t) ]· ds + A(t)· ( Hc(t) + Ac(t) - J00 Pc(s) -C(s) · exp[-1• r(s' )· ds']- ds) 
F.O.C. with respect to C(s) yields: 
C~s) · exp[-p · (s - t)]- A(t) · ( Pc(s) · exp[f s r(s·) · ds' ]) = 0 =} P (s) · C(s) = __l_ _ exp[-p · (s - t)] · exp[f 'r(s·) · ds·] 
C A(tj t 
Plug back into the lifetime budget constraint yields: 
Hc(t) + A_c(t) = f
00
Pc(s) -C(s) -exp[-l'r(s') · ds'] • ds 
= f 00 A~t) · exp[-p · (s - t) ] · exp [f s r(s·) · ds ·] · exp[- J s r(s' ) · ds'] · ds 
Joo 1 = -· exp[-p ·(s-t)]-ds t A(t) 
1 
p·(Hc(t) + Ac(t)) = -
A(t) 
1 1 
A(t) p 
Pc(s) · C(s) = p · (Hc(t) + Ac(t)) · exp [-p · (s - t)] · exp[f s r(s' ) · ds'] 
Given the human and financial wealth at time t, the household will choose her optimal 
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consumption path over time s = [t,t + 1, ... ,00] according to the above equation. Let s = t and 
derive the optimal consumption level at current period: 
Pc(s)-C(s) = p·(Hc(t) + Ac(t)) 
This formula represents the consumption behavior of household according to permanent income 
hypothesis - household's consumption expenditure equals to a constant proportion of the 
aggregated human and financial wealth. But some group of household are liquidity-constrained 
with myopic expectations about her future income, and are only able to consume a fraction of the 
after-tax income given by exogenous propensity to consume a . The aggregate consumption 
expenditure Pc . C is expressed as a weighted average of neoclassical optimizing behavior and 
liquidity-constrained behaviors as follows: 
Pc(t) · C(t) = e. p· [Hc(t) + Ac(t)] + (1 - 8)· a-w(s)· L(s) 
Based on the two-tier nested CES structure of consumption, the aggregate consumption 
expenditure can be allocated to each goods and services component: 
o Pc(t) [ l(Tg-1 Pq(t) · Xq (t) = b'q · Pq (t) · Pc(t) · C(t) j = E,M 
E E E Pa (t) [ l(T~ - 1 Pq (t) ·Xq (t)= b'q· P~(t) ·Pa (t) ·Xa (-t) j = 1, .. . ,5 
M M M PcM (t) [ lo-t-1 Pq (t) ·Xq (t) = b'q · P~(t) ·PcM (t)·XcM (t) j = 6, ... ,12 
where Pq(t) · Xq(t) = [PcE (t) · XcE (t),PCM (t) · XcM (t)] are the consumption expenditure on energy 
and material bundles. P~(t) · X~(t) are the consumption expenditure on energy commodities, 
P~(t) · Xq(t) are the consumption expenditure on material commodities 
3) Char_acterization of Consumer Problem 
• From labor endowment, human and financial wealth, aggregate consumption expenditures 
are determined: 
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Pc (t)-C(t) = 8- p· [Hc (t) + Ac(t)] + (1-8) -a-w(s)· L(s) 
H c(t) = J 0\l - r w )•w(s)· L(s)-exp[-Js r(s·) -ds' ]- ds 
Ac (t) = L - [AiK (t) ·Ki(t)+.X.iH (t) -Hi (t)] 1- 1, ... ,12 
• Aggregate consumption expenditure is allocated into individual E/M commodities as: 
o [ Pc(t) lag XCE (t) = 6cE · -- · C(t) 
PCE (t) 
· o [ Pc(t) lag XcM (t) = 6cM · -- -C(t) 
PcM (t) 
where the demand for energy bundle XCE (t) and materials bundle XCM (t) is further allocated 
into each energy commodities X~i (t) j = 1, ... ,5 and material commodities X~ (t) j = 6, ... , 12: 
E E Pa (t) [ )~ Xq(t) = i5q · p~i (t) · Xa (t) 
[ )
a/! M M PcM (t) Xc (t) = be· -- · XcM (t) 
I I P~ (t) 
3.B.3 Capital good producing sector 
The investment sector produces new investment goods by combining energy and materials 
according to a two-tier nested CES production technology: 
a? 
Qr= A? -[I::j=E,M (Srf r~Q ·(Xrjt~t r-l 
[ 
_'!_ of'-1 i:1 M M aM M -M-XIM = A1 · L = (61j ) 1 ·(Xrj) a1 . J 6, ... ,12 
The dual cost function corresponding to each variable is as follows: 
. 1 
Pi = (A? t . [L j=E,M 61? . (Prj )1-a? 11-a? 
1 
( E )-1 [~ E ( E )l-af 11-af Prn = Ar · L., i=l, ... ,s 61j · Pii 
1 
M -1 [ M M 1-a(" 11-a(" P1M = (A1 ) . L = 61j . (Hi ) J 6, ... ,12 
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where Q r , Pr are the quantity and price of investment good, X 1 = [XIE, X IM ] , P1 = [PIE , P1M ] 
are quantity and price of E/M bundle used in financial sector. Xij,Prf are the quantity and price 
of energy commodities, X~, Pif are the quantity and price of material commodities. 
For the investment sectors, the producer problem is specified as: 
max TI1(t) = Pi(t) · Qi (t)-Prn (t) · Xrn(t)-PiM (t)· XrM (t) 
where the firm's objective is to optimally choose the inputs of energy bundle XIE and materials 
bundle XIM for maximizing its current profit flows IL . Solving this top-tier static maximization 
problem can determine the demands for the inputs of energy and materials bundles. We further 
solve a cost minimization problem at energy and material tier, and characterize the demand for 
each individual energy and material commodities. 
The optimal level of demand for energy bundles and materials bundles are characterized as: 
where the demand for energy bundle Xm and materials bundle XIM is further disaggregated 
into each energy commodities Xff j = 1, ... , 5 and material commodities xr j = 6, ... , 12: 
E E ( E)o-f-1 [Pm(t)la1E 
xlj (t) = 8,j . A, . nr (t) . x IE (t) 
M M
0 
( M)ar-1 [PIM (t)lar X,i (t) = blj · A r · - M- ·XINr(t) 
Pri (t) 
3.B.4 R~D good producing ·sector 
The structure of production technology in R&D sector is to produce R&D goods by combining 
energy a.hd material bundles according to a two-tier nested CES function. 
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M 
[ 
1 M ] ~ 
xRM =Ar. I:_ (ait; r~ .(x~ )O":r1 O"R -l 
J- 6, ... ,12 
By the principle of duality, the dual cost function can be expressed as follows: 
1 
p = (A Q )-1 . [~ oQ. (P )1-0-f 11-af 
R R L._,, j= E,M RJ RJ 
1 
( E )-1 [~ E ( E )1-o-~ 11-0-: PRE = AR . L.,, j= l , ,5 0Rj . PRj 
where QR, PR are the quantity and price of produced R&D good, XR = [XiE , X1M] , PR = [P1E , PiM ] 
are quantity and price of capital service, labor, energy and materials used in R&D sector. X ~i, PJ} 
are the quantity and price of energy commodities, X~ ,PM are the quantity and price of material 
commodities. 
For R&D sectors, the producer problem is specified as follows: 
max [h ( t) = PR ( t) · QR ( t) - PRE ( t) · XRE ( t) - PRM ( t) · XRM ( t) 
where the firm's objective is to optimally choose the inputs of energy bundle XRE and materials 
bundle Xiw for maximizing its current profit flows TI R. Solving this top-tier static maximization 
problem can determine the demands for the inputs of energy and materials bundles. We further 
solve a cost minimization problem at energy and material tier, and characterize the demand for 
each indiyidual energy and material commodities. The optimal level of demand for energy 
bundles and materials bundles are characterized as : 
where the demand for energy XRE and materials bundle XRM is disaggregated into each energy 
good x~i j = 1, ... ,5 and material good X~ j = 6, ... , 12: 
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3.B.5 Government 
Government behavior is normally constrained by a specific budgetary regime, which is 
represented by a certain well-defined fiscal target. The target of the Chinese government is to 
ensure a balanced budget with public revenue neutrality (NBS, 2010). Thus, our model specifies 
the government behavior as follows: it collects the revenue of tax imposed on corporate profit, 
household income and fossil energy use to finance public expenditure and subsidies on private 
investment and R&D: 
G ( t) = T Q ( t) + T w ( t) + Tc ( t) - Tr ( t) - TR ( t) 
where G is aggregate government expenditure for the current use of goods and services. This 
aggregate spending is then allocated among individual energy and material goods according to 
historical spending shares. Tax revenue is collected from corporate profit TQ, household income 
Tw and carbon emissions Tc . Tr, TR denote government spending on subsidizing private 
investment and R&D, respectively. The government budget constraint is hereby determined by 
endogenous economic activities of private agents and exogenous tax rates setting. 
According to historical spending shares, aggregate government expenditure is allocated 
among individual commodities, and yield government demands for each energy good 
X~i(t) j = l, ... ,5 andmaterialgood X~ (t) j = 6, ... ,12 : 
GE(O) 
XE(t) = _ i --G(t) 
GJ G(O) 
GM(O) 
X~ (t) = ~(O) · G(t) 
j = 1, ... ,5 
j = 6, .. . ,12 
where G(O),Gf (O),Gr (O) denote the initial period government aggregate spending, spending on 
energy goods and spending on material goods, respectively . 
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3.B.6 International Trade 
We model international trade flows in line with the Armington structure: a commodity produced 
domestically is an imperfect substitute for the imported goods. For any given good, the 
domestically-produced output is combined with the imports to create a CES Armington 
composite of that commodity. 
a y 
Y;(t) = [Qi(ttt + Mi(t)
0
~t r~l 
where y i denote the total supply of Armington composite good i as a CES aggregate of 
domestically-produced output Q and import M; that is set exogenously. Total supplies of that 
Armington commodity are used to clear the demands by intermediate production and final use. 
The export is modeled by allocating each Armington commodity between domestic and export 
markets via a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) assumption. 
where the export XXi is modeled by allocating Armington composite Yi to export market 
according to its product price p i and CET parameter am . 
3.B.7 Market clearing condition 
• Market clear condition for each individual commodity (j = 1, ... , 12) 
where the LHS denotes the total supply of Armington goods j (j=l, .. . ,12), which is used to 
satisfy the' RHS demand by production, consumption, investment, R&D, government and export. 
This market clearing condition thus pins down an equilibrium price of commodity j. 
• Market clear condition for raw investment good 
where the LHS denotes the total supply of raw investment good (the output produced by 
investment sector), which is used to satisfy the capital good demand by production sectors in the 
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RHS. This market clearing condition pins down an equilibrium price of raw investment good. 
• Market clear condition for raw R&D goods 
where the LHS denotes the total supply of raw R&D goods (the output produced by R&D sector), 
which is used to satisfy the R&D good demand by production sectors in the RHS. This market 
clearing condition thus pins down an equilibrium price of raw R&D goods. 
• Market clear condition for labor 
where the representative household derives no felicity from leisure and inelastically supplies its 
labor endowment at a constant exponential rate of growth nL , with initial period labor 
endowment L5 (0). The demand side is determined by labor employment in production sectors. 
Equilibrium closure requires full employment and labor market clearing, which pins down the 
equilibrium labor wage. 
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3.C GEMPACK TABLO Model Codes 
!==========================================================-- ----- ---
GEMPACK TABLO code for impLementing a single-country endogenous 
technical change CGE model as out l ined in the thesis Chapter 3 
====================================================================! 
Text bet ween exclamation marks is a comment . 
Text bet ween hashes(#) is labelLing information. 
!============================================= 
FILES 
=============================================! 
FILE BAS EDATA # input base data#; 
!========================================== 
SETS 
==========================================! 
SET sectors# 12 production sectors# 
(a01, a02, a03, a04, a05, a06, a07, a08, a09, al0, all, al2); 
SET sectors_e # S energy sectors# 
(a01, a02, a03, a04, a05); 
SET sectors_m # 7 material sectors# 
(a06, a07, a08, a09, al 0, al l, al2); 
SUBSET sectors_e IS SUBSET OF sectors; 
SUBSET secto r s_m IS SUBSET OF sect ors; 
SET goods# 12 commodities# 
(g01, g02, g03, g04, g05, g06, g07, g08, g09, gl0, gll, gl2); 
SET goods_e # S energy commodities# 
(g01, g02, g03, g04, g05) ; 
SET goods_m # 7 material commodities# 
(g06, g07, g08, g09, gl0, gll, gl2); 
SUBSET goods_e IS SUBSET OF goods; 
SUBSET goods_m IS SUBSET OF goods; 
SET 
( INTERTEMPORAL ) al lt ime # all time periods# (p0 - p26); 
SET 
( INTERTEMPORAL ) fwdtime #domain of forward difference# (p0 - p25); 
SET 
( INTERTEMPORAL ) endtime # ending time# (p26); 
SUBSET fwd t ime IS SUBSET OF alltime; 
SUBSET endt ime IS SUBSET OF allt ime; 
!====================================================================== 
Data coefficients & variables: Energy commodity flows of IO table 
for Production 1, Consumption 2, Investment 3, R&D 4, Gov ' t S, Export 6 
=======================================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , i, sectors) (all , t, alltime) VlE(j, i, t) 
# value: enfrgy commodity into production ·#; 
(all , j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) V2E(j, t) 
# value : energy commodity into consumption#; 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, al ltime) .V3E( j , t) 
# value: energy commodi ty into investment#; 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) V4E( j , t) 
# value: energy commodity into R&D #; 
(all , j , goods_e) (all , t , al lt i me) VSE(j, t) 
# value: energy commodity into gov't #; 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, al ltime) V6 E(j, t) 
# value: energy commodity into export #; 
Read 
VlE f rom FILE BAS EDATA HEADER "Vl E"; 
V2E from FILE BAS EDATA HEADER "V2E"; 
V3 E from FILE BASEDATA HEADER "V3E"; 
V4E from FILE BASEDATA HEADER "V4E "; 
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VSE from FILE BASEDATA HEADER "V5E"; 
V6E from FILE BASEDATA HEADER "V6E"; 
Variable 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , i, sectors) ( al l , t, alltime) en(j, i, t) 
# quantity of E commodity into production#; 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) cone(j, t) 
# quantity of E commodity into consumption#; 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) iine(j, t ) 
# quantity of E commodity into investment#; 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) rrne(j, t) 
# quantity of E commodity into R&D #; 
( all , j, goods_e) (all , t , alltime) gcee(j, t ) 
# quantity of E commodity into gov't #; 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) exqe(j, t) 
# quantity of E commodity into export#; 
(all , j, goods) (all , t, alltime) pry(j, t) 
·# price of both E and M commodity as Armington good#; 
Update 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
VlE(j, i, t) = en(j, i, t) * pry(j, t) 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) 
V2E(j, t) = cone(j, t) * pry(j, t); 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) 
V3E(j, t) = iine(j, t) * pry(j, t); 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) 
V4E(j, t) = rrne(j, t) * pry(j , t); 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) 
VSE(j, t) = gcee(j, t) * pry(j, t); 
(all , j, goods_e) (all , t, alltime) 
V6 E(j, t) = exqe(j, t) * pry(j, t); 
!====================================================================== 
Data coefficients & variables: Material commodity flows of io table 
for Production 1, Consumption 2, Investment 3, R&D 4, Gov't 5, Export 6 
========================================================================! 
Coefficient 
( all , j, goods_m) (all , i, sectors) (all , t, alltime) VlM(j,i,t) 
# value: M commodity into production #; 
(all , j, goods_m) (al l, t, alltime) V2M(j, t) 
# value: M commodity into consumption # ; 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) V3M(j, t) 
# value: M commodity into investment #; 
(all , j, goods_m) (al l, t, alltime) V4M(j, t ) 
# value: M commodity into R&D #; 
(all, j, goods_m ) (all, t, alltime ) VSM(j, t ) 
# value: M commodity into gov't #; 
( all , j, goods_m ) (all , t, alltime ) V6M(j, t ) 
# value: M commodity into export#; 
Read 
VlM from FILE BASEDATA HEADER "VlM"; 
V2M f rom FILE BASEDATA HEADER "V2M"; 
V3M from FILE BASEDATA HEADER "V3M"; 
V4M from FILE BASEDATA HEADER "V4M"; 
VSM from FILE BAS EDA TA HEADER "VSM"; 
V6M fr om FILE BASEDATA HEADER "V6M"; 
Va r iable 
(al l , j, goods_m) (al l, i, sectors) (all , t, alltime) oi(j, i, t) 
# quantity of M commodity into production#; 
( al l , j, goods_m) (all , t, alltime ) cono(j, t) 
# quantity of M commodity i nto consumption#; 
(all , j, goods_m) (all , t, alltime ) iino(j , t) 
# quantity of M commodity into investment#; 
(all, j, goods_m) (all , t, alltime ) rrno(j, t ) 
# quantity of M commodity into R&D #; 
(all , j, goods_m) ( al l , t, alltime) gceo(j, t) 
# quantity of M commodity into gov't #; 
(all , j, goods_m) (all , t, alltime) exqo(j, t ) 
# quantity of M commodity into export#; 
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Update 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
VlM(j, i, t) = oi(j, i, t) * pry(j, t) ; 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
V2M(j, t) = cono (j, t) * pry(j, t); 
(all, j, goods_m) (al l , t, alltime) 
V3M(j, t) = iino (j, t) * pry(j, t); 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
V4M(j, t) = rrno (j, t) * pry(j, t); 
(all, j , goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
VSM(j, t) = gceo (j, t) * pry(j , t); 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
V6M(j, t) = exqo (j, t) * pry(j, t); 
!==================================================================== 
Data coefficients and variables: Primary factor input into production 
=====================================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) VL(i, t) 
# Labor employment payment#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t , alltime) VK(i, t) 
# physical capital rental payment#; 
(all, i , sectors) (all, t, alltime) VH(i, t) 
# knowledge capital rental payment#; 
Read 
VL from FILE BAS EDA TA HEADER "VL "; 
VK from FILE BAS EDA TA HEADER "VK"; 
VH from FILE BASEDATA HEADER "VH"; 
Variable 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) 
# Labor employment#; 
(all, t , all time) 
# Labor wage rate#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
# physical capital stock#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) 
# implicit rental price of physical 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) 
# knowledge capital stock#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) 
# implicit rental price of knowledge 
Update 
lab(i, 
wag(t) 
cap(i, 
prk(i, 
stock#; 
hcp(i , 
phc(i , 
stock#; 
t) 
t) 
t) 
t) 
t) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
(all, i, sec~ors) (all, t, alltime) 
VL(i, t) 
VK(i, t) 
VH(i, t) 
!======================================= 
Import component of each Armington good 
========= ·==============================! 
Coefficient 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime) VM(j, t) 
# import component for each Armington good#; 
Read 
VM from FILE BASEDATA HEADER "VM"; 
Variable 
(all, J, goods) (all, t, alltime) imq(j, t) 
lab(i, t)*wag(t); 
cap(i, t)*prk(i, t); 
hcp(i, t)*phc(i, t); 
# quantity of import for each Armington good#; 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime) pmr(j, t) 
# price of import for each Armington good#; 
Update 
(all, j,goods) (all, t, alltime) VM(j, t) = imq(j, t)*pmr(j, t); 
!================================================================ 
Producer problem characterization: demand for E commodity: 
allocate aggregate E bundle into each E commodity 
-=========================================----------------------' 
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Coefficient 
(parameter)(all, i, sectors) 
SIGMA_lE(i) # energy substitution elasticity#; 
(all, j , goods_e) (all, t, alltime) 
TCAR(j,t) # ad valorem equivalent carbon tax#; 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
S_VlEE (j, i, t) # cost share of individual E commodity in E bundle#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
Vl_E(i,t) # value of energy bundle input#; 
Read 
SIGMA_lE from FILE BASEDATA header "SlE"; 
TCAR from File BASEDATA header "TCAR"; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
Vl_E(i , t) = sum {j, goods_e, VlE(j, i, t)}; 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
S_VlEE(j, i, t) = VlE(j, i, t) / Vl_E(i, t); 
S_VlEE represent the cost share of individual E commodity in E bundle, 
so double EE! 
Variable 
(CHANGE) (all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) 
delTCAR(j,t) # ad valorem equivalent carbon tax#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) ent (i, t) 
# quantity of energy bundle#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) pre (i, t) 
# price index of energy bundle#; 
Update 
(CHANGE) 
TCAR(j,t) 
Equation 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) 
delTCAR(j,t) 
E_en # producer demand for individual energy commodity# 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
en(j,i,t) SIGMA_lE(i)*[pre(i,t) - pry(j,t) - 100/( l+TCAR(j,t)) *delTCAR(j,t)] 
+ ent(i,t); 
E_pre # price index of energy bundle inputs in each sector# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
pre(i, t) = sum{j, goods_e, 
S_VlEE(j,i,t) * [pry(j,t) + 100/( l+TCAR(j,t)) *delTCAR(j,t)] }; 
!====================================================================== 
Producer demand for individual material commodity: 
allocate aggregate material bundle into· tndividual M commodities 
======================================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S_VlMM(j, i, t) 
# cost share of individual material commodity in material bundle#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) Vl_M(i,t) 
# value of material bundle inputs#; 
(parameter) · (all, i, sectors) SIGMA_lM(i) 
# material substitution elasticity#; 
Read 
SIGMA l M from FILE BASEDATA header "SlM"; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
Vl_M(i, t) = sum { j, goods_m, VlM(j, i, t)}; 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
S_VlMM (j, i, t) = VlM(j, i, t) / Vl_M(i, t); 
Variable 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) oin (i,t) 
# quantity of material bundle inputs#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t , alltime) poi (i,t) 
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# price index of materiaL bundLe inputs#; 
Equation 
E_oi # producer demand for individuaL materiaL commodity# 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
oi(j, i, t) = SIGMA_lM(i) * [poi(i, t) - pry(j, t)] + oin(i, t); 
!POI: price index of materiaL bundLe, 
PRY: price of individuaL Armington materiaL good! 
E_poi # price index of materiaL bundLe inputs in each sector# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
poi(i, t) = sum { j, goods_m, S_VlMM(j, i, t) * pry(j,t)}; 
! cost minimization of materiaL commodity subject to exogenous 
aggregate of materiaL bundLe! 
!==================================================================== 
Producer demand for Labor, energy bundLe, materiaL bundLe 
- aLLocating aggregate physicaL input bundLe Z into L, E, M 
=====================================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) VlZK (i, t) 
# vaLue of K input into the production of sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) VlZ L (i, t) 
# vaLue of L input into the production of sector i #; 
(all, i , sectors) (all, t, alltime) VlZE (i, t) 
# vaLue of E input into the production of sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) VlZM (i, t) 
# vaLue of M input into the production of sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) Vl_Z(i, t) 
# vaLue of tangibLe physicaL inputs into production#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S_VlZK (i, t) 
# cost share of Kin tangibLe physicaL bundLe Z#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S_VlZL (i, t) 
# cost share of Lin tangibLe physicaL inputs Z #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S_VlZE (i, t ) 
# cost share of E in tangibLe physicaL bundLe Z #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S_VlZM (i, t) 
# cost share of Min tangibLe physicaL bundLe Z #; 
(parameter ) (all, i, sectors) SIGMA_lZ(i) 
# KLEM substitution eLasticity #; 
Read 
SIGMA_lZ from FILE BASEDATA Header "SlZ"; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) VlZK(i, t) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) VlZL(i, t) 
VK(i, 
VL(i, 
t) 
t) 
(all, i, sectors) (all , t, all time) VlZE(i, t) Vl_E(i , 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) VlZM( i, t) Vl_M(i, 
(all, i, sectors) (all , t, all time) 
; 
; 
t) 
t) 
Vl_Z(i, t) = VlZK(i, t) + VlZL(i, t) + VlZE(i, t) + VlZM(i, t); 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S_VlZK(i, t) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) S_VlZL(i, t) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) S_VlZE(i, t) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) S_VlZM(i, t) 
Variable 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) ouz (i, t) 
# quantity of tangibLe physicaL inputs composite#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all , t, alltime) prz (i, t) 
VlZK(i, 
VlZL(i, 
VlZE(i, 
VlZM(i, 
# price index of tangibLe physicaL input composite#; 
Equation 
E_lab # producer demand for Labor# 
(all, i, sectors) (all , t, alltime) 
lab(i, t) = SIGMA_lZ(i) * [prz(i,t) wag(t) ] + ouz(i,t) 
E_ent # producer demand for energy bundLe # 
(a ll , i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
ent(i, t) = SIGMA_lZ(i) * [prz(i,t) pre(i,t)] + ouz(i,t) 
E_oin # producer demand for materiaL bundLe # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
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t) 
t) 
t) 
t) 
I Vl_Z(i, 
I Vl_Z(i, 
I Vl_Z(i, 
I Vl_Z(i, 
t); 
t) ; 
t); 
t); 
oin(i, t) = SIGMA_lZ(i) * [prz(i,t) - poi(i, t)] + ouz(i,t) 
E_prz # price index of physical inputs bundle Z # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
prz(i, t) = S_VlZL(i, t) * wag(t) + S_VlZK( i, t) * prk(i, t) 
+ S_VlZE(i, t) * pre(i, t) + S_VlZM(i, t) * poi(i, t); 
!======================================================== 
Producer demand for tangible physical input bundle Z 
=========================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) VlQZ(i, t) 
# value of tangible physical input Z used in sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) VlQH(i, t) 
# value of knowledge input H used in sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) Vl_Q(i, t) 
# value of domestic output of sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S_VlQZ(i, t) 
# cost share of Zin domestic output of sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S_VlQH(i, t) 
# cost share of Hin domestic output of sector i #; 
(parameter) (all, i, sectors) SIGMA_lQ(i) 
# substitution elasticity between tangible I intangible input#; 
Read 
SIGMA_lQ from FILE BASEDATA Header "SlQ"; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) VlQZ(i, t) = Vl_Z(i, t); 
(all, i, sectors) (all , t, all time) VlQH(i, t) = VH(i, t) ; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) Vl_Q (i, t) = VlQZ(i, t) + VlQH(i, t); 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) S_VlQZ (i, t) VlQZ(i, 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, all time) S_VlQH (i, t) = VlQH(i, 
Variable 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) oup (i, t) 
# quantity of domestic production output of sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) prp (i, t) 
# producer price index of sector i #; 
Equation 
E_ouz # producer demand for tangible physical inputs Z# 
(all, i , sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
ouz(i,t) = SIGMA_lQ(i) * [prp(i , t) - prz(i, t)] + oup(i, t); 
t) / Vl_Q(i, t); 
t) / Vl_Q(i, t); 
!PRP: producer price, PRZ: price index of tangible physical inputs composite 
E_prp # producer price index of sector i # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
prp(i, t) = S_VlQZ(i, t) * prz(i, t) + S_VlQH(i, t) * phc(i, t); 
! cost minimtzation of Z-H input subject to exogenous domestic 
production output OUP. ! 
E_phc # implicit rental price. of knowledge capital stock PHC# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
phc(i, t) = prp(i, t) + 1/SIGMA_lQ(i)*oup(i,t) - 1/SIGMA_lQ(i) * hcp(i,t) ; 
! PHC: the value of marginal product of knowledge stock at top tier production! 
E_prk # implicit rental price of physical capital PRK# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
prk(i,t) = prp(i,t) + 1/SIGMA_lZ(i)*ouz(i,t) - 1/SIGMA_lZ(i) *cap(i, t) 
+ 1/SIGMA_lQ(i)*oup(i,t) + 1/SIGMA_lQ(i)*ouz(i,t) ; 
! PRK: the· value of marginal product of physical capital stock 
in producing physical inputs bundle! 
!===========================================================--------
One-to-one correspondence between commodity and sector: 
OUP determined by OUG, PRO determined by PRP 
====================================================================' 
Mapping GOD2SEC from goods to sectors; 
Formula (all, j, goods) GOD2SEC(j) = $POS(j); 
Mapping SEC2GOD from sectors to goods; 
Formula (all, i, sectors) SEC2GOD(i) = $POS(i); 
!the integer function $POS: identity the position number 
of element name in the defined set! 
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Coefficient 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime) S_VlYQ (j, t) 
# share of domesticaLLy-produced component Q of Armington good j # ; 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime) S_VlYM (j, t) 
# share of imported component M of Armington good j # ; 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime) VlYQ(j, t) 
# vaLue of domesticaLLy-produced component Q of Armington good j # ; 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime ) VlYM(j, t) 
# vaLue of imported component M of Armington good j # ; 
(all, j , goods) (all, t, alltime ) Vl_Y(j, t) 
# vaLue of Armington good j #; 
(parameter) (all, j, goods) SIGMA_lDF ( j) 
# substitution eLast. between domesticaLLy-produced/ imported components#; 
Read 
SIGMA_lDF from FILE Basedata Header "SWF"; 
Formula 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, all time) VlYQ(j , t) = Vl_Q(GOD2SEC(j),t); 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime) VlYM(j, t) = VM(j, t) ; 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, all time ) Vl_Y(j, t) = VlYQ(j, t) + VlYM(j, t); 
(all, j, goods) (all , t, all time) S_VlYQ (j, t) VlYQ(j, t) / Vl_Y(j , 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, all time) S_VlYM (j , t) = VlYM(j, t) / Vl_Y(j , 
Variable 
(all , j, goods) (all, t, alltime) oug (j, t) 
# quantity of domesticaLLy-produced components of the Armington good j # ; 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime) prd (j , t) 
# price of domesticoLLy-produced components of the Armington good j # ; 
(all, j , goods) (all, t, alltime) ouy (j , t) 
# quantity of Armington good j #; 
Equation 
E_oup 
(all, i, 
# mapping sector output to corresponding good# 
sectors) (all, t, alltime) oup (i , t) = oug (SEC2GOD(i), t); 
E_oug # domesticaLLy-produced component of the Armington good# 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime) 
oug (j, t) = ouy(j, t) + SIGMA_lDF(j) * [pry(j. t) - prd(j, t)] ; 
E_imq # import component of the Armington good# 
(all, j, goods) (all, t, alltime) 
imq (j,t) = ouy (j, t) + SIGMA_lDF (j) * [pry(j, t) - pmr(j , t)] ; 
E_prd #price of domesticaLLy-produced component of the Armington good# 
(all, j, goods) (all, t , alltime) prd(j, t) = prp (GOD2SEC(j) , t) ; 
E_pry # price of Armington· good# 
(all, j, goo9s) (all, t , alltime) 
pry(j, t) = S_VlYQ (j, t) * prd (j , t) + S_VlYM (j , t) * pmr (j,t) 
!====================================================== 
IntertemporaL set 
=======================================================! 
Coefficient(parameter) (all , t, alltime) year(t); 
READ year FROM FILE basedata Header "YEAR"'; 
Coefficient (all, t, fwdtime) dt(t) ; · 
FORMULA (ali , t, fwdtime) dt(t) = year(t+l) - year(t) 
!=================================================------
Investment ' and physicaL capitaL accumuLation 
==================================================- ----/ 
Coefficient 
(parameter) DELTA 
# depreciation rate of physicaL capital stock #; 
(parameter) LABGROW 
# effective Labor growth rate#; 
(parameter) PHI 
# investment adjustment cost coefficient#; 
(all, t, alltime) TCOR(t) 
# corporate income tax rate#; 
(all, t, alltime) TITC(t) 
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t) 
t) 
# investment tax credit#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LCAP(i ,t) 
# physical capital stock#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LJNV(i,t) 
# installed investment in physical capital#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LINV(i,t) 
# raw investment good (adjustment cost included)#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LLAM(i,t) 
# shadow price of physical capital#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LPRK(i,t) 
#implicit rental price of physical capital#; 
(all, t, alltime) LPRII(t) 
#purchase price of raw investment good#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LTOB(i,t) 
# Tobin's-q in physical capital investment#; 
Read 
DELTA from file BASEDATA header "DELT"; 
LABGROW from file BASEDATA header "LGOW"; 
PHI from file BASEDATA header "PHI"; 
TCOR from file BASEDATA header "TCOR"; 
TITC from file BASEDATA header "TITC"; 
LCAP from file BAS EDA TA header "CAP" j 
LJNV from file BASEDATA header "JNV"; 
LPRII from file BASEDATA header "PRII"; 
Variable 
(CHANGE) (all, t, alltime) delTCOR(t) 
# corporate income tax rate#; 
(CHANGE) (all, t, alltime) delTITC(t) 
# rate of investment tax credit#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) jnv(i, t) 
# installed investment in physical capital#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) inv(i, t) 
# raw investment good (adjustment cost included)#; 
(all, t, alltime) prii(t) 
#purchase price of raw investment good#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) lam(i, t) 
# shadow price of physical capital#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) tob(i, t) 
# Tobin's-q in physical capital investment#; 
Update 
(CHANGE) 
(CHANGE) 
(all, i, 
(all, i, 
(all, t, 
(all, t, alltime) TCOR(t) = delTCOR(t); 
(all, t, alltime) TITC(t) = delTITC(t); 
sectors) (all, t, alltime) LCAP(i,t) = cap(i,t) 
sectors) (all, t, alltime) LJNV(i,t) = jnv(i,t) 
alltime) LPRII(t) = prii(t); 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LLAM(i,t) = [1-TITC(t)] * LPRII(t) * [1 +PHI* LJNV(i,t) / LCAP(i,t)]; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LTOB(i,t) ~ LLAM(i , t) / [( 1-TITC(t)) * LPRII(t)] ; 
(all, i, sectors)(all, t, alltime) 
LPRK(i,t) = 0 VK(i,t) / LCAP(i,t); 
!====================================== 
Producer demand for investment good 
========== · ===========================! 
Equation 
E_tob # Tobin's-q as a function of shadow price of physical capital# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
tob(i,t) = lam(i,t) - prii(t) + 100/(1-TITC(t)) * delTITC(t) ; 
E_jnv # demand for installed investment# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
jnv(i, t) = [LTOB(i, t)/(LTOB(i,t)-1)] * tob(i, t) + cap (i, t); 
E_inv # demand for raw investment good including adjustment cost# 
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(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
inv(i,t) [PHI*LJNV(i,t) / (PHI*LJNV(i,t)+2*LCAP(i , t))] 
* [jnv(i,t)-cap(i , t)] + jnv(i,t); 
!========================================= 
Law of motion for physical capital stock 
=========================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors)(all, t, fwdtime) S_Kl(i, t); 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors)(all, t, fwdtime) 
S_Kl(i, t)= LCAP(i, t) * [1- (DELTA+LABGROW) * dt(t)] / LCAP(i, t+l); 
Equation 
E_cap # percentage change of the Law of motion for physical capital# 
(all, i , sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
cap(i, t+l) = S_Kl(i, t) * cap(i, t) + (1-S_Kl(i, t)) * jnv(i,t); 
!======================================================== 
Law of motion for the shadow price of physical capital 
=======================================================! 
Coefficient 
(parameter) INTR # interest rate#; 
(all, i , sectors)(all, t , fwdtime) S_K2(i, t) 
# coefficient used in equation#; 
(all, i, sectors)(all, t, alltime) S_K3(i, t) 
# coefficient used in equation#; 
Read 
INTR from file Basedata header "INTR "; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors)(all, t, fwdtime) 
S_K2(i, t) = [1+ (INTR+DELTA)*dt(t)] * LLAM(i, t) / LLAM(i, t+l); 
(all, i, sectors)(all, t, alltime) 
S_K3(i, t) = (1-TCOR(t)) * LPRK(i , t) 
/ [(1-TCOR(t)) *LPRK(i,t) 
+ (1-TITC(t))*LPRII(t) *(PHI/2) *(LJNV(i,t)/LCAP(i,t)) ~2] 
Equation 
E_lam # Law of motion for shadow price of physical capital# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
lam(i, t+l) = S_K2(i, t) * lam(i, t) 
+ [1-S_K2(i,t)] * S_K3(i,t) * [prk(i, t) - 100 / (1-TCOR(t)) * delTCOR(t) 
+ [1-S_K2(i,t)] * [1 - S_K3(i,t)] 
* [prii(t) + 2 * (inv(i,t)-cap(i,t)) - 100/(1-TITC(t))*delTITC(t)] 
Equation 
E_lamend # boundary condtion for shadow price of physical capital # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, endtime) 
lam(i, t) = S_K3(i,t) * [prk(i, t) - 100 /( l ~TCOR(t)) * delTCOR(t)] 
+ [1 - S_Kj (i,t)] 
* [prii(t) + 2*(inv(i,t)-cap(i,t)) - 100/ (1-TITC(t)) *delTITC(t)]; 
f========== ·==========================================--
R&D and knowledge capital accumulation 
=======================================================! 
Coefficient 
(parameter) AH 
# knowledge creation efficiency#; 
(parameter) ALPHA 
# power on R in IPF #; 
(parameter) BETA 
# power on Hin IPF #; 
(parameter) DELTAH 
# depreciation rate of knowledge capital#; 
(all, t, alltime) TRTC(t) 
# R&D tax credit#; 
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(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LRNV(i,t) 
# R&D investment#; 
(all, t, alltime) LPRRR(t) 
# price of raw R&D good#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LHCP(i,t) 
# knowledge capital stock#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t , alltime) LLAMR(i,t) 
# shadow price of knowledge capital#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LPHC(i,t) 
# implicit rental price of knowledge capital#; 
Read 
AH from file BASEDATA header "AH"; 
ALPHA from file BASEDATA header "ALPH"; 
BETA from file BASEDATA header "BETA"; 
DELTAH from file BASEDATA header "DETH"; 
TRTC from file BASEDATA header "TRTC''; 
lHCP from file BASEDATA header "HCP"; 
LRNV from file BASEDATA header "RNV"; 
LPRRR from file BAS EDA TA header "PRRR "; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LPHC (i,t) = VH(i,t)/LHCP(i,t); 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LLAMR(i ,t) =(1-TRTC(t)) * LPRRR(t) 
/ [AH*A LPHA*[LRNV(i, t )A(ALPHA- l ) ] *( LHCP (i, t )ABETA)]; 
VARIABLE 
(CHANGE) (all, t, alltime) delTRTC(t) 
# ordinary change of R&D tax credit#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) rnv(i,t) 
# R&D investment in knowledge capital#; 
(all, t, alltime) prrr(t) 
# purchase price of raw R&D good#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) lamr (i,t) 
# shadow price of knowledge capital#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) tobr(i,t) 
# Tobin's-q for R&D investment#; 
Update 
(CHANGE ) 
(all, i, 
(all, i, 
(all, t, 
(all, t, alltime) 
sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
all time) 
TRTC(t) = delTRTC(t); 
LHCP(i ,t) = hcp(i,t); 
LRNV(i,t) = rnv(i,t); 
LP RRR(t) = prrr(t); 
!=================================================== 
producer demand for R&D investment 
=================================================--! 
Equation 
E_tobr # Tobin 's-q for R&D investment# 
(all, i, sectors) (all , t, alltime) 
tobr(i,t) = lamr(i,t) - prrr(t) + 100 /( 1-TRTC(t)) * delTRTC(t); 
E rnv # R&D investment# 
(~11, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
0 = tobr(i,t) + (A LPHA-1 ) * rnv(i,t) +BETA* hcp(i,t); 
!================================================---
Law of motion for knowledge capital stock 
===========================================--------' 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors) (all , t, f wdtime) S_Hl(i,t); 
Formula 
(all , i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
S_Hl(i,t)= [1- (DELTAH+LABGROW)*dt(t)] * LHCP(i,t) / LHCP(i,t+l); 
Equation 
E_hcp # Law of motion for knowledge capital stock# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
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hcp( i,t+l) = S_Hl(i,t) * hcp(i,t) 
+ [1-S_Hl(i , t)] * [ALPHA*rnv(i ,t) + BETA*hcp(i ,t) ]; 
!=================================================== 
Law of motion for shadow price of knowledge capital 
===================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, endtime) 
S_H2(i,t); 
S_H3(i,t); 
S_H4(i,t); 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
S_H2(i,t) = [l + dt(t) *( INTR + DELTAH) - dt(t) *AH*BETA 
* (LRNV(i,t)AALPHA)*(LHCP(i,t)A(BETA-1))] 
* LLAMR(i,t) / LLAMR(i,t+l); 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
S_H3(i,t) = [- dt(t) *AH*BETA*( LRNV(i,t) AALPHA) 
*( LHCP(i,t) A( BETA-1))] 
/ [1 + dt(t) *( INTR+DELTAH) - dt(t) *AH*B ETA 
* (LRNV(i,t)AALPHA)*(LHCP(i,t)A(BETA-1))]; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, endtime) 
S_H4(i,t) = [- AH *BETA*(LRNV(i,t) AA LPHA) 
*( LHCP(i,t)A(BETA-1))] 
/ [INTR + DELTAH - AH *BETA*( LRNV(i,t) AALPHA) 
*( LHCP(i,t) A( BETA-1))]; 
Equation 
E_lamr # Law of motion for the shadow price of knowledge capital stock# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
lamr(i,t+l) = S_H2(i,t) * [lamr(i,t) + 
S_H3(i,t)*(ALPHA*rnv(i,t)+(BETA-l)*hcp(i,t))] 
+(1-S_H2(i,t)) *[phc(i,t) - 100/ (1-TCOR(t)) * delTCOR(t)]; 
E_lamrend # boundary condtion for shadow price of knowledge capital# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, endtime) 
S_H4(i,t) * [ALPHA*rnv(i,t)+(BETA-l) *hcp(i,t)] + lamr(i,t) 
= phc(i,t) - 100/( 1-TCOR(t)) * delTCOR(t) ; 
!================================================================ 
Characterization of consumption for the representative household 
================================================================! 
!============================= 
HH after-tax current income 
===============================! 
Coefficient . 
(all, t, alltime) LINCM(t) 
# after-tax income#; 
(all, t, alltime) TINC(t) 
# income tax rate#; 
(all, t, a"lltime) V_L(t) 
# value of aggregate Labor income payment#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S VL(i, t) 
# share of each sector's Labor income payment#; 
Read 
TINC from file basedata header "TINC"; 
Variable 
(CHANGE) (all, t, alltime) delTINC(t) 
# ordinary change in income tax rate#; 
(all, t, alltime) incm(t) 
# after-tax current income#; 
Update 
(CHANGE) (all, t, alltime) TINC(t) delTINC(t) 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) V_L(t) sum {i, sectors, VL(i, t)} 
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(all, t, alltime) LINCM(t) = [1-TINC(t)] * V_L(t) ; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) S_VL(i , t) = VL(i, t) / V_L(t); 
Equation 
E_incm # HH after-tax current income# 
(all, t, alltime) 
incm(t) = - 100 / (1-TINC(t)) * delTINC(t) 
+ wag(t) 
+ sum{i, sectors, S_VL(i, t) *lab(i, t)} 
!============================================ 
HH total wealth (financial plus human wealth) 
=============================================! 
!================ 
Financial wealth 
================! 
Coefficient 
(parameter) FORE_C 
# share of consumption driven by perfect foresight # ; 
(parameter) TIME PREF 
# pure rate of time preference#; 
(parameter) MPC 
# marginal propensity to consume#; 
(all, t, alltime) V2(t) 
# HH aggregate consumption expenditure#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LSTM(i, t) 
# sector-specific equity value in stock market # ; 
(all, t, alltime) LSTMT(t) 
# economy-wide equity value in stock market #; 
(all, t, alltime) LWELA(t) 
# financial wealth component in HH total wealth#; 
(all, t, alltime) LWELT(t) 
# HH total wealth#; 
(all , t, alltime) S_C2(t) 
# coefficient used in equation E_welt #; 
(all , i, sectors)(all, t, alltime) S_C3(i,t) 
# coefficient used in equation E_wela #; 
Read 
FORE_C from file Basedata header "FORE"; 
TIMEPREF from file Basedata header "TIMP"; 
MPC from file Basedata header "MPC" ; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t , alltime) 
LSTM(i,t) = LLAM(i,t) *LCAP(i,t) + LLAMR(i , t) *LHCP(i,t); 
!equity value from both physical and knowledge capital stock! 
(all, t, all~ime) 
LSTMT(t) = sum{i, sectors, LSTM(i, t)} ; 
(all, t, alltime) 
LWELA(t) = LSTMT(t) ; 
(all, t, alltime) 
V2(t) = sum{ j, goods_e, V2E(j, t)} + sum{ j, goods_m, V2M(j, t)} ; 
(all , t, alltime) 
LWELT(t) = [V2(t) - (1-FORE_C) * MPC * LINCM(t)] / (FORE_C * TIMEPREF) ; 
(all, t , al i time) S_C2(t) = LWELA(t) / LWELT(t) ; 
(all, i, sectors)(all , t, alltime) S_C3(i,t) = LSTM(i , t) / LSTMT(t) ; 
Variable 
(all, i , sectors) (all , t, alltime) stm(i , t) 
# equity value of sector i in stock market # ; 
(all, t, alltime) wela(t) 
# financial wealth component in HH total wealth # ; 
(all , t, alltime) welh(t) 
# huamn wealth component in HH total wealth#; 
(all, t, alltime) welt(t) 
# HH total wealth#; 
Equation 
E_welt # HH total wealth as summation of financial and human wealth # 
(all , t,alltime) welt(t) = S_C2(t) *wela(t) + (1-S_C2(t)) *welh(t); 
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E_wela # financial wealth: holding of the equity value of firms# 
(all,t,alltime) wela(t) = sum{i, sectors, S_C3(i,t)*stm(i,t)}; 
E_stm # equity value of firms# 
(all,i,sectors) (all,t,alltime) 
stm(i,t) = LLAM(i,t) *LCAP(i,t) / LSTM(i,t) *[lam(i,t) + cap(i,t)] 
+ [1-LLAM(i,t)* LCAP(i,t) / LSTM(i,t)] *[lamr(i,t) + hcp(i,t)]; 
!================== 
human wealth 
===================! 
Coefficient 
# human wealth#; (all, t, alltime) 
(all, t, fwdtime) 
LWELH(t) 
S_C4(t) # coefficient used E_weLh #; 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) LWELH(t) = LWELT(t) - LWELA(t); 
(all, t, fwdtime) S_C4(t) = [l+(INTR-LABGROW)*dt(t)]*LWELH(t)/ LWELH(t+l); 
Equation 
E_welh # Law of motion for the human wealth# 
(all, t, fwdtime) 
welh(t+l) = S_C4(t) * welh(t) 
+ [1 - S_C4(t)] * wag(t) 
+ [1- S_C4(t)] * sum{i, sectors, S_VL(i,t) * lab(i,t)}; 
Equation 
E_welhend # boundary condtion for human wealth# 
(all, t, endtime) 
welh(t) = wag(t) + sum{i, sectors, S_VL(i,t)*lab(i,t)}; 
!====================== 
Aggregate consumption 
=======================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, all time) S_Cl(t) # coefficient used in equation E_conp #; 
Formula 
(all, t, all time) S_Cl(t) (1-FORE_C) * MPC * LINCM(t) / V2(t) 
Variable 
(all, t, all time) conp(t) # HH aggregate consumption 
(all, t, all time) prct(t) # consumer price index#; 
Equation 
E_conp # aggregate consumption# 
(all, t, alltime) 
#· ,
conp(t) = S_Cl(t) * incm(t) + (1-S_Cl(t)) * welt(t) - prct (t) 
!======== ·========================================================= 
allocating aggregate consumption CONP into energy & material bundle 
========================================= ·===================-----! 
Coefficient · 
(all, t, alltime) S_V2E (t) 
# cost share of energy bundle in consumption expenditure#; 
(all, t, alltime) S_V2M (t) 
# cost sha.re of material bundle in consumption expenditure #; 
(all, t, alltime) V2_E (t) . 
# value of HH expenditure on energy bundle#; 
(all, t, alltime) V2_M (t) 
# value of HH expenditure on material bundle#; 
(parameter) SIGMA_20 
# elasticity of E&M bundle substitution on top tier#; 
Read 
SIGMA_20 from file Basedata Header "520"; 
Formula 
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(all, t, all time) V2_E(t) = sum{ j, goods_e, V2E(j, t)} j 
(all, t, alltime) V2_M(t) = sum{ j, goods_m, V2M(j, t)} j 
(all, t, alltime ) S_V2E(t) V2_E(t)/V2(t); 
(all, t, all time) S_V2M(t) = V2_M(t)/V2(t); 
Variable 
(all, t, all time) cnpe(t) # quantity of energy bundLe consumed#; 
(all, t, alltime) prce(t) # price of energy bundLe consumed#; 
(all, t, all time) cnpo(t) # quantity of materiaL bundLe consumed#; 
(all, t, all time) prco(t) # price of materiaL bundLe consumed#; 
Equation 
E_cnpe # HH demand for energy bundLe # 
(all, t, alltime) cnpe(t) = conp(t) + SIGMA_2O * [prct(t) - prce(t)] 
E_cnpo # HH demand for materiaL bundLe # 
(all, t, alltime) cnpo(t) = conp(t) + SIGMA_2O * [prct(t) - prco(t)] 
E_prct # consumer price index# 
(all, t, alltime) prct(t) = S_V2E(t) * prce(t) + S_V2M(t) * prco(t) 
!============================================================== 
aLLocating energy bundLe CNPE into individuaL energy commodities 
===============================================================! 
Coefficient 
(parameter) SIGMA_2E 
# eLasticity of E commodity substitution in E bundLe #; 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) S_V2EE(j, t) 
# cost share of E commodity in E bundLe #; 
Read 
SIGMA_2E from file Basedata header "52E"; 
Formula 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) S_V2EE(j, t) V2E(j,t) / V2_E(t) 
Equation 
E_cone # individuaL energy commodity consumed by HH # 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) 
cone(j,t) = cnpe (t) + SIGMA_2E * [prce(t) - pry(j,t) 
- 100/(l+TCAR(j,t))*delTCAR(j,t)]; 
E_prce # price index of energy bundLe in consumption· # 
(all, t, alltime) 
prce(t) = sum{j, goods_e, 
S_V2EE(j,t)* [pry(j,t) + 100/(l+TCAR(j,t)) *delTCAR(j,t)]} ; 
!=================================================================== 
aLLocating materiaL bundLe CNPO into individuaL materiaL commodities 
=,=== ·====== ·=======================================================! 
Coefficient 
(parameter) SIGMA_2M # eLasticity of M commodity substitution in M bundLe #; 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) S_V2MM(j ; t) 
# cost share of each individuaL materiaL commodity in materiaL bundLe #; 
Read 
SIGMA_2M from file Basedata Header "52M"; 
Formula 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) S_V2MM(j, t) V2M(j, t) / V2_M(t) 
Equation 
E_cono # individuaL materiaL commodity consumed by HH # 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
cono(j, t) = cnpo (t) + SIGMA_2M*[prco(t) - pry (j,t)] ; 
E_prco # price index of materiaL bundLe in consumption# 
(all, t, alltime) prco(t) = sum{j, goods_m, S_V2MM(j,t)* pry(j,t)} 
!-=================================================== 
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Characterization of investment sector 
=====================================================! 
!================================= 
demand for individual E commodity 
=================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) V3_E(t) 
# value of energy bundle in investment sector#; 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) S_V3EE(j, t) 
# cost share of E commodity in E bundle#; 
(parameter) SIGMA_3E 
# energy commodity substitution elasticity in investment sector#; 
Read 
SIGMA_3E from file Basedata header "53E"; 
Formula 
·{all, t, alltime) V3_E(t) = sum{j, goods_e, V3E(j, t)}; 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) S_V3EE(j, t) = V3E(j, t) / V3_E(t); 
Variable 
(all, t, alltime) 
# demand for energy 
(all, t, alltime) 
iite(t) 
bundle in investment sector#; 
prie(t) 
# price of energy bundle in investment sector#; 
Equation 
E_iine # investment sector demand for individual energy commodity# 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) 
iine(j,t) SIGMA_3E*[prie(t) - pry(j,t) - 100/( l+TCAR(j,t)) *delTCAR(j,t)] 
+ iite(t); 
E_prie # price index of energy bundle in investment sector# 
(all, t, alltime) 
prie(t) = sum{j, goods_e, S_V3EE(j,t) 
* [pry(j,t) + 100/(l+TCAR(j , t)) *delTCAR(j,t)]} 
!================================== 
demand for individual M commodity 
===================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) V3_M(t) 
#value of material bundle in investment sector#; 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) S_V3MM(j, t) 
#cost share of M commodity in M bundle#; 
(parameter) SIGMA_3M 
# M commodity substitution elasticity in investment sector#; 
Read 
SIGMA_3M from file Basedata header "53M"; 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) V3_M(t)= sum{j, goods_m, V3M(j,t)}; 
(all, j , goods_m) (all, t, alltime) S_V3MM(j_, t) = V3M(j, t) / V3_M(t); 
Variable 
(all, t, alltime) 
# demand f or material 
(all, t, alltime) 
iito(t) 
bundle in investment sector#; 
# price of material 
Equation 
proi(t) 
bundle in investment sector #; 
E_iino # investment sector demand for individual material commodity# 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
iino(j, t) = SIGMA_3M * [proi(t) - pry(j,t)] + iito(t) ; 
E_proi # price index of material bundle in investment sector# 
(all, t, alltime) 
proi(t) = sum{j, goods_m, S_V3MM(j, t) * pry(j,t)}; 
!==---===========================. 
Demand for energy/ material bundle 
===----=======================-==- ! 
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Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) V3(t) 
# vaLue of aLL commodity inputs into investment sector#; 
(all, t , alltime) S_V3E(t) 
# cost share of energy bundLe #; 
(all, t, alltime) S_V3M(t) 
# cost share of materiaL bundLe #; 
(parameter) SIGMA_3O 
# E/M substitution eLasticity in investment sector#; 
Read 
SIGMA_3O from file Basedata header "530"; 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) 
(all, t, alltime) 
(all, t, alltime) 
V3(t) = V3_E(t) + V3_M (t); 
S_V3E(t) = V3_E(t)/ V3(t); 
S_V3M(t) = V3_M(t)/ V3(t); 
Variable 
(all, t, alltime) invt(t) # suppLy of raw investment good#; 
Equation 
E_iite # investment sector demand for energy bundLe # 
(all, t, alltime) 
iite(t) = SIGMA_3O * [prii(t) - prie(t)] + invt(t) ; 
E_iito # investment sector demand for materiaL bundLe # 
(all, t, alltime) 
iito(t) = SIGMA_3O * [prii(t) - proi(t)] + invt(t) ; 
E_prii # purchase price of raw investment good# 
(all, t, alltime) 
prii(t) = S_V3E(t) * prie(t) + S_V3M(t) *proi(t); 
!============================================================== 
Characterization of R&D sector 
===============================================================! 
!================================ 
demand for individuaL E commodity 
=================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) V4_E(t) 
# vaLue of energy bundLe in R&D sector#; 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) S_V4EE(j, t) 
# cost share of E commodity in E bundLe #; 
(parameter) SIGMA_4E 
# energy commodity substitution eLasticity in R&D sector#; 
Read 
SIGMA_4E from file Basedata header "54£"; 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) 
(all, j, goods_e) (all , t , alltime) 
V4_E(t) = sum{ j, goods_e, V4E(j,t)}; 
S_V4EE(j, t) = V4E(j, t) / V4_E (t); 
Variable 
(all, t, alltime) rrte(t) 
# demand for E bundLe in R&D sector#; 
(all, t, alltime) prre(t) 
# price of E bundLe in R&D sector#; 
Equation 
E_rrne # R&D sector demand for individuaL E commodity# 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) 
rrne(j,t) = SIGMA_4E * [prre(t) - pry(j,t) - 100/( l+TCAR (j,t))*delTCAR(j,t) ] 
+ rrte(t) ; 
E_prre # price index of E bundLe in R&D sector# 
(all, t , alltime) 
prre(t) = sum{j, goods_e, S_V4EE(j,t) * [pry(j,t) 
+ 100/( l+TCAR(j,t)) *delTCAR(j,t)]}; 
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!==================================================== 
demand for individuaL materiaL commodity 
=====================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) V4_M(t) 
#vaLue of materiaL bundLe in R&Dsector#; 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) S_V4MM(j, t) 
# cost share of M commodity in M bundLe #; 
(parameter) SIGMA_4M 
# materiaL commodity substitution eLasticity in R&Dt sector#; 
Read 
SIGMA_ 4M from file Basedata header "54M"; 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) V4_M(t) = sum{j, goods_m, V4M(j, t)}; 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) S_V4MM(j,t) = V4M(j,t)/ V4_M(t); 
Variable 
(all, t, alltime) rrto(t) 
# demand for materiaL bundLe in R&D sector#; 
(all, t, alltime) prro(t) 
# price of materiaL bundLe in R&D sector#; 
Equation 
E_rrno # R&D sector demand for individuaL materiaL commodity# 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
rrno(j, t) = SIGMA_4M*[prro(t)-pry(j,t)] + rrto(t) 
E_prro # price index of materiaL bundLe in R&D sector# 
(all, t, alltime) 
prro(t) = sum{j, goods_m, S_V4MM(j,t)*pry(j,t)} ; 
!===================================================== 
Demand for energy/materiaL bundLe of R&D sector 
=====================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) V4(t) 
# vaLue of aLL commodity inputs into R&D sector#; 
(all, t, alltime) S_V4E(t) 
# cost share of energy bundLe #; 
(all, t, alltime) S_V4M(t) 
# cost share of materiaL bundLe #; 
(parameter) SIGMA_40 
# E/M substitution eLasticity in investment sector#; 
Read 
SIGMA_4Q from file Basedata header ' "540"; 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) 
(all, t, alltime) 
(all ,' t, alltime) 
Variable 
V4(t.) = V4_E(t) + V4_M(t); 
S V4E(t) V4 E(t)/ V4(t); 
S=V4M(t) = V4=M(t)/ ·v4(t); 
(all, t , alltime) rnvt(t) # totaL suppLy of raw R&D good#; 
Equation · 
E_rrte # R&D sector demand for energy bundLe # 
(all, ' t, alltime) 
rrte(t) = SIGMA_40 * [prrr(t) - prre(t)] + rnvt(t) 
E rrto # R&D sector demand for materiaL bundLe # 
(all, t, alltime) 
rrto(t) = SIGMA_40 * [prrr(t) - prro(t)] + rnvt(t) 
E_prrr # purchase price of raw investment good# 
(all, t, alltime) 
prrr(t) = S_V4E(t) * prre(t) + S_V4M(t) *prro(t); 
!======================================== 
Government behavior 
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=========================================! 
!=================================== 
Government demand for E/M commodities 
===================================! 
Variable 
(all, t, alltime) gcet(t) 
# totaL gov't expenditure in vaLue unit#; 
Equation 
E_gcee # gov't purchase of energy commodity# 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) 
gcee (j, t) = gcet(t) - pry(j, t); 
The actuaL quantity form: 
GCET(t) * S_VSE(t) * S_VSEE(j, t) = GCEE(j, t) * PRY(j, t) 
E_gceo # gov't purchase of materiaL commodity# 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
gceo (j, t) = gcet(t) - pry(j, t); 
! The actuaL quantity form: 
GCET(t) * S_VSM(t) * S_VSMM(j, t) = GCEO(j, t) * PRY(j, t) 
!======================================================================== 
Government budget constraint 
- assume no gov't deficit and issued bond 
- gov't expenditure financed by tax revenue, incLuding corporate short-run 
profit tax+ HH income tax - investment tax credit - R&D tax credit 
- gov't expenditure goes to pure consumption of commodity 
=========================================================================! 
!================================= 
Corporate income tax revenue TAXC 
=================================! 
Coefficient 
LPRF(i, t) (all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
# short-run profit of sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LTAXCI (i, t) 
# sector-specific corporate short-run 
(all, t, alltime) LTAXC (t) 
profit tax revenue#; 
# aggregate corporate short-run profi tax revenue#; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LPRF(i, t) = Vl_Q(i, t) - Vl_E(i, t) - VL(i, t) - Vl_M(i, t); 
! originaL form of short-run profit: PRF = OUP*PRP - ENT*PRE - LAB*WAG 
- OIN*POI, expressed in TABLO using the vaLue coefficient in IO tabLe ! 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LTAXCI (i, t) = TCOR(t) * LPRF(i, t); 
(all, th alltime} · 
LTAXC (t) = sum {i, sectors, LTAXCI(i , t)}; 
Variable 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) prf(i,t) 
# shor t-run profit of sector i #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) taxci(i,t) 
# sector-specific corporate short-run · profi tax revenue#; 
(all, t; alltime) taxc(t) 
# aggregate corporate short-run profi tax revenue#; 
Equation 
E_taxc # aggregate corporate short-run profi tax revenue# 
(all, t, alltime) 
taxc (t) = sum{i, sec tors, LTAXCI(i ,t) / LTAXC(t) * taxci(i,t)}; 
E_taxci # corporate short-run profi tax revenue from sector i # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
taxci (i, t) = 100 / TCOR(t) * delTCOR(t) + prf(i,t); 
E_prf # short-run profit of sector i # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
prf(i, t) = Vl_Q(i,t) / LPRF(i,t) * [oup(i,t) + prp(i,t)] 
- Vl_E(i,t) / LPRF(i,t) * [ent(i,t) + pre(i,t)] 
- VL(i,t) / LPRF(i,t) * [lab(i,t) + wag(t)] 
- Vl_M(i,t) / LPRF(i,t) * [oin(i,t) + poi(i,t)]; 
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!=========================== 
HH income tax revenue TAXH 
===========================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) LTAXH(t) # HH income tax revenue# 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) LTAXH(t) = TINC(t) * V_L(t) ; 
! TAXH(t) = TINC(t) * WAG(t) * sum{i, sectors, LAB(i,t) } TINC(t) * V_L(t) 
Variable 
(all, t, alltime) taxh(t) # HH income tax revenue# 
Equation 
E_taxh # HH income tax revenue# 
(all, t, alltime) 
taxh(t) = 100 / TINC(t) * delTINC(t) 
+ wag(t) 
+ sum{i, sectors, S_VL(i, t) * lab(i, t)}; 
!========================== 
Investment tax credit TAXI 
===========================! 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LTAXII(i, t) 
# sector i's investment tax credit#; 
(all, t, alltime) LTAXI(t) 
# gov't revenue Loss from investment tax credit#; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LINV(i,t) = LJNV(i,t) * [ 1 + (PHI/2) * (LJNV(i,t) / LCAP(i ,t)) ] ; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LTAXII(i,t) =TITC(t) * LINV(i,t) * LPRII(t); 
(all, t, alltime) 
LTAXI(t) = sum {i, sectors, LTAXII(i ,t) }; 
Variable 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) taxii(i, t) 
# sector i's investment tax credit#; 
(all, t, alltime) taxi(t) 
# gov't total revenue Loss from investment tax credit#; 
Equation 
E_taxii # sector i's investment tax credit# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
taxii(i, t) .= 100 / TITC(t) * delTITC(t ; + inv(i, t) + prii(t) ; 
!deLTITC(t), inv(i,t), prii(t) defined in producer demand for investment good 
E_taxi # total revenue Loss . from investment tax credit# 
(all, t, alltime) 
taxi(t) = s um{i, sectors, LTAXII(i, t) / LTAXI(t ) * taxii(i, t)}; 
! total investment tax credit TAXI(t) = sum {i, sectors, TAXII(i,t)}, 
the percentage change form: · 
TAXI(t) * t axi(t) = sum{i, sector, TAXII(i, t) * taxii(i, t)} ! 
!======================== 
R&D tax credit TAXR 
========== ·=============! 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LTAXRI(i,t) # sector i's R&D tax credit#; 
(all, t, alltime) 
L TAXR(t) # gov 't revenue Loss form R&D tax credit #; 
Formula 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LTAXRI(i,t) = TRTC(t) * LRNV(i ,t) * LPRRR(t); 
(all, t, alltime) LTAXR(t) = sum {i , sectors, LTAXRI(i,t)}; 
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Variable 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
taxri(i,t) # sector i's R&D tax credit#; 
(all, t, alltime) 
taxr(t) # gov 't revenue Loss form R&D tax credit #; 
Equation 
E_taxri # sector i's R&D tax credit# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
taxri(i,t) = 100 / TRTC(t) *delTRTC(t) + rnv(i, t) + prrr(t); 
! deLTRTC(t), rnv(i,t), prrr(t) all defined in producer demand for R&D good 
LTAXR is the defacto gov't expenditure on providing R&D fund, 
viz. gov't subsidy to R&D investment! 
E_taxr # total R&D tax credit# 
(all, t, alltime) 
taxr(t) = sum {i, sectors, LTAXRI(i, t) / LTAXR(t) * taxri(i, t )} 
!============================= 
total gov't tax revenue TAXT 
=============================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) LTAXT(t) # total tax revenue collected by gov't #; 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) LTAXT(t) LTAXC(t) + LTAXH(t) - LTAXI(t) - LTAXR(t ); 
Variable 
(all, t, alltime) taxt(t) # total tax revenue collected by gov't # 
Equation 
E_taxt # total tax revenue collected by gov't # 
(all, t , alltime) 
taxt(t) = LTAXC(t) / LTAXT(t) * taxc(t) + LTAXH(t)/LTAXT(t) * taxh(t) 
- LTAXI(t) / LTAXT(t) * taxi(t) - LTAXR(t) / LTAXT(t) * taxr(t) 
!================================================================= 
Gov't budget constraint: gov't tax revenue LTAXT used to afford 
gov't expenditure on commodity consumption LGCET 
================================================================! 
Equation 
E_gcet # total gov't expenditure# 
(all, t, alltime) gcet(t) = taxt(t); 
!gov't budget constraint: LGCET(t) = LTAXT(t)! 
!============================================= 
export demand for energy/material commodities 
=============================================! 
Coefficient 
(parameter)(all, j, goods_e) EXP_ELAST_E(j) 
# energy commodity export elasticity#; 
(parameter)(all, j, goods_m) EXP_ELAST_M(j) 
# material "commodity export elasticity#; 
Read 
EXP _ELAST E from file Basedata header "EXPE"; 
EXP_E LAST_M from file Basedata header "EXPM"; 
Equation 
E_exqe # export demand for energy commodities# 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) 
exqe(j,t) = ouy(j,t) + EXP_ELAST_E (j) * pry(j,t); 
E_exqo # export demand for material commodities# 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
exqo(j,t) = ouy(j,t) + EXP_ELAST_M (j) * pry(j,t); 
!=========================================== 
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Market cLearing condition for E commodities 
===========================================! 
Equation 
E_mkte # market cLearing condition for energy commodities# 
(all, j, goods_e) (all, t, alltime) 
ouy(j, t) = V2E(j, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * cone(j, t) 
+ V3E(j, t) /Vl_Y(j, t) * iine(j, t) 
+ V4E(j, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * rrne(j, t) 
+ VSE(j, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * gcee(j, t) 
+ V6E(j, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * exqe(j, t) 
+ sum {i, sectors, VlE(j, i, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * en(j, i, t)} 
!============================================ 
Market cLearing condition for M commodities 
============================================! 
Equation 
E_mkto # market cLearing condition for materiaL commodities# 
(all, j, goods_m) (all, t, alltime) 
ouy(j, t) = V2M(j, t) /Vl_Y(j, t) * cono(j, t) 
+ V3M(j, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * iino(j, t) 
+ V4M(j, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * rrno(j, t) 
+ VSM(j, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * gceo(j, t) 
+ V6M(j, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * exqo(j, t) 
+ sum {i, sectors, VlM(j, i, t)/Vl_Y(j, t) * oi(j, i, t)} 
!================================================= 
Market cLearing condition for raw investment good 
==================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) LINVT(t) # totaL raw investment demand# 
Formula 
(all, t, alltime) LINVT(t) sum{i, sectors, LINV(i, t)} 
Equation 
E_mkti # market cLearing condition for raw investment good# 
(all, t, alltime) 
invt(t) = sum{i, sectors, LINV(i , t)/LINVT(t) * inv(i,t)}; 
!LHS: the output of investment sector, suppLy of raw investment good. 
RHS: the producer demand for raw investment good! 
!========================================== 
Market cLearing condition for raw R&D good 
==========================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, t, alltime) LRNVT(t) # economy-wide R&D investment#; 
Formula 
(all, t, all~ime) · LRNVT(t) sum{i , sectors, LRNV(i,t)}; 
Equation 
E_mktr # market cLearing condition for raw R&D good# 
(all, t, alltime) 
rnvt(t) = sum{i, sectors, LRNV(i ,t)/ LRNVT(t) *rnv(i,t)}; 
!=================================== 
Market cLear ing condition for Labor 
====================================! 
Variable 
(all, t, alltime) labt (t) # percentage change in totaL Labor suppLy #; 
Equation 
E_mktl # market cLearing condition for Labor# 
(all, t, alltime) labt(t) = sum{i, sectors, S_VL(i, t) * lab(i, t)}; 
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Chapter 4 
Can China Harness Globalization to Reap Domestic Carbon 
Savings? Modelling International Technology Diffusion in a 
Multi-region Framework* 
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of globalization, particularly international 
technology diffusion (TD), on China's domestic carbon savings. Building on a multi-region 
numerical model, this study considers both indigenous R&D and foreign TD as two sources 
of endogenous TC for domestic carbon savings. The model systematically describes foreign 
TD through three diffusion channels of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
disembodied spillovers, with an elaborate treatment on local knowledge absorptive capacity. 
Simulation results show that: (1) Foreign knowledge inflows complements China's 
I 
indigenous R&D investment to help reduce domestic carbon emissions, with the leading 
diffusion channel being disembodied spillovers in the short run and embodied diffusion (via 
import and FDI) in the long run; (2) Trade and FDI liberalization (economic globalization) 
facilitates economic integration and production growth, but at the cost of higher emissions 
levels without carbon savings (scale effect); (3) Removal of the barriers of transferring 
technologies by advanced . countries (knowledge globalization) can create the benefits of 
domestic" carbon savings (technique effect); (4) Domestic climate regulations can generate the 
composition effect by inducing indigenous R&D and foreign knowledge inflows to shift 
domestic .economic composition, hence helping partially mitigate climate compliance costs. 
Keywords: Globalization; International technology diffusion; Climate policy modelling 
* This chapter is based on the paper that is invited revisions in Energy Economics as Jin, W.,. 
"Can China harness globalization to reap domestic carbon savings? Modelling international 
technology diffusion in a multi-region framework." 
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4.1 Introduction 
In formulating prudent strategies to combat global warming, emissions from every corner of 
the world must be considered due to the global nature of climate stabilization (IEA, 2010; 
Stavins, 2011). Although most emission abatement obligations rest with the industrialized 
countries, it is likely that many low-cost mitigation opportunities exist in the developing 
world. In particular, the emerging economies call for international technology transfers to 
support indigenous efforts, so that the climate compliance cost can be mitigated (IPCC, 2000; 
World Bank, 2008; Popp, 2011; Freitas et al., 2012). 
While the traditional paradigm of international technology transfers (e.g., North-South 
Official Development Assistance) may be useful for climate negotiating agenda (UNFCCC, 
2007a), it has become increasingly flawed due to a narrow conceptualization of the nature, 
size, scope and method of technology diffusion (TD) . The paradigm that emphasizes the role 
of government neglects the normal working of market force in the process of TD, which 
fundamentally brings about the current impasse of climate negotiations and slow progress of 
low-carbon technology transfers (Brewer, 2008, 2009; Gupta et al., 2007).1 
To break the impasse, there is a d~re need for climate technology strategies to reorient 
the decentralized market and private sector as the key force to mobilize international TD. 
This pivo~ is particularly necessary in the current context of globalization (World Bank, 2008; 
Popp, 2011). On the one hand, as the traditional aspect of globalization (production 
globalization), national economies are increasingly integrated into an interdependent world 
economy through multilateral trade and investment, the globalized network of production 
and distribution enables . . an extensive dissemination of technologies via cross-border 
transactions of material, capital, and products (Wolf, 2005; Stiglitz, 2006; UNCTAD, 2010a) . 
On the o.ther hand, as the modern aspect of globalization (innovation globalization), 
internationalization of R&D enhances a tendency for higher reliance of indigenous 
innovation on external knowledge sources, both developed and developing nations have 
1 Put another way, technology is at the hand of private sectors and can't be transferred at will by 
the government. As a result, the magnitudes of ODA programs remain quite small relative to 
private investments. FDI are on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars per year, as compared 
with total ODA flows on the order of hundreds of millions (World Bank, 2007; UNFCCC, 2007a). 
Private financial contribution is essential for leveraging investments for a low-carbon economy, 
in view of huge public fiscal deficits worldwide (UNCTAD, 2010b). 
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leveraged the international heightened mobility of ideas for building domestic knowledge 
stock (OECD, 1997; Archibugi and Michie, 1995, 1997; Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999; 
UNCTAD, 2005). 
Clearly, the globalization creates an opportunity of low-carbon TD and carbon savings 
for the world's largest carbon emitter - China. To decouple carbon emissions from economic 
growth, this nation has stepped up efforts to change its development pattern by boosting 
technological innovation (MOST, 2006) . Albeit strong growths in indigenous R&D, China's 
indigenous innovation does not necessarily signal an abandonment of the "open door" 
policy. Instead, China seeks to leverage the growing globalization to reinforce its innovative 
capacities. First, Beijing begins to attach the same importance to imports as exports in its 
foreign trade policy, with the purpose of importing foreign high-tech products and 
absorbing embodied technologies (WTO, 2010; IMF, 2011). Second, China's rapid expansion 
of higher education has reshaped global distribution of human capital, which fosters a 
transition of inward FDI into modern high-tech investment and hence a dispersion of 
technologies (UNCTAD, 2005). Thirdly, innovation globalization has created an international 
mobility of ideas through scientific papers, patent, technical conference, and academic 
networking. The worldwide spread of disembodied knowledge thus favors technology 
learning and absorption by China (OECD, 1997; Freeman, 2006; 2010). 
Therefore, in such a context where China's integration into the globalized economy not 
only stimulates growth momentum but also provides an opportunity of knowledge diffusion, 
both of which have significant impacts on China's environmental performance. It is thus 
vital to explore the effect of globalization, particularly international TD, on China's carbon 
saving potential. In explicit, we attempt to address the following issues: 1) What's the 
contribution of indigenous R&D and foreign TD to China's domestic carbon savings; 2) 
Through which channels does China acquire foreign knowledge to complement indigenous 
innovation; 3) How knowledge absorptive capacity affect assimilation of foreign diffused 
technologies; 4) Which policies can be designed to harness the beneficial effects of 
globalization for domestic carbon savings; 5) Can domestic climate regulations induce 
international knowledge inflows to help lower climate compliance costs. 
To address these issues, we incorporate the mechanism of endogenous technical change 
(TC) into a multi-sector, multi-region CGE numerical model. The "stock of knowledge" 
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approach is used to explicitly represent technology in the spirit of Goulder and Schneider 
(1999) and Sue Wing (2001).2 To advance the existing modeling literature that only considers 
indigenous innovation within a closed economy, we attempt to extend the single-country 
structure into a multi-region one, so that the mechanism of cross-nation knowledge diffusion 
can be explicitly examined. Such an effort is necessary, because with technology transfer 
placed high upon climate policy agenda, there is a pressing need for researchers to examine 
the potentials of international TD to facilitate low-carbon innovation. Modeling international 
TD thus becomes a fruitful avenue for future climate policy analysis (Grubb et al., 2002; 
Popp, 2006a; Gillingham et al., 2008; Popp et al., 2010b; Hubler, 2011).3 
To our knowledge, only a few studies exist that considers international TD in current 
climate policy modeling literature. Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) use the GTAP-E model to 
investigate a mechanism of technology spillovers through the transfers of price-induced 
energy-saving TC. Hubler (2011) develops a recursive-dynamic CGE model to examine a 
mechanism of international TD through FDI. Leimbach and Baumstark (2010) (also in 
Leimbach and Edenhofer (2007) and Leimbach and Eisenack (2009)) provides a multi-region 
framework to model TD embodied in foreign trade. Methodologically, these studies adopt 
the implicit (parametrical) approach to represent technology, where the mechanism of TD is 
described as productivity parameter growth as an outcome of underlying drivers (e.g., trade 
and FDI). In contrast, other studies choose the "stock of knowledge" approach to explicitly 
represent technology, where the mechanism of TD is described as the spillover of foreign 
knowledge into domestic knowledge stock. For example, Bosetti et al. (2008, 2011) explore 
the mechanism of disembodied knowledge spillover that augments domestic knowledge 
assets. Buonanno et al. (2003) consider modeling a stock of global knowledge that generates 
internatic_mal knowledge spillover into individual countries.4 
2 The explicit method of representing technology has theoretical origins in endogenous growth 
literature, which demonstrates the link between knowledge and technical progress (Romer, 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Acemoglu, 2002, 2009). Along this direction, this is a growing trend in 
climate policy analysis to model technology using the "stock of knowledge" approach (e.g., 
Caulder and Schneider, 1999; Nordhaus, 2002; Buonanno et al., 2003; Popp, 2004; Sue Wing, 2006; 
Loschel and Otto, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2009; Jin, 2012). 
3 Most of existing literature focus on empirical evidences on environmentally friendly TD (e.g., 
Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Popp, 2006b; Dechezlepretre et al., 2008; Johnstone et al., 2010; Popp et 
al., 2010a; Lovely and Popp, 2011), but numerical modeling in this field are still not sufficient. 
4 The literature also includes studies that model international technology transfer through direct 
financial transfers from donor to recipient countries for climate mitigation (e.g., Yang and 
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While providing insights into the TD mechanism, current modeling studies only capture 
one single type of TD channel in isolation.5 It is thus needed to develop a comprehensive 
framework that models various conduits of TD and their combined effect. To fill this gap, 
this paper contributes to climate policy modeling in the following ways: (1) An innovation 
possibility frontier (IPF) is used to explicitly represent both indigenous R&D and international 
TD as dual sources of domestic knowledge creation; (2) A systematic modeling framework is 
developed to capture international TD through the channels of trade, FDI, and disembodied 
knowledge spillovers; (3) An elaborate treatment of knowledge absorptive capacity is 
presented to describe technology appropriateness (compatibility between foreign transferred 
technology and local technical condition). 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the modeling framework, 
with an emphasis on modeling international TD through various channels. Section 4.3 
discusses model calibration and implementation. Simulation results and discussions are 
presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Model Description 
4.2.1 Basic Framework 
The basic framework is a multi-region, multi-sector intertemporal optimization CGE model.6 
It distinguishes six world countries/regions, including: China (CHN), USA, Japan (JPN), 
Western Europe (EUW), the rest of the industrialized countries (RIN), and the rest of the 
world (ROW).7 Economic system in each region is represented by multiple agents, including: 
Twelve production sectors~ an investment sector (producing physical capital goods), a R&D 
sector (producing R&D good), a representative household and a government. To be relevant 
to climate _policy studies, the twelve production sectors consist of five energy sectors and 
Nordhaus, 2006; Kypreos and Turton, 2011). For a critique of this method, see Popp (2009). 
5 As shown in some empirical studies (e.g., Clerides et al., 1998; Keller, 2004), private firms do 
not merely conduct a single type of economic activity associated with TD, but perform several 
such activities simultaneously. 
6 As compared to the recursive-dynamic models, intertemporal optimization CGE models feature 
an endogenous treatment of the intertemporal behavior of forward-looking agents, with their 
current decisions depending on expectation about future economic conditions (Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen, 1990; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1998; Dixon et al., 2005). 
7 For the country composition of each world region, see Appendix 4.A. 
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seven non-energy sectors. 8 Carbon emissions are calculated based on carbon intensities of 
fossil fuel inputs (coal, oil and natural gas) used in intermediate production and final use. 
Economic behaviors of multiple agents within each region are modeled in line with the 
general equilibrium structure, which outlines input-output (IO) circular flows of multiple 
commodities and primary factors within the economy (see Fig. 3.1 in Chapter 3). There are 12 
produced commodities and corresponding production sectors, indexed by the row subscript 
j(j=l,2, ... ,12) and the column subscript i(i=l,2, ... ,12), respectively; 3 types of primary 
factors (labor, physical capital, knowledge capital), indexed by the subscript f (f = L,K,H); 5 
types of final use (consumption, investment, R&D, government, export), indexed by the 
subscript d (d = C,I,R,G,X) . Intersectoral transactions in intermediate productions are 
represented by the j xi matrix; Inputs of primary factors in production are indicated by the 
f xi matrix; Final uses of produced commodities are represented by the j x d matrix. 
From this IO framework to a CGE model, I describe the decision problems facing these 
economic agents and characterize their behaviors in a decentralized equilibrium condition.9 
To endogenously represent TC, the model broadens the traditional CGE structure by adding 
R&D investment and knowledge input. This will be articulated in the following sections. 
4.2.2 Endogenous Technical Change 
In the spirit of Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Sue Wing (2001), this study adopts the 
"stock of knowledge" method to explicitly represent technology, because TC per se is a 
reconfiguration of production factors as a result of applying new knowledge (e.g., technical 
know-how, managerial skills) in production. A representation of knowledge as a production 
input can thus give insights into its effect on production TC. In explicit, knowledge is treated 
as an accumulated stock of economically useful asset which is augmented by indigenous 
R&D and foreign TD. The accumulated knowledge stocks are then applied in production to 
facilitate a reconfiguration of production factor inputs for productivity growth (the rate of 
production TC). Simultaneously, the use of knowledge inputs leads to a substitution for 
physical inputs such as labor, energy and materials (the bias of production TC). 
8 For the model sectoral classification and mapping, see Appendix 4.A. 
9 Specification and characterization of the problem faced by economic agents within each foreign 
country is similar to the modeling framework presented in Chapter 3 Appendix 3.B, except for 
the specification of international technology diffusion into China as described in Section 4.2.4. 
107 
To model this endogenous TC mechanism, I specify the production technology as a 
separable KLEM-H nested CES function (see Fig. 3.2 in Chapter 3). That is, for a given sector 
i producing output Q,10 knowledge capital H i substitutes for a composite of physical 
inputs Zi, which is in turn made up of primary factor of physical capital Ki and labor XiL, 
as well as intermediate commodity inputs of energy bundle XiE and material bundle XM. 
XiE comprises five energy goods X ij , and XM is composed of seven non-energy goods xr. 
Given this production technology, the producer problem specific to sector i is formulated as: 
s.t. U (t) = (1-TQ) · Pi (t) -Qi (t) - PiL(t) · XiL(t)- (1 + re)· PiE (t) · XiE (t) - PiM (t) · Xuv1 (t) 
-(l-T1). E1 (t) · L (t)-(1-TR )· PiR (t) • R (t) 
:r< (t) = L (t)-6K -Ki (t) 
[ l I 1/J L(t) I L(t) = cpi L(t),Ki(t) = L(t)· 1 + 2 · Ki(t) 
tL(t) = n [Ri(t),Hi(t),R; (t)] 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
where the firm's objective is to optimally choose the inputs of labor x iL , energy xiE , 
material XiM , physical capital investment L and R&D investment Ri to maximize an 
intertemporal profit stream Vi, subject to the technology constraints. In Eq. (4.1), v; is 
formulated as a discounted present value of future profit streams from time t to an infinite 
future, with real interest rate r as discounting factor. In Eq. (4.2), current profit flow n 
equals output revenues minus input costs, with TQ, Tc , Tr , TR being corporate income tax, 
carbon tax on fossil energy inputs, investment tax credit and R&D tax credit, respectively. 
Eq. (4.3) specifies the law of motion of physical capital stock K, its accumulation 
depends .on fixed capital investment L and the rate of capital depreciation 6K. Eq. (4.4) 
models the capital investment process that is subject to imperfect capital mobility and 
investment adjustment cost (Goulder and Schneider, 1999; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999).11 
10 For ease of exposition, we have not subscripted variables by country notation. 
11 In explicit, to install L unit of capital, a firm must buy a larger amount of raw investment 
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Eq. (4.5) is the IPF that describes the knowledge creation process, where accumulation of 
domestic knowledge stock It depends on indigenous R&D Ri, existing knowledge stocks 
Hi and international TD R~. As Fig. 4.1 illustrates, in modeling the pattern of international 
TD I only consider unidirectional knowledge spillovers from technologically advanced 
countries to China.12 Accordingly, I assume that TC in each foreign country is driven by 
indigenous R&D, with the IPF degenerated as I°L(t) = n [Ri(t),Hi(t)] without international 
TD R~ .13 In contrast, TC in China depends on both indigenous R&D and foreign TD, with 
its IPF remained as Eq. (4.5).14 Before providing an explicit representation of the IPF in 
Section 4.2.5, we will examine the dual sources of innovation and endogenous TC -
indigenous R&D (in Section 4.2.3) and international TD (in Section 4.2.4), to which I now 
turn. 
goods Ii that depends on the rate of investment L/K. and adjustment cost coefficient 1P. 
12 For the sake of model tractability, we surpass multidirectional knowledge spillovers and 
interaction which may involves computing a Nash Equilibrium. For example, see Leimbach and 
Baumstark (2010). 
13 This is according to the path dependence of innovation in technologically advanced nations, 
where technological progress tends to move along independent path with innovation pattern 
embedded in local specific socio-technological circumstances (Rosenberg, 1994; Bosetti et al., 2008; 
Acemoglu, 2009). 
14 Due to a: backward position in the global technology ladder, innovations in developing 
countries can largely benefit from their knowledge gap relative to technologically advanced 
countries and knowledge diffusion (Gerschenkron, 1962; Acemoglu, 2009). 
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Figure 4.1: Pattern of international technology diffusion: Unidirectional 
knowledge diffusion from technologically advanced foreign countries to China 
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4.2.3 Indigenous R&D Investment 
To capture indigenous innovation, we solve the producer problem outlined in Eqs. (4.1)-(4.5), 
and chai:acterize the behavior of indigenous R&D investments as follows: 
(l - rR )-P; (t) = AiH(t)- an [Ri (t),H (t),R~ (t)] 
_ 8Ri(t) 
(4.6) 
~iH(t) + {i - ,Q) ·E(t)- 8Qi(t) + 8n[Ri(t),H(t),R~(t)] 
8Hi(t) 8H(t) , = r(t) 
:\il-l(t) 
(4.7) 
where Eq. (4.6) is the optimality condition of indigenous R&D investment Ri, instructing 
R&D investment of private firms to reach an equilibrium level where marginal cost (LHS) is 
equal to marginal benefit (RHS). The marginal cost comes from expenditures on purchasing 
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an extra unit of R&D goods. The marginal benefit involves the shadow price of knowledge 
capitals Ail-! and innovation possibility gain.15 In particular, the innovation possibility gains 
from R&D investment can be harvested from two sources: Indigenous R&D not only create 
in-house knowledge, but also enhance indigenous capacity to assimilate international 
knowledge diffusion - the dual faces of R&D in innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 
Keller, 1996; Griffith et al., 2000). 
Similarly, Eq. (4.7) provides an intertemporal arbitrage condition of knowledge 
accumulation, which instructs marginal cost (RHS) to equal marginal benefit (LHS). The RHS 
is the real interest rate as an opportunity cost. The LHS represents the rate of return from 
knowledge accumulation, including: An increase in the shadow price of knowledge asset, a 
rise in the marginal product of knowledge input, and innovation possibility gain from more 
existing knowledge stocks. 
4.2.4 International Technology Diffusion 
Drawing on the insights of Griliches (1979) on two types of knowledge spillovers, our model 
identifies two principal mechanisms through which external knowledge diffuse into China: 1) 
Embodied knowledge diffusion through indirectly using knowledge-embodied intermediate 
and capital goods; 2) Disembodied knowledge diffusion through directly learning 
disembodied knowledge spillovers.16 
Embodied knowledge diffusion (passive knowledge diffusion) occurs when domestic 
firms indirectly benefit from external innovation by using knowledge-embodied foreign 
intermediate commodity (via import) or capital goods (via FDI) . 17 Embodied TD has its 
15 The shadow price of knowledge capital is determined according to the "Tobin' s-q" investment 
theory, with the shadow price denoting the increments to the equity value of the firm from 
investing an additional unit of capital (Tobin, 1969; Summers, 1981; Goulder and Schneider, 1999; 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999). 
16 Identification of these two mechanisms stems from the basic distinction between codified and 
tacit knowledge. Codified knowledge is explicit knowledge that is embodied in specific physical 
products, while tacit knowledge is the personalized knowledge that is virtually impossible to 
make explicit through embodied mechanism (Hayek, 1945; Polanyi, 1958; Arrow, 1969). While 
application of efficient physical products can advance capital vintage of production technology in 
recipient countries, there is also a need to learn and absorb disembodied knowledge for building 
an indigenous capacity of innovation (IPCC, 2000; Stern, 2007). 
17 Embodied TD corresponds to the first type of knowledge spillovers identified by Griliches 
(1979): rent spillovers (purchase prices of imported intermediate input and capital goods do not 
completely embody the opportunity cost of producing the product that include R&D cost of 
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theoretical and empirical origins in the seminal work by Coe and Helpman (1995), indicating 
that international TD should be embodied in the flows of physical commodity transactions 
through the channels of international trade and investment. 
In parallel, disembodied knowledge diffusion (active knowledge diffusion) involves 
direct learning and absorption of the disembodied forms of technologies (e.g., formulas, 
blueprints, patents), not necessarily linking to the economic transactions of physical goods.18 
Disembodied TD is rooted in the seminal works by Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) that 
suggests the key role of disembodied knowledge spillover externality in the process of 
international TD. 
To describe the embodied and disembodied TD, Sections 4.2.4.1-4.2.4.3 provide a 
comprehensive framework to model three channels of TD, including: TD embodied in trade, 
TD embodied in FDI, and disembodied TD. Moreover, while knowledge can diffuse from 
abroad through these three channels, the efficiencies of assimilating the diffused knowledge 
of the recipient countries are determined by local knowledge absorptive capacity, which will 
be considered in Sections 4.2.4.4. 
4.2.4.1 Technology Diffusion Embodied in Trade 
TD embodied in trade refers to the process of knowledge diffusion through import flows. 
Imported goods and services (e.g., chemical products, electronic components and software) 
are used as intermediate inputs into the production in the host country for productivity 
growth. On the one hand, imports broaden input supply chains, creating an access to an 
expanding_variety of intermediate inputs from abroad (variety-expanding effect of imports) . 
On the other hand, the imported products embody foreign knowledge that can be 
assimilated by the host country to improve input efficiency (input-augmenting effect of 
embodied knowledge) (Eaton and Kortum, 2001, 2002; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Acharya 
and Keller, 2008). 
In this sense, TD through the channel of trade comes from the diffusion of knowledge 
embodied in the imports of intermediate input commodities, with the embodied knowledge 
foreign innovation). 
18 Disembodied TD corresponds to the second type of knowledge spillovers identified by 
Griliches (1979): pure knowledge spillovers (learning of foreign disembodied technologies 
augments domestic knowledge stocks with the learning cost usually less than the original R&D 
cost of foreign innovator). 
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augmenting input use efficiency.19 In other words, if we think of commodity imports as a 
vehicle of TD, then foreign knowledge is embodied in intermediate product imports, with 
the embodied knowledge being absorbed by the recipient country to accumulate knowledge. 
To describe this mechanism, I model China's import flows in line with the Armington 
structure, with the Armington composite of intermediate commodity being modeled as a 
CES aggregate of domestically-produced and imported component of that commodity as: 
(4.8) 
where Xi,i is the composite of intermediate input commodity j used in China's sector i. 
x pi ,Xli are the domestically-produced and imported component of that intermediate goods, 
respectively. Substitution between domestic and import component is governed by the 
Armington elasticity a/ . Within our multi-country model that distinguishes China's 
multiple trading partners, the imported component of that intermediate input is further 
modeled as a CES composite of imports from all foreign source countries as: 
(4.9) 
where X[i,r is the import of intermediate input commodity j into China's sector i from 
foreign country r. Substitution among foreign countries is governed by the elasticity err. 
First, solving the producer problem as outlined in Eqs. (4.1)-(4.5) characterize the levels 
of demand for intermediate input variety X i, i . Next, by solving the problem of cost 
minimization associated with the Eqs. (4.8)-(4.9), I can optimally allocate the intermediate 
input demand ( X i,i ) into its import composite ( X Ti ) and import component from each 
foreign source country (X (j,r ) as: 
19 Empirical evidences of this TD pattern is recorded in the pioneering work by Coe and 
Helpman (1995) who found a statistically significant effect of bilateral trade on international TD. 
Other empirical studies also find the significant and positive link between a country's factor 
productivity and knowledge created by its trading partners (e.g., Coe et al., 1997; Keller, 1998, 
2002; Xu and Wang, 1999; Pavcnik, 2002; Madsen, 2007). 
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a[ 
XT (t) = ~ (t) 
t,J ~T (t) -X(t) 1,J (4.10) 
n 
X T.. t - P{ (t) (Ji T ( ) () - ------'---'---'--- -X•·t 
t,J, r - Pj ,r (t)·(l+r;) t, J (4.11) 
where Pi is China's market price of intermediate goods composite j. P{ is the ideal price 
index of imported component of intermediate goods j. 20 Pi,r is the price of intermediate 
goods j supplied by foreign country r. r; is the rate of import tariff imposed on commodity 
j. Pi,r. (1 + r;) is China's import price of commodity j from the foreign country r. 
As mentioned above, both import flows and knowledge embodiment intensity 
determine the amount of knowledge diffused through trade. So far Eq. (4.11) has estimated 
the imports of intermediate input goods from foreign exporting countries into China. I 
further introduce the other factor: intensity of knowledge embodied in imports, which 
represents the amount of knowledge that is embodied in each unit of import flows. In line 
with the embodied technology hypothesis, this intensity can be esti~ated as: 21 
(4.12) 
where Rilr denotes the intensity of knowledge embodied in intermediate goods j imported 
from foreign country r. This intensity is measured as a ratio between R&D expenditure (Rj,r ) 
and production output (Yi,r) in foreign exporting country r. Yi,r is the outputs specific to 
commodity j . R i,r is the amount of commodity j that is used for R&D investment. 22 
Yi,r,R j,r ·are both endogenously determined in modelling the foreign economy r. BT is an 
20 As the dual price function associated with the CES composite of imports, P{ can be expressed 
as a CES aggregate of the imported commodity price from foreign source country as: 
1 
~ T (t) = [ L, (Pj,r (t) · (1 + tj) ta;rr ]1~r 
21 
"Embodied technology hypothesis" claims that intangible knowledge has to be embodied in 
specific tangible physical products in order to embody their economically useful characteristics 
(Schmookler, 1966; Terleckyj, 1974; Scherer, 1982; Papaconstantinou et al., 1998; Hauknes and 
Knell, 2009). 
22 By the same token, this variable also represents R&D investment expenditure spend by the 
corresponding sector that producing commodity j, since our model implementation impose a 
one-to-one correspondence between each industrial sector and its produced commodity. 
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exogenous parameter that indicates foreign barriers of exporting knowledge-intensive goods 
to China.23 
Given the two determinants of TD through trade, we can model the diffusion of 
knowledge embodied in trade as a product of import flows (X[i,r) and embodied knowledge 
intensity ( RI!r) as: 
(4.13) 
where R(j,r denotes knowledge embodied in the import of intermediate commodity j from 
foreign country r into China's sector i. Next, the total amount of knowledge embodied in 
import flows can be estimated as follows : 
(4.14) 
R; (t)= L RL(t) 
J 
(4.15) 
where by summing over foreign countries r, R Ti is knowledge embodied in the import of 
intermediate input commodity j into China's sector i. By summing over intermediate input 
varieties, I further capture the total amount of knowledge embodied in intermediate imports 
into China's sector i (R;). Once diffusing into China (the recipient country) through import, 
the embodied knowledge Rt is assimilated for building domestic knowledge. This process 
will be inco~porated into the IPF in Section 4.2.5. 
4.2.4.2 Technology Diffusion Embodied in FDI 
TD embodied in FDI refers to the diffusion of knowledge that is embodied in foreign 
investment inflows. In the process of FDI, foreign invested capitals are used as primary 
factor inputs into production in the host country for productivity gains .24 On the one hand, 
23 We introduce this parameter for the purpose of undertaking policy experiments (e.g., easing 
technology transfer restriction) in knowledge globalization scenario in Section 4.4, where policy 
shock raises the value of this exogenous parameter. 
24 FDI is an investment of MNCs in a foreign country with the intention of gaining a degree of 
control over the firm's operation. MN Cs will bring with advanced technologies and best practices 
in the operation of foreign affiliates. It differs from indirect portfolio investment where foreign 
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inward FDI can bring to the host country new varieties of hardware, machinery, equipment, 
and other capital goods, which advances the capital vintage of domestic production recipes 
(provision of physical capital) . On the other hand, the advanced capital goods invested by 
foreign MNC affiliates embody foreign technology that can be learnt by domestic firms 
through sectoral linkages along the supply chain (diffusion of embodied knowledge) 
(Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; Javorcik, 2004; Lin and Saggi, 2007; 
Haskel et al., 2007; Blalock and Gertler, 2008). 
In this sense, if I think of FDI as a vehicle of TD, then foreign knowledge is embodied in 
the foreign invested capital, with the embodied knowledge being absorbed by the recipient 
country for knowledge accumulation.25 To model this mechanism, I postulate that both 
domestic and foreign investments contribute to China's physical capital formation, and 
capitals invested by domestic and foreign countries are imperfect substitutes (Petri, 1997; 
Markusen, 2002; Mai, 2005; Lejour et al., 2008). The physical capitals invested in China are 
thus modeled as a CES aggregate of domestic and foreign components of that capital goods 
as: 
cl I 
[ 
of-1 of-lJof-1 
L (t) = IP(t)~ + If (t)~ (4.16) 
where L is the composite of capital goods ·invested in China's sector i. IP, If are the 
domestic and foreign component of that capital good composite, respectively. Substitution 
between these two components is .governed by the CES elasticity al , indicating the joint 
venture requirements on foreign investments entry.26 Within the multi-region model that 
distinguishes multiple FDI sources, the component of foreign-invested capital is further 
modeled as a CES composite of FDI from all foreign source countries: 
firms purchases stocks/shares in other companies for financial reasons (UNCTAD, 2005). 
25 Empirical evidence for this kind of TD is recorded in the work by Blomstrom and Persson 
(1983) who found a statistically significant influence of FDI inflows on international TD. Other 
empirical studies also suggest that host countries benefit from knowledge diffused from MNC 
foreign affiliates, with FDI being a robust diffusion channel (e.g., Haddad and Harrison, 1993; 
Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Xu, 2000; Keller and Yeaple, 2009). 
26 A larger value of the CES elasticity implies a higher possibility of substitution between foreign 
and domestic varieties in investment activities (a lower joint venture requirement). 
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(4.17) 
where IL is the FDI inflows into China's sector i from foreign country r. Substitution 
between foreign countries is governed by the CES elasticity ( ar ). 
Solving the producer problem as outlined in Eqs. (4.1)-(4.5) characterizes the demand 
for capital investment L .27 Next, by solving the problem of cost minimization associated 
with Eqs. (4.16)-(4.17), I can characterize the level of FDI composite (If ) and the component 
from each foreign source country (IL) as: 
(4.18) 
aFF 
IF ( ) I Pl( t) I I IF ( ) 
i ,r t = Pr,,(t)·(l + rf) . i t (4.19) 
where P1 is China's market price of capital good composite. Pt is ideal price index of FDI 
composite.28 Pr,r is the price of capital goods invested by foreign country r. rf is the rate of 
preferable tax (fiscal incentive) offered to MNC affiliates for FDI. Pr,, (t)·(l+d) is the 
after-tax price of capital goods invested by foreign country r. 
The specifications in Eqs, (4.18)-(4.19) reflect two basic determinants of FDI. 1) Economic 
fundamentals: FDI is driven by the incentives of market-seeking MNC to exploit economies 
of scales ~Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003; Blonigen, 2005). As the levels of FDI are expressed as 
a function of output size of the sector_where foreign capitals are installed, the sector-specific 
outputs reflect market size and economic fundamentals in the host country; 2) Fiscal 
incentives: Developing countries commonly base fiscal incentives on preferable tax to attract 
FDI, (Brewer and Young, 1997; Blomstrom and-Kokko, 2003; UNCTAD, 2005). The favorable 
27 The optimal levels of physical capital investment can be characterized according to the 
Tobin's-q theory. For the details, see Appendix 3.B. 
28 As the dual price function associated with the CES composite of FDI, Pt can be expressed as a 
CES aggregate of foreign capital prices from foreign source country as: 
Pt (t) = [I:r(H,, (t) -(1 + tr ))I-of" ]1~ 
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FDI tax is set to lower the costs of installing foreign capital goods, thus facilitating the 
physical capital formation in the recipient countries. 
As mentioned previously, both the level of FDI and knowledge embodiment intensity 
determine the amount of knowledge diffusion through FDI. So far the level of inward FDI 
has been estimated by Eq. (4.19), I further model the knowledge intensity of FDI (the amount 
of knowledge embodied in each unit of FDI inflows) as follows: 
(4.20) 
where RIL denotes the intensity of knowledge embodied in capital goods invested by 
foreign country r, measured as a ratio between R&D expenditure ( Ri,r ) and production 
output ( Yi ,r ) specific to sector i in foreign country r. 8F is an exogenous parameter, 
representing foreign restrictions on technology transfer through FDI outflows. 
Given the two determinants of TD through FDI, we can model the diffusion of knowledge 
embodied in FDI as a product of FDI inflows (IL ) and embodied knowledge intensity ( RIL ) as: 
R L (t) = IL (t)·RIL (t) (4.21) 
where RL denotes knowledge embodied in FDI inflows into China's sector i from foreign 
country r. By summing over foreign countries r, I estimate the knowledge embodied in FDI as: 
R; (t) = LrRL(t) (4.22) 
where R; denotes the total amount of knowledge embodied in FDI inflow into China's sector i. 
Once diffusing into China via the channel of FDI, the embodied knowledge R; can be absorbed 
for domestic knowledge accumulation, which will be described by the IPF in Section 4.2.5. 
4.2.4.3 Disembodied Technology Diffusion 
Disembodied TD occurs when disembodied pure knowledge (as a public good) spill over 
from technology frontier countries to the laggards due to the imperfect appropriability of 
knowledge, which does not necessarily link to the economic transactions of physical goods. 
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Learning and absorption of disembodied knowledge thus favors innovation in places 
different from where originally created (Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg, 1998; Eaton and Kortum, 1999; Lee, 2006). 
In this context, I draw on the insights of Bosetti et al. (2008), and postulates that China 
is exposed to an international knowledge pool created by technology frontier countries. On 
the one hand, due to the heterogeneous nature of knowledge created by individual 
technologically advanced countries,29 their aggregate knowledge constitutes the global pool 
of disembodied knowledge. On the other hand, because of a backward position in the global 
technology leader,30 the technologically backward country has a knowledge gap relative to 
advanced nations, which creates the disembodied knowledge pool that can be absorbed by 
China. Thus, the disembodied knowledge that may spill over to China can be modeled as 
(4.23) 
where 'I: ,Ri,, is the aggregate of foreign R&D investment specific to sector i, summing 
over all foreign countries r. Ri is China's indigenous R&D investment in that sector. The 
R&D gap thus constitutes foreign disembodied knowledge that may spill over to China. e0 
is an exogenous parameter indicating the externality of disembodied knowledge spillovers, 
of which the value is regulated by patent policy in foreign countries. Once spilling over to 
China, the disembodied knowledge RP can be absorbed for domestic knowledge creation, 
which will be described by the IPF in Section 4.2.5. 
4.2.4.4 Knowledge Absorptive Capacity 
So far the model has captured all three channels of international TD, the diffused knowledge, 
however, are not the "manna from heaven" that indiscriminately falls on the host country, 
29 This coincides with the path dependence of innovation. TC within technological advanced 
country tends to follow a specific path that is embedded in local socio-technological context, 
generating differentiated and heterogeneous technologies (Nelson, 1993; Rosenberg, 1994). For 
example, U.S. has competitive advantage in coal gaslification technology, E.U in renewable 
energy, Japan in energy efficiency equipments. 
30 This view was put forward by Gerschenkron (1962) in his seminal work Economic Backwardness 
in Historical Perspective, arguing that TC is a process where all countries move upwards along a 
technology ladder, with the innovator at the top and the laggards at the bottom. By adopting 
frontier technologies, the backward countries can catch up with the advanced countries at a 
relatively rapid pace (Acemoglu, 2009). 
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only a fraction can be effectively absorbed according to local socio-technological conditions, 
with the efficiencies of knowledge absorption by the recipient countries are highly localized 
in the real practice of technology transfer.31 The benefits of knowledge diffusion can be 
realized only if the recipient country builds indigenous capacity of knowledge absorption. 
Accordingly, we distinguish two factors that influence knowledge absorptive capacity. 1) 
Indigenous R&D: host countries need to undertake R&D investment to enhance indigenous 
capacity for absorbing foreign diffused technologies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Keller, 2004; 
Bosetti et al., 2008); 2) Structural characteristics: the host countries also need to improve 
structural characteristics (e.g., R&D intensity) of production technology, so that a match can 
be achieved between the transferred technologies and local technical sophistication levels 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969; Basu and Weil, 1998; Acemoglu, 2009). To represent these two 
factors, we model the knowledge absorptive capacity as: 
(4.24) 
where, for any given sector i, knowledge absorptive capacity Yi is _~xpressed as a product of 
indigenous R&D index YF0 and structural characteristics index y:,S , implying their 
complementary roles in affecting knowledge absorptive capacity. yf0 is modeled as a ratio 
of China's indigenous R&D to foreign R&D totals, indicating China's technological distance 
relative to the global technology frontier.32 In specifying y~5 , R&D intensity (R&D to output 
ratio) is used to indicate the structural characteristics of production technology.33 d ,(t) is 
R&D intensity specific to Chinas' sector i at period t, and ct(t) is the average of R&D 
intensity among foreign advanced countries cL(t) =(l /N)· I:::1di,, (t). di(O) - cL(O) is structural 
31 This "localness" is reflected by the mismatch between transferred technology and locality in 
developing countries. For an articulation on the inappropriateness of technologies and its effect 
on produstivity difference across nations, see Acemoglu (2009). 
32 As mentioned in Section 4.2.3 on the dual face of indigenous R&D, such a specification reflects 
the second face: indigenous R&D can reinforce domestic capacity to absorb and exploit foreign 
diffused knowledge (Cohen and Lethvinal, 1989; Keller, 1996). 
33 Structural similarity index reflects the degree to which foreign-created knowledge is targeted 
to local structural characteristics of production techniques (Acemoglu, 2009). For example, 
German manufacturing sector has higher R&D intensity level as compared with China, implying 
that the technology of German produced products, once introduced into China, is less targeted to 
China's less sophisticated production recipe, so that the embodied knowledge can't be fully 
absorbed. 
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difference in production technology between China and foreign countries at initial period. 
The exponential function scales the structural difference on a unit interval index.34 
4.2.5 Synthesis of Innovation Possibility Frontier 
Having examined both indigenous innovation and international TD in Sections 4.2.3-4.2.4, I 
synthesize the two sources of endogenous TC and formulate the IPF (innovation process) as: 
(4.25) 
indigenous innovation international technology diffusion 
where accumulations of China's domestic knowledge stocks H are driven by two forces. 1) 
Indigenous innovation: Both indigenous R&D investment (Ri ) and existing knowledge stock 
( H ) contribute to direct creations of domestic knowledge. 77 denotes the efficiency of 
knowledge creation. 5i--i is the depreciation rate of. knowledge obsolescence. The conditions 
o < Y/ < 1, o <a+~ < 1 implies diminishing returns to R&D in innovation (Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer, 1991; Popp, 2004; Bosetti et al., 2008); 2) International TD: Foreign knowledge 
diffusions occur through three channels: imports (RT), FDI (R;), and disembodied spillovers 
(RP) . China assimilates a fraction of the diffused knowledge according to local knowledge 
absorption capacity ( Y; ).35 
Note that, this IPF specification highlights three determinants of China's knowledge 
creation: (1) Indigenous R&D investment - the "no free lunch" assumption (to benefit from 
innovation,. domestic countries should commit to undertake indigenous R&D and not solely 
free ride on foreign knowledge diffusion); (2) Existing stocks of knowledge - the "standing 
on the shoulders of predecessors" assumption (the more current stocks of knowledge, the 
more likely to create new knowledge); (3) International knowledge diffusion - the "pubic 
good sharing" assumption ( domestic countries benefit from the positive externality of 
34 At the initial period, the function takes a value of exp(-1)=0.367, since China has the largest 
difference in R&D intensity relative to the advanced countries. As time goes by, indigenous R&D 
improves China's R&D intensity with its level steadily reaching advanced country levels. As a 
result, the function value increases to its maximal level exp(0)=l. For a similar treatment, see van 
Meijl and van Tongeren (1999). 
35 International TD, corrected by local knowledge absorptive capacity, is a perfect substitute for 
domestic knowledge creation. Hence, indigenous innovation and international TD are additive in 
the specification of IPF. 
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international knowledge diffusion by absorbing foreign diffused knowledge). 
4.3 Model Calibration and Implementation 
4.3.1 Input-output Data and Knowledge Accounting 
To implement the theoretical model in a numerical simulation, I construct a benchmark 
dataset for model calibration. First, the year 2004 IO tables are collected from the GTAP 7 
Data Base (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008). Second, we adapt the GTAP data to our model 
structure by aggregating the 113 world regions into 6, the 57 sectors into 12, and the 5 
primary factors into labor and physical capital.36 Finally, the 2004 IO tables are scaled to 
approximate each region's economy in the year 2005 (the base year of simulation) using 2005 
growth rate of real GDP. 
To calibrate China's domestic and foreign varieties of intermediate input and capital 
goods, we refer to the GTAP database (it distinguishes intersectoral transaction flows 
between domestic and import sources) to calibrate substitution between domestic and 
imported components of intermediate input commodities as well as.. regional composition of 
China's imports from foreign trading partners.37 For investment capital goods, we refer to 
the China Statistical Yearbook 2010 for the data on domestic and foreign components of fixed 
capital investment as well as regional composition of foreign-invested capital (FDI among 
foreign source countries) (NBS, 2011).38 
The aforementioned steps produce a stylized IO dataset that can calibrate a traditional 
CGE model. However, this dataset is not well suited to calibrate a CGE model that 
incorpor~tes a mechanism of endogenous TC (explicitly represented by knowledge), because 
it does not separately record the economic flows associated with R&D investment and 
knowledg~ input. To transform this stylized IO dataset, I need to collect sector-level R&D 
36 The original GT AP dataset records 113 world regions' economic IO flows associated with 
57-by-57 sectors intermediate production transactions, 5 categories of primary factor inputs, and 
4 components of final use. The FlexAgg program contained in the GTAP is used to perform data 
aggregation for model calibration. 
37 In explicit, industrial intermediate input purchases of domestic and imported goods at agent 
prices are contained in the GTAP data array "VDFA" and "VIFA". Regional details of bilateral 
trade flows are contained in the GTAP data array "VIWS". 
38 The GTAP dataset contains the sector-level data on physical capital investment, but not 
distinguishes domestic and foreign sources of such capital formations. 
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expenditure data from the OECD ANBERD database, and perform knowledge accounting to 
capture knowledge flows.39 The procedure of knowledge accounting hereby constructs a 
modified IO dataset with an explicit representation of R&D investments and knowledge 
inputs, based on which the CGE model that features endogenous TC can be calibrated. 
4.3.3 Parameterization and solver 
The GEMP ACK is used to solve the intertemporal optimization model.40 The solver requires 
an initial equilibrium data as the benchmark point to calibrate the model. For an 
intertemporal dynamic model, this benchmark equilibrium data is required to record the 
values of economic variables at each time point over simulation periods, which is a 
time-series IO dataset ( one for each time point) consistent with both intratemporal and 
intertemporal equations in the model. 
To obtain such a full time-series dataset, we collect the available initial period (base year 
2005) dataset and replicate it in future years over the period 2005-2030. Next, the Homotopy 
treatment is used to generate a non-steady-state baseline equilibrium dataset for model 
calibration.41 Based on this consistent time-series benchmark dataset and the collected model 
parameters shown in Tabs. 4.1-4.2, the theoretical structure in the model can be numerically 
solved by the GEMP ACK. 
39 Knowledge accounting used in our study is building on the works of Terleckyj (1974), Scherer 
(1982), Sue Wing (2001; 2003), and Jin (2012), which used the IO-based knowledge flows matrices 
to measure inter-sectoral technology interactions in an economic system. For the details of R&D 
data preparation and knowledge accounting, see Appendix 4.B. For our model sectoral mapping 
by reference to the OECD ANBERD (!SIC Rev.3) sectoral classification, see Appendix 4.A. 
40 GEMPAt::K is a suite of general-purpose CGE modeling software, which is more efficient than 
CAMS to solve an intertemporal optimization model (Codsi et al., 1992; Harrison and Pearson, 
1996; Horridge and Pearson, 2011). The GEMPACK TABLO codes for running the model are 
outlined in Appendix 4.C. 
41 Normally, the initial period is not in a steady-state (SS) equilibrium, the dataset created by 
replicating initial period data into future periods thus can't be used as a baseline to calibrate 
intertemporal equations (e.g., Eq., (4.3), Eq. (4.5)). To remedy this problem, I add a Homotopy 
term into each intertemporal equation and carry out a simulation where the Homotopy variables 
are shocked. This simulation then generates a non-SS time-series dataset that can be used a 
baseline to calibrate both intra- and inter-temporal equations in our model. The Homotopy 
treatment is automated by the TABLO program in GEMPACK. For the details, see Codsi et al. 
(1992), and Wendner (1999). 
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Table 4.1: Substitution elasticity 
(J"Q (J"z (J"E (J"M (J"T (J"TI (J"F (J"FF 
Production sectors 
Electric utility 1.0 0.8 0.2 1.0 2.8 5.6 4.0 2.0 
Gas utilities 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.2 2.8 5.6 4.0 2.0 
Petro refining 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 2.1 4.2 4.0 2.0 
Coal mining 1.0 1.7 0.2 0.5 3.0 6.1 4.0 2.0 
Crude oil & gas 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.2 7.6 14.4 4.0 2.0 
Mineral mining 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.8 0.9 1.8 4.0 2.0 
Agriculture 1.0 1.3 0.6 1.7 2.4 4.8 4.0 2.0 
Forestry 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.2 3.2 6.7 4.0 2.0 
Durable 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.2 3.7 7.6 4.0 2.0 
Non-durable 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 3.0 6.4 4.0 2.0 
Transportation 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.9 3.8 4.0 2.0 
Services 1.0 0.3 0.3 3.0 1.9 3.8 4.0 2.0 
O"Q : Elasticity of substitution between knowledge input and physical input composite. 
O"z : Elasticity of substitution among the physical inputs of capital, labor, energy, and material. 
O"E : Elasticity of substitution among intermediate energy goods. 
O"M: Elasticity of substitution among intermediate material goods. 
O"T : Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported variety of intermediate 
commodity. 
O"TT : CES elasticity of substitution for regional composition of import bundles. 
O" F: CES elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign-invested physical capital goods. 
O"FF : CES elasticity of substitution for regional composition of FDI. 
Note: Physical capital goods invested in individual sectors are assumed to have a substantial 
degree of homogeneity, I hereby impose a restriction that substitution elasticities of physical 
capital investment are equal across sectors. I also make assumptions that substitution elasticities 
within individual sectors are equal across world regions. However, this does not mean that the 
elasticities are the same across sectors within a world region. 
Source: Goulder and Schneider (1999), McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999), Sue Wing (2001; 2003), 
Li:ischel and Otto (2009), Narayanan and Walmsley (2008), Springer (1998), Mai (2005), Lejour et 
al. (2008). 
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Table 4.2: Parameter values 
CHN 
TQ 0.25 
T1 0.20 
T R 0.10 
a 0.18 
~ 0.53 
fJ 0.02 
r 0.01 
()K 0.05 
0H 0.1 
ljJ 4 
TQ : Corporate profit tax rate 
T r : Investment tax credit 
T R : R&D tax credit 
USA EUW 
0.40 0.30 
0.12 0.15 
0.06 0.08 
0.18 0.18 
0.53 0.53 
0.02 0.02 
0.03 0.03 
0.05 0.05 
0.1 0.1 
4 4 
a : Elasticity of knowledge creation to R&D investment 
JPN 
0.40 
0.20 
0.15 
0.18 
0.53 
0.02 
0.04 
0.05 
0.1 
4 
f: Elasticity of knowledge creation to existing knowledge stock 
fJ : Efficiency of knowledge creation 
r : Real interest rate 
◊K : Depreciation rate of physical capital 
◊ H : Depreciation rate of knowledge capital 
1V: Investment adjustment cost coefficient 
RIN ROW 
0.30 0.15 
0.15 0.20 
0.10 0.10 
0.18 0.18 
0.53 0.53 
0.02 0.02 
0.05 0.05 
0.05 0.05 
0.1 0.1 
4 4 
Source: Caulder and Semi.eider (1999), McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999), Popp (2004), Bosetti 
et al. (2008), OECD (2010), World Bank (2011). 
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4.4 Results and Discussions 
4.4.1 Alternative Scenario Settings 
Recall that, I am motivated to examine the effect of indigenous R&D and foreign TD (the two 
sources of endogenous TC) on China's knowledge creation and carbon savings. To do that, I 
design and simulate two alternative scenarios: one is an endogenous TC scenario where 
indigenous R&D and foreign TD are explicitly considered, and the other is a reference 
s·cenario where indigenous R&D and foreign TD are ignored.42 
In Section 4.4.2, I compare both scenarios to give insights into the effect of endogenous 
TC driven by indigenous R&D and foreign TD. In Section 4.4.3, I analyze the effect of policy 
interventions in a context of globalization, where economic and knowledge globalization 
policies are examined. By doing that, I capture two important effects of globalization (scale 
and technique effect) on domestic carbon saving. In Sections 4.4.4, I further examine whether 
domestic climate regulations can induce foreign knowledge inflows to help lower climate 
mitigation costs, from which the composition effect of globalization on domestic carbon 
savings can be considered. 
4.4.2 Effects of Endogenous TC 
For insights into the effect of endogenous TC, we compare economic and emission growth 
paths under the two aforementioned scenarios. As shown in Fig. 4.2(a), GDP in the reference 
scenario is projected to grow by 6.4 % annually from $2327 to $10779 billion dollars between 
2005 and 2030.43 In contrast, GDP in the endogenous TC scenario rises from $2327 to $14272 
billion dollars during the same period, creating an annual average growth rate of 7.6 %. 
Consider that, the effect of endogenous TC stems from both indigenous R&D and foreign TD. 
To distinguish them, we simulate the growth path solely driven by indigenous R&D. Results 
show that with the stand-alone effort of indigenous R&D, GDP rises from $2327 to $13078 
42 In explicit, by setting indigenous R&D and foreign TD null, simulation in the reference 
scenario can drop the mechanism of endogenous TC, e.g., the process of knowledge creation as 
specified in Eq. (4.5). 
43 In our analysis, all measurements of output values are real GDP in unit of 2005 constant price 
U.S. dollars (year 2005 is the base period). To ensure the reliability of the model, we compare the 
simulated GDP and emissions growth rate with historical data, with their difference within an 
error range of 5 % . 
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billion dollars between 2005-2030, generating an annual average growth rate of 7.2% that is 
lower than the rate achieved by the joint efforts of indigenous R&D and foreign TD (7.6%). 
This suggests that, on top of indigenous R&D, international TD contributes to an additional 
growth rate of 0.36% annually over the time period. 
Climate repercussions of endogenous TC are shown in Fig. 4.2(b). Carbon emissions in 
the reference scenario are set to rapidly rise from 5100 to 13980 Mt between 2005-2030 - an 
average annual growth rate of 4.2 % . In comparison, the endogenous TC scenario exhibits a 
trajectory of carbon emissions that grow by a lesser 3.5% annually from 5100 to 11817 Mt 
during the same period. As a result, cumulative emission cuts by endogenous TC relative to 
the reference levels are estimated to reach 24.8 gigatons over the time frame, of which 
indigenous R&D and international TD contribute to 18.3 and 6.5 gigatons emission cuts 
respectively. Measured in terms of percentage deviation, endogenous TC are seen to drive 
China's cumulative emissions below its reference levels by 9.1 %, of which indigenous R&D 
and international TD contribute to 6.7% and 2.4% respectively. This suggests that foreign TD 
plays an important role to complement indigenous R&D in helping cut China's carbon 
emissions. 
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(a) 
Figure 4.2: China's GDP and carbon emissions growth paths 
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Figure 4.3: Effect of indigenous R&D investment and foreign technology 
diffusions ( dual sources of endogenous TC) on carbon emission reductions 
-20 ------------------------------------------------------ ----
-?, ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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iii International TD 
Note: The effect is measured as the percentage reductions of sec.!or-level cumulative 
emission levels by endogenous TC relative to their reference emission levels. 
In addition to the economy-wide effect, our multi-sector framework is used to examine 
the impact of endogenous TC on carbon abatement at sectoral level.44 As Fig. 4.3 shows, the 
sectors of manufacturing, electricity and transport accommodate highest carbon abatement 
potential fr?m endogenous TC, with 15-20% emission cuts relative to their sector-specific 
reference emission levels.45 In particular, foreign TD contributes to about one fourth of these 
emission abatements, suggesting a notable benefit of carbon saving from foreign TD. 
I now. turn to the driving forces for the aforementioned economic and emission changes. 
As Fig. 4.4(a) shows, China's indigenous R&D investment is likely to grow by 12% annually 
from $34,9 to $484.3 billion dollars during the period 2005~2030.46 The strong growths in 
44 This is done by firstly estimating sector-specific cumulative emission cuts by endogenous TC 
relative to the reference levels. Next, the cumulative emission cuts are decomposed into the 
abatement driven by indigenous R&D and international TD (the two sources of endogenous TC). 
45 The reason is that production technologies in these sectors heavily rely on the inputs of fossil 
fuels. Once indigenous R&D and foreign TD are induced to create new knowledge, these sectors 
have a large room of applying knowledge to substitute for fossil energy and save carbon. 
46 Accordingly, R&D intensity is estimated to rise from 1.5% to 3.2% as a share of GDP. This 
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R&D are spread across sectors, with manufacturing, agriculture, electric utility and transport 
investing the bulk of aggregate R&D.47 In terms of international TD (the other source of 
endogenous TC), Fig. 4.4(b) shows that international knowledge diffusions are estimated to 
rise by 9% annually from $9.1 to $87.2 billion dollars between 2005-2030. Foreign knowledge 
diffuses into China through three channels to favor domestic knowledge creation. In the 
short run (2005-2015), disembodied spillover serves as the leading channel of knowledge 
diffusion, because there is a huge international disembodied knowledge pool ( created by 
China's knowledge gap relative to technology frontier countries) accessible to China for 
learning. In the long run (2015-2030), as China enhances indigenous R&D to catch up with 
the global technology frontier, the knowledge pool would shrink. Hence the leading 
diffusion channel of disembodied spillovers will be replaced by import and FDI. On the one 
hand, China is anticipated to boost the imports of knowledge-intensive high-tech goods, so 
that the knowledge embodied in imports can be absorbed for domestic technical 
upgrading.48 One the other hand, China's continued growth is expected to create a huge 
consumer market, which attracts market-seeking MNCs to undertake R&D-related FDI 
(particularly in R&D-intensive industries like pharmaceutical, electronic products, consumer 
durables) to develop customized products for local consumers. The pattern of R&D-related 
FDI hence accelerates the transfer of foreign advanced technology.49 
projection coincides. with China's R&D blueprint in its transit towards an innovation-oriented 
economy - by 2020 the R&D intensity tends to reach 2.5% of the GDP (MOST, 2006). 
47 The reason is that, R&D investments have higher marginal benefits in these sectors due to 
higher innovation efficiency and marginal products of knowledge application. Given the same 
marginal cost of R&D (the market price of ·R&D goods purchased), the sectors that accommodate 
higher marginal benefits would undertake more R&D investments. The results coincide with 
empirical evidence that about 80% of all R&D are concentrated in high-R&D industries producing 
chemical products, technology hardware and transport equipments (Keller, 2002; 2004). 
48 This technology acquisition strategy is reflected by China's recently announcement of boosting 
imports of hi-tech products, which gives priority to the imports of electronic and mechanical 
products that have gained growing shares (47%) in China's total imports portfolio (UNCTAD, 
2010a). These imports are expected to foster China's emerging strategic industries, including 
biotechnology, nanotechnology, information technologies, and equipment manufacturing. 
49 R&D activities of MNCs are becoming increasingly internationalized, with the developing Asia 
continuing to be the most dynamic recipients. In the case of R&D expenditure by majority-owned 
foreign affiliates of U.S. MNCs, the share of developing Asian countries (particularly China) 
soared from 3% in 1994 to 15% in 2007. For example, the world's leading corporate R&D investors 
(e.g., Pfizer, Microsoft, Intel, IBM) have their own R&D centers in China (UNCTAD, 2005). 
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Figure 4.4: Intertemporal profiles of China's indigenous R&D 
investment and foreign knowledge inflows 
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Figure 4.5: Sector-specific international knowledge diffusion and 
the composition across three diffusion channels 
500 ------------------------------------------------------------------·----------------
450 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
400 - - · - -- - - -- - - - -- - - - --- -- - -- - -- -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -· · - - - -
350 --------------------------------------------------------
300 --------------------------------------------------------
250 --------------------------------------------------------
200 
150 
100 
so 
0 
■ Disembodied TD 
■ TD embodied in FDI 
■ TD embodied in trade 
At the sector level, knowledge diffusions (cumulative amounts over time period 
2005-2030) into each sector are displayed in Fig. 4.5, with the manufacturing sectors 
accommodating most of foreign diffused knowledge. so . Within these sectors, diffusion 
through the channels of FDI and disembodied spillovers accounts for about 35% and 40 % of 
the total _amounts of foreign diffused knowledge respectively, suggesting their important 
roles in transferring tacit · knowledge that has increasingly become an integral part of 
effective technology transfers. 
Finally, we look at the trend of convergence in cross-country R&D commitment. As 
shown in Fig. 4.6(a), global R&D spending is projected to triple over the time period, 
reaching an absolute level of $2.43 trillion dollars by 2030. This global picture, however, 
displays a shifting geography of R&D distribution. While foreign advanced countries like the 
so This is because most of knowledge-intensive intermediate goods imports (e.g., electronic 
components) and foreign-installed capital goods (e.g., equipment) concentrate in China's 
manufacturing sectors, making foreign TD more likely to occur in this sector. Meanwhile, the 
stronger knowledge absorptive capacity (due to a higher level of R&D investment) in China's 
manufacturing sector facilitates absorbing foreign diffused knowledge. 
132 
U.S. and Japan contribute to most of total R&D investments, their shares are anticipated to 
decline which is largely offset by China's share gains. As a result, the continued convergence 
in cross-country R&D growth trend suggests China's technology catch-up and an 
improvement of knowledge absorptive capacity.51 This is demonstrated in Fig. 4.6(b) where 
individual sectors all feature an improvement in knowledge absorptive capacity. They begin 
with weak capacities of knowledge learning due to low levels of indigenous R&D and 
structural mismatch of production technology, and then steadily improve as China continues 
growth in indigenous R&D and restructure production technology over time. 
We summarize this section by elucidating the endogenous TC mechanism, that is, the 
causal relation between knowledge creation (cause) and economic and emission growth 
(consequence). Indigenous R&D, combined with the complement of foreign TD, induce 
domestic knowledge accumulation. The augmented knowledge capitals are then applied in 
production to facilitate a reconfiguration of production factors for the Hicks-neutral 
productivity growth (the rate of production TC) - an explanation for the stronger output 
growth in the endogenous TC scenario. At the same time, owing to knowledge substitution 
for physical inputs, production technology experiences a decline in the share of physical 
input use and a rise for knowledge input (the bias of production TC). This gives rise to a 
reduction in uses of fossil energy - an explanation for the lower emissions levels in the 
endogenous TC scenario. 
51 Recall that, as mentioned in Section 4.2.4.4, China's knowledge absorptive capacity is 
measured as the ratio of R&D investment between China and technologically advanced foreign 
countries. 
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Figure 4.6: (a) Intertemporal profiles of R&D investment expenditure across 
six world countries/regions; (b) Changin paths of China's knowledge 
absorptive capacity specific to individual production sector 
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4.4.3 Globalization Policy Scenario 
As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, globalization may provide the benefit of low-carbon TD and 
carbon saving, we thus design globalization policy scenario in this section, where the effects 
of economic and knowledge globalization policies are explicitly considered.52 
To represent the economic globalization policy (trade and FDI liberalization), our model 
removes import and FDI barriers by imposing the policy shocks: rT = 0 for import tariffs 
and r f = O for FDI tax (see Appendix 4.D). Simulation results show that as economic 
globalization policies stimulate further expansions of international trade and investment, 
GDP is projected to grow by 8.1 % annually from $2327 to $15662 billion dollars between 
2005-2030, generating stronger output growths than that in endogenous TC scenario (see Fig. 
4.2(a)). In terms of climate repercussions, the dynamic growth pushes a further rise of carbon 
emissions from 5100 to 12705 Mt, with a growth rate of 3.8% that is above the rate in 
endogenous TC scenario (see Fig. 4.2(b)). 
The results show that the economic effect of trade and FDI liberalization (as measured 
by GDP growth) is positive, but its environmental consequence ~(as measure by carbon 
savings) is negative. This is primarily b~cause, as the global manufacturing engine, China is 
in a transition into a capital-abundant country specializing in manufacturing, of which the 
production pattern is both capital- and energy-intensive as compared to other sectors (e.g., 
services).53 Therefore, in the presence of trade and FDI liberalization, manufacturing sectors 
will attract more foreign intermediate input and capital goods to expand production capacity, 
which entails more uses of fossil energy and carbon emission. 
Generally, economic globalization policy creates the scale effect (Copeland and Taylor, 
2003; 2004): It accelerates economic growth momentum through the stimulus of international 
trade and investment, but without improving the intensity of knowledge embodied in 
52 Globalization as a multi-faced process mani_fests itself in two basic ways. 1) Economic 
globalization: national economies are increasingly integrated into a globalized production system 
through trade and FDI liberalization; 2) Knowledge globalization: globalized innovation 
networks facilitate a geographically extensive diffusion of technology, making individual country 
actively involved in knowledge exchange and sharing (ArchiJ:mgi and Iammarino, 1999; 
UNCTAD, 2005; Freeman, 2010). 
53 This coincides with the "factor endowment hypothesis"': there is a strong correlation between 
emissions and capital intensity, with globalization · leading to emission increases in the 
capital-abundant countries (Antweiler et al. 2000; Cole and Elliot, 2003; Frankel, 2003). 
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import and FDI, this expanding production size necessarily requires more uses of fossil 
energy without carbon saving. Therefore, policies should be directly targeted at the growing 
globalization of knowledge to lift technology transfer restrictions erected by technologically 
advanced countries,54 so that the intensity of knowledge embodied in foreign trade and 
investment can increase, creating the technique effect that favors domestic carbon savings. 
To represent the knowledge globalization policy, our model removes foreign barriers of 
TD by raising the values of parameters eT ,8\ 8° from 0.5 to 1. Results in Fig. 4.7 (a) show 
that, under a policy shock of knowledge globalization, sector-specific knowledge diffusions 
are induced to rise by a range of 50-80%, which facilitate the creation of more domestic 
knowledge. As a result, GDP is driven to grow by 8.2% annually from $2327 to $16404 billion 
dollars between 2005-2030 (see Fig. 4.2(a)). Meanwhile, augmented knowledge capital 
substitutes for the use of fossil energy, slowing down the emissions growth by 3.4 % annually 
from 5100 to 11305 Mt between 2005-2030 (see Fig. 4.2(b)). Over the time frame, cumulative 
emission cuts reach a level of 15.8 gigatons, which suggests that knowledge globalization 
policy can a technique effect that favors domestic carbon saving (Copeland and Taylor, 2003; 
2004). 
Meanwhile, once removing foreign barriers of TD, China's indigenous R&D are induced 
to increase by a range of 20-35% across sectors (see Fig. 4.7(b)), suggesting that foreign TD in 
knowledge globalization does not necessarily crowd out indigenous R&D. There is little 
evidence on the incentive of free riding on foreign knowledge diffusion without indigenous 
R&D commitment. That's because indigenous R&D investment is necessary for the recipient 
country China to build indigenous capacity of absorbing foreign diffused knowledge. 
In summary, economic globalization policy (trade and FDI liberalization) facilitates a 
transition to economic integration and production growth, but leading to higher emissions 
levels without carbon saving (scale effect). To acquire the benefits of domestic carbon saving, 
knowledge globalization policy should be implemented to create the technique effect, which 
depends on: 1) Removal of TD restrictions by technologically advanced nations; and 2) 
Improvement of knowledge absorptive capacity by the host developing countries. 
54 While removal of import tariff and FDI tax reflects economic globalization policy adopted by 
China (technology demand side) to grant foreign access to domestic market for technology 
transfer, a lifting of knowledge transfer limits by foreign advanced countries (technology supply 
side) can be thought of as a particular type of knowledge globalization policy (UNCTAD, 2010b). 
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Figure 4.7: Effect of knowledge globalization policy to induce foreign 
knowledge inflows and indigenous R&D for knowledge absorption 
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(b) 
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Note: (a) Effect of knowledge globalization policy on foreign technology diffusion is measured 
as percentage changes of foreign knowledge inflows induced by the policy shock relative to 
knowledge inflows without that policy shock; (b) Effect of knowledge globalization policy on 
indigenous R&D is measured as percentage changes of R&D investment induced by the policy 
shock relative to the knowledge inflows without that policy shock 
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4.4.4 Climate Policy Scenario 
In the last section, knowledge globalization, by facilitating foreign technology flows, 
indirectly favors domestic carbon savings. While important, it can't stand alone, but rather 
must be part of policy portfolio to address climate mitigation. In this section, we explicitly 
consider direct climate policy regulation and its effect on economic growth, carbon savings, 
and innovation inducement. 
I thus impose the policy shock of a carbon tax, $20 dollars per ton of carbon dioxide 
from the year 2012 onward. Simulation results in Fig. 4.2(b) show that the carbon tax creates 
a noticeable effect to stabilize emissions growth trend, driving down from 5100 to 9795 Mt 
between 2005- 2030 (2.2% annual growth rate) . Over the time period, carbon tax generates 
carbon savings of about 26.7 gigatons, translating into 12% cuts relative to emission levels 
without taxation. The sectoral composition of cumulative carbon abatement is given in Fig. 
4.8(a), coal sector has the highest levels of emission cuts (50% ), followed by oil and natural 
gas sectors (20-30% ), with a modest level of abatement (10-20%) occurring in non-energy 
production sectors.ss 
It comes as no surprise that, with higher energy input costs imposed by carbon tax, 
carbon savings benefits are at the economic cost of deadweight losses. As Fig. 4.2(a) shows, 
GDP is likely to grow at a lesser rate by 7.2% annually from $2327 to $13309 billion dollars 
between 2005-2030, with a present-value cumulative output losses of $9763 billion (an 
equivalent of 2.4% loss relative to the output levels without carbon tax). The sectoral 
composition of cumulative output losses is displayed in Fig. 4.8(b) . Most non-energy sectors 
experience output reductions of less than 5%. Carbon-intensive fossil fuel sectors suffer 
precipitous output declines of roughly 10.:20%.56 
To demonstrate how innovation helps lower climate compliance costs, we simulate the 
55 Electricity sector, as compared to non-energy sectors, is carbon-intensive that heavily relies on 
fossil fuels inputs to generate power. Putting a carbon price on fossil fuels thus incentivize 
electricity. sector to lower fossil fuels uses, hence having a proportionally higher level in carbon 
emissions cuts. 
56 As compared to primary energy sectors (coal, natural gas, oil), electricity sector (secondary 
energy sector) is R&D-intensive. Carbon taxation thus induces electricity sector to create and 
apply low-carbon energy technologies (e.g., wind, solar) to generate power, which partially 
offsets output loss of coal-fired electricity incurred by carbon tax. Hence, electricity sector has a 
proportionally lower level of output losses. 
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dead weight loss incurred by carbon taxation in the reference (no-innovation) scenario, where 
endogenous-TC is absent in private firms' response to energy price shock. Results show that 
carbon tax is likely to drive down GDP growth at a lesser rate (5.8 % annually) from $2327 to 
$9357 billion dollars between 2005-2030, with a present-value cumulative output losses of 
$23410 billion dollars. It implies that endogenous TC helps partially mitigate economic costs 
of $13647 (23410-9763) billion dollars, of which foreign TD (one source of endogenous TC) 
helps mitigate a deadweight loss of $3713 billion dollars. Therefore, while climate regulation 
has a negative effect on economic production, the innovative response of private firm can 
help partially mitigate the climate compliance costs. 
For insights into the effect of climate policy on innovation inducement, we examine the 
effect of the carbon tax on the R&D intensity at sector level. As Fig. 4.8 (c) shows, although 
higher input cost incurred by carbon tax would diminish the absolute levels of production 
output and hence indigenous R&D spending, R&D intensity (R&D to output ratio) does not 
necessarily drop across sectors. Decline in cumulative R&D exceeds the fall in cumulative 
outputs in fossil fuel sectors, but falls short of those in non-fossil fuel sectors. Consequently, 
R&D intensity increases slightly across a range of non-fossil fuel sectors, suggesting that 
indigenous R&D investments are induced by climate policy in these sectors. 
Moreover, as Fig. 4.8(d) shows, the decline in cumulative foreign TD also exceeds the 
fall in cumulative outputs in fossil fuel sectors, but falls short of those in non-fossil fuel 
sectors. As a result, input share of foreign diffused knowledge in domestic production 
increase slightly across non-fossil fuel sectors, which indicates that domestic climate 
regulations ·also stimulate external knowledge inflows to help increase knowledge uses in 
domestic production technology. 57 This finding thus broadens the scope of "Porter 
Hypothesis" within a close economy, in the sense that a tightening of domestic climate 
regulation -also stimulates inflows of external knowledge that helps increase knowledge 
57 This can be explained from a technology push/ market pull perspective. Foreign developed 
countries have the "first mover advantage" in selling low-carbon technologies to the latecomers 
(technology push). Meanwhile, China's climate policies create a carbon market where huge 
demands for low-carbon products and technologies can draw in market-seeking foreign investors 
and innovators (market pull). Moreover, transfers of climate-friendly technology can lower the 
climate compliance cost in the recipient developing countries, making climate regulations more 
likely (Lovely and Popp, 2011; Popp, 2011). 
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intensity in domestic production technology.58 
In summary, under stringent climate regulation, individual sectors are induced to create 
new knowledge through indigenous R&D investment and foreign knowledge inflows. From 
an economy-wide perspective, once new knowledge is applied in domestic economic system, 
the contribution of knowledge-intensive sectors would expand, with that of carbon-intensive 
sectors contracting. Therefore, such a shift in the composition/ structure of the aggregate 
economy suggests a composition effect. 
58 
"Porter Hypothesis" holds that stringent environmental regulations not only create direct 
environmental benefits but also have indirect benefit of stimulating technological innovation 
(Porter and van der Linde, 1995). For empirical evidences of the induced innovation hypothesis, 
see Newell et al. (1999), Popp (2002). For numerical simulation analysis, see Goulder and 
Schneider (1999), Sue Wing (2003) and Jin (2012). 
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Figure 4.8: (a) Effect of carbon tax on sector-level cumulative emission cuts; (b) Effect of carbon tax on 
sector-level cumulative production output losses; (c) Effect of carbon tax on sector-level R&D intensity; 
(d) Effect of carbon tax on sector-level input share of foreign diffused knowledge in domestic production. 
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4.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Tab. 4.3 lists the results of sensitivity analysis (SA) for key technology parameters used in 
our model. The SA is implemented by lowering and raising these exogenous parameters by 
25% relative to their original values (as shown in Tabs. 4.1-4.2) . We then compare new 
simulation results (parameters take new values) with regular simulation results (parameters 
take original values), and report the SA results as the percentage change between them. As 
Tab. 4.3 shows, the results of SA suggest that the basic findings from Sections 4.4.1-4.4.4 are 
robust to changes in exogenous technology parameters. 1) Foreign TD complements 
indigenous R&D to help cut domestic carbon emissions; 2) Economic globalization generates 
the scale effect that is adverse to domestic carbon savings; 3) Knowledge globalization creates 
the technique effect that favors domestic carbon savings; 4) Climate mitigation policy creates 
the composition effect by inducing foreign knowledge inflows to help mitigate climate 
compliance costs. 
Turning to technology parameters specific to China, in the case of lowering ~ by 25%, 
a lower possibility of knowledge substitution translates into a lowe: incentive to undertake 
indigenous R&D and absorb foreign TD for knowledge creation. As a result, the scale effect of 
economic globalization is stronger in new simulation, and the technique effect in knowledge 
globalization is weaker. In the meantime, lower knowledge substitution also weakens the 
effect of carbon taxation to induce indigenous innovation, suggesting the composition effect 
becomes weaker. The opposite holds if the parameter ~ is raised by 25%. 
Turning to technology parameters specific to foreign countries, in the case of lowering 
~ by 25%, lower possibilities of knowledge substitutions in the foreign countries translates 
into their lower incentives of R&D investment. As foreign R&D levels decline, the potential 
of foreign knowledge diffusion into China become small. As a result, the scale effect of 
economic globalization is stronger in new simulation, and the technique effect of knowledge 
globalization is weaker. Less foreign TD also suggests a weaker composition effect. The 
opposite holds if these parameters ~ are raised by 25 % . 
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Table 4.3: Results of sensitivity analysis 
a E . . b Composition effect Endogenous TC rmss10n cuts Scale Technique 
Indigenous effect c d Indigenous Foreign Foreign effect R&D Share of foreign 
R&D TD R&D TD . . e knowledge f mtens1!_y 
China 
(J"Q Lowh -3.52% -2.61 % 6.47% 2.33% 3.85% 2.23 % -2.84% -0.57% 
High 3.64% 2.85 % 6.92% 2.46% -3.47% -2.08% 2.65% 0.48% 
Low 2.76% ·2.53% 6.89% . 2.46 % -2.12% -0.87% 1.72% 0.36% 
6H 
High -2.48 % -2.15% 6.51 % 2.34% 1.86% 0.74% -1.96% -0.33 % 
a, p, 11 Low -5.46% -4.27% 6.35% 2.29% 6.12% 5.20% -4.15 % -0.91 % 
High 6.27% 4.89% 7.12% 2.51 % -5.46% -4.70 % 3.72% 0.64% 
Foreign 
(J"Q 
Low -1 .26% -3.85% 6.62% 2.26% 1.58% 1.07% -0.98% -3.76% 
High 1.15% 3.67% 6.77% 2.53 % -1.46 % -0.95% 1.11 % 3.82% 
Low 0.75% 2.28 % 6.76% 2.49% -0.91 % -0.43% 0.66% 2.34% 
6H 
High -0.93% -2.57%. 6.64% 2.31 % 0.82% 0.37% -0.57% -2.19% 
a, p, 11 Low -1.39% -5.72% 6.62% 2.22% 2.51 % 2.13% -1.72% -5.92% 
High 1.12% 5.48% 6.79% 2.58 % -2.46% -2.04% 1.78 % 5.75 % 
O" Q : Elasticity of substitution between knowledge and physical input. 6H : Depreciation rate of knowledge capital stock 
a: Elasticity of knowledge creation to R&D. ~: Elasticity of knowledge creation to existing knowledge stock. I]: Efficiency of knowledge creation 
a Percentage change of China's cumulative indigenous R&D and cumulative international TD in new simulation relative to that in regular simulation. 
b China's cumulative emission cuts driven by indigenous R&D and international TD in new simulations. 
(in regular simulation, cumulative emission cuts driven by indigenous R&Q and international TD equal to 6.7% and 2.4 %, respectively) 
c Percentage change of China's cumulative carbon emissions in economic globalization scenario in new simulation relative to that in regular simulation. 
Cost 
savings g 
-1.02% 
0.93 % 
0.64% 
-0.76% 
-1.45 % 
1.53% 
-0.56% 
0.46% 
0.30% 
-0.24% 
-0.95 % 
0.69% 
d Percentage change of China's cumulative carbon emissions in knowledge globalization scenario in new simulation relative to that in regular simulation .. 
e Percentage change of the average levels (among China's eight non-fossil fuel sectors) of R&D intensity 
(ratio of indigenous R&D investment to output) in new simulation relative to that in regular simulation. 
f Percentage change of the average levels (among China's eight non-fossil fuel sectors) of the input share of foreign diffused knowledge 
(ratio of foreign diffused knowledge to output) in new simulation relative to that in regular simulation. 
g Percentage change of China's climate compliance cost savings (mitigation of the dead weight losses incurred by carbon tax) 
by endogenous TC in new simulation relative to that in regular simulation. 
h Low and High refer to lowering and raising exogenous parameters by 25 % relative to their central case values, respectively. 
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4.5 Conclusion and Outlook 
Building on a multi-region global numerical model, this chapter considers both indigenous 
R&D and foreign TD as dual sources of endogenous TC for domestic carbon savings. The 
model fully represents international TD through three diffusion channels of trade, FDI, and 
disembodied spillovers, with an elaborate treatment of knowledge absorptive capacity. 
Simulation results show that 1) foreign TD contributes to 20%-25% of carbon emission 
cuts by endogenous TC. In the short run, 60-70 % of foreign knowledge diffusion occurs via 
the channel of disembodied spillover. In the long run, the leading diffusion channels become 
embodied knowledge diffusion via import and FDI which account for almost 80% of total 
foreign TD; 2) Trade and FDI liberalization facilitates economic growth, creating an 
additional GDP growth rate of about 0.5 % annually over time. But this is at the cost of more 
carbon emissions, raising emissions growth rate by about 0.3 % annually. So economic 
globalization policy may not create the benefit of domestic carbon saving (scale effect); 3) 
Removal of foreign technology transfers barriers facilitates domestic knowledge creation and 
productivity growth, generating an additional GDP growth rate _of about 0.1 % annually. It 
also brings down the carbon emission growth rate of roughly 0.4% annually. So knowledge 
globalization policy creates the benefit of domestic carbon savings (technique effect); 4) 
Domestic climate policies induce both indigenous R&D (R&D intensity increases by about 
2-5%) and foreign TD (input share of foreign diffused knowledge rise by about 5-8%). As a 
result, both types of innovation inducement would help shift the composition of domestic 
production techniques (composition effect), which eventually lowers climate compliance cost 
(output losses incurred by carbon taxation) by about 15-20%. 
Needless to say, a number of model extensions are required in future work. In particular, 
current works focus on modeling unidirectional knowledge diffusion from technologically 
advanced countries to China, without factoring into multidirectional technology interaction. 
As China is increasingly integrated into the global innovation landscape, it is possible for 
technology incumbents in advanced countries to learn the ideas created by the new entrants 
in the emerging markets. Hence, future work should study the mechanism of cross-country 
multidirectional knowledge diffusions, based on which the issue of international technology 
coordination can be addressed. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
4.A Country Composition of Regions 
Region Number Region Name 
1 CHN 
2 USA 
3 JPN 
4 EUW 
5 RIN 
6 ROW 
Western Europe: 
Region Description 
China 
United States of America 
Japan 
Western Europe 
Rest of the Industrialized Countries 
Rest of the World 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Rest of the Industrialized Countries: 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
Rest of the World: 
All countries not included in other region groups 
Model sectoral classification and mapping 
Sector number/ name GTAP OECDANBERD 
in our mode sector numbers sector number 
1. Electric utilities 43 40 
2. Gas utilities 44 41 
3. Petroleum refining 32 23 
4. Coal mining 15 10 
5. Crude oil & gas extraction 16-17 11 
6. Mineral mining 18 12-14 
7. Agr.iculture 01-12, 14 01, 03-05 
8. Forestry & wood products 13,30 02,20 
9. Durable manufacturing 34-42 26-37 
10. Nondurable manufacturing 19-29, 31, 33 15-19, 21-22, 24-25 
11. Transportation 48-50 60-64 
12. Services 45-47, 51-57 45, 50-59, 70-99 
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4.B Knowledge Accounting 
In the System of National Accounts, the conventional IO table treats corporate expenditures on 
R&D as current cost of production along with intermediate inputs, implying that only a 
portion of each intermediate transaction reflects the value of pure physical flows, with the 
remainder being the value of intangible knowledge flows embodied in that transaction. In 
line with this principle, knowledge accounting can be conceptualized as follows: in a stylized 
IO table, the intangible knowledge flows matrix Q = [ euii ]i=l, .,n;i=J, ,n is embodied in the 
intermediate transactions matrix X = [ xii ]i=l,. ,n;i=l, .,n . The row sums of Q is the 
sector-specific R&D investments, Ri = Li euii , and the column sums of Q denote the 
remuneration of knowledge capital as primary factor inputs into production, H i = L i wii . 
Based on the embodied technology hypothesis, we estimate the intangible knowledge 
flows embodied in the intermediate transaction as: 
⇒ (4.B.1) 
Embodied technology hypothesis 
where Xji is the (j,i) cell of the intermediate transaction matrix X in the stylized IO table, 
representing the intersectoral transaction of intermediate inputs from sector j to i. wii is the 
intangible knowledge flows embodied in that transaction. Ri, Xi denote R&D investment 
and intermediate production specific to sector j, respectively. The embodied technology 
hypothesis claims that, for any given commodity j, the knowledge embodiment ratio uJii/xii 
is invariant across sectors in intermediate production. 
As mentioned previously, innovations in foreign technologically advanced countries are 
driven _by their indigenous R&D, but TC in China benefits from both indigenous R&D and 
international knowledge diffusions. Hence, a distinction is made in knowledge accounting 
between foreign technologically advanced economies and China. For the former, 
sector-specific R&D investment ( Ri) is equal to indigenous R&D expenditure, of which the 
sector-level data can be collected form OECD ANBERD dataset. China's R&D investment, in 
comparison, amounts to a sum of indigenous R&D and international knowledge diffusion. 
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China's indigenous R&D expenditure data is also available from OECD ANBERD dataset. 
International knowledge diffusions through the three channels (trade, FDI and disembodied 
spillovers) are calculated using the formula presented in the manuscript Sections 2.4.1-2.4.3. 
The shares of product sales to other sectors in intermediate transaction (xii/Xi) are calculated 
from the stylized IO table. We then use Eq. (4.B.1) to estimate the intangible knowledge 
flows embodied in the intermediate production. 
Generally, the knowledge accounting by using Eq. (4.B.1) is equivalent to a horizontal 
mapping of the column of sector-specific R&D investment expenditure into each cell in the 
intangible knowledge flow matrix. Then, the knowledge flow matrix is vertically aggregated 
to create an additional row of knowledge input in the primary factor use matrix V, with 
each element being the value of knowledge input into production sector i, H = L/ilii . 
Finally, the elements of intermediate production matrix :X are purged of the intangible 
knowledge flows to represent the value of pure physical flows. 
The residual elements of intermediate transaction matrix ( X ji = X ji -GJji) is subject to the 
non-negativity constraint. Once the column and row balance hold in the stylized IO table, 
the matrix balance still holds for the modified IO table with explicit knowledge accounting: 
L/ik + L f V & + V Hk = L/ki + L f8 kf + g kR . This procedure hereby constructs a modified IO 
dataset with an explicit representation of R&D investments and knowledge inputs, based on 
which the CGE model with endogenous TC can be calibrated. 
147 
4.C GEMPACK TABLO Model Codes 
The model developed in Chapter 4 focus on representing unidirectional R&D spillovers from 
foreign countries to China. The modeling structure of each foreign country (e.g., USA, JPN, 
EUW, RIN, ROW) is similar to a single-country CGE framework incorporating indigenous 
R&D (see Appendix 3.C in Chapter 3). Meanwhile, innovations in China can benefit from 
knowledge diffusion from these foreign countries, with TC depending on both indigenous 
R&D and international TD. So the basic structure of the China part is similar to Appendix 
3.C in Chapter 3, with an extension that characterizes foreign knowledge diffusion into 
China as outlined in the following GEMPACK TABLO code. 
!====--===========-------------=========================================================== 
GEMPACK TABLO code for implementing the model of foreign knowledge diffusion into China 
-------==================================================================================! 
!============================================ 
SETS 
=============================================! 
SET sectors# 12 production sectors# 
(a01, a02, a03, a04, a05, a06, a07, a08, a09, al0, all, al2); 
SET sectors_e # 5 energy sectors# 
(a01, a02, a03, a04, a05); 
SET sectors_m # 7 material sectors# 
(a06, a07, a08, a09, al0, all, al2); 
SUBSET sectors_e IS SUBSET OF sectors; 
SUBSET sectors_m IS SUBSET OF sectors; 
SET goods# 12 commodities# 
(g01, g02, g03, g04, g05, g06, g07, g08, g09, gl0, gll, gl2); 
SET goods_e # 5 energy commodities# 
(g01, g02, g03, g04, g05); 
SET goods_m # 7 material commodities# 
(g06, g07, g08, g09, gl0, gll, gl2); 
SUBSET goods_e IS SUBSET OF goods; 
SUBSET goods_m IS SUBSET OF goods; 
SET regions # 4 foreign regions# 
(USA, EUW, JPN, RIN, ROW); 
SET 
(INTERTEMPORAL) alltime # all time periods# (p0 - p25); 
SET 
(INTERTEMPORAL) fwdtime # domain of forward difference# (p0 - p24); 
SET 
(INTERTEMPORAL) endtime # ending time# (p25); 
SUBSET fwdtime IS SUBSET OF alltime; 
SUBSET endtime IS SUBSET OF alltime; 
!-----==· =============================================== 
Definition of coefficients and variable associated with 
Representing China R&D and knowledge capital accumulation 
=============================================-=======-=! 
Coefficient 
(parameter) 
# knowledge creation efficiency in IPF #; 
(parameter) 
# power on R in IPF #; 
(parameter) 
# power on Hin IPF #; 
(parameter) 
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CAH 
CALPHA 
CBETA 
CDELTAH 
# knowledge depreciation rate#; 
(all, t, alltime) 
# R&D tax credit#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
# R&D investment in knowledge capital#; 
(all, t, alltime) 
# purchase price of raw R&D good#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
# knowledge capital stock#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
# shadow price of knowledge capital#; 
# Foreign barrier to disembodied R&D spillover#; 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
# total R&D of technology frontier countries#; 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
# disembodied R&D spillover#; 
Read 
CAH from file BASEDATA header "CAH"; 
(ALPHA from file BASEDATA header "CAlP "; 
CB ETA from file BASEDATA header "CBET"; 
CDEL TAH from file BAS EDA TA header "CDEH"; 
CTRTC from file BAS EDA TA header "CTRT"; 
LCHCP from file BASEDATA header "CHCP"; 
LCRNV from file BASEDATA header "CRNV"; 
LCPRRR from file BAS EDA TA header "CPRR "; 
BARD from FILE BASEDATA header "BARD"; 
Formula 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRNV_R(i,t) = sum{r, regions, LRNV(r,i,t)}; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LCLAMR(i,t) =(1-CTRTC(t)) * LCPRRR(t) 
CTRTC(t) 
LCRNV(i,t) 
LCPRRR(t) 
LCHCP(i,t) 
LCLAMR(i,t) 
BARD 
LRNV_R(i,t) 
LRTD(i,t) 
/ (CAH * (ALPHA * LCRNV(i,t) A(CALPHA-1) * LCHCP(i,t) ACBETA 
+ BARD - 2*LCRNV(i,t) / LRNV_R(i,t)]; 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t , alltime) 
LRTD(i,t) = BARD*LRNV_R(i,t) - LCRNV(i,t); 
VARIABLE 
(CHANGE) (all, t, alltime) delCTRTC(t) 
# R&D tax credit#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) crnv(i,t) 
# R&D investment#; 
(all, t, alltime) cprrr(t) 
# price of R&D good#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t , alltime) clamr(i,t) 
# shadow price of knowledge capital#; 
(all, i , sectors) (all, t, alltime) ctobr(i,t) 
# Tobin's-q in R&D investment # ; 
Update 
(CHANGE) (all, t, alltime) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t , alltime) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t , alltime) 
(all, t, · alltime) 
CTRTC(t) = delCTRTC(t); 
LCHCP(i,t) = chcp(i,t); 
LCRNV(i,t) = crnv(i,t); 
LCPRRR(t) = cprrr(t); 
!======== .======================================================= 
Foreign Tech Transfer into China through 
Knowledge embodied in import (the 1st Channel) 
================================================================! 
Coeffici~nt 
(all,j,goods) BART(j) 
# foreign barrier of export hi-tech good #; 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods)(all,t,alltime) LERT(r , j,t) 
# R&D embodiedment intensity of Traded good from region r #; 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods_e)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) LRTET(r,j,i,t) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade Energy good into sector i, from region r #; 
(all,j,goods_e)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) LRTET_R(j,i,t) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade Energy good into sector i, sum over region r #; 
(all,i,sectors)(all , t,alltime) LRTET_RJ(i,t) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade Energy good into sector i, sum over rand j #; 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods_m)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) LRTMT(r,j,i,t) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade M good into sector i , from region r #; 
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(all,j,goods_m)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) LRTMT_R(j,i,t) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade M good into sector i, sum over region r #; 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) LRTMT_RJ(i , t) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade M good j into sector i, sum over rand j #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LRTT(i,t) 
# Total R&D transfer via trade in both E and M, used in IPF #; 
Read 
BART from FILE BASEDATA header "BART"; 
Formula 
(all,r , regions)(all,j,goods)(all,t,alltime) 
LERT(r,j,t) = BART(j) * LRNV(r,GOD2SEC(j),t) / Vl_Y(r,j,t); 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods_e)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRTET(r,j,i,t) = LERT(r,j,t) * S_CVEFF(r,j) * S_CVEF(j) * CVlE(j,i,t); 
(all,j,goods_e)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRTET_R(j,i,t) = sum{r, regions, LRTET(r,j,i,t)}; 
· (all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRTET_RJ(i,t) = sum{j, goods_e, LRTET_R(j,i,t)}; 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods_m)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRTMT(r,j,i,t) = LERT(r,j,t) * S_CVMFF(r,j) * S_CVMF(j) * CVlM(j,i,t); 
(all , j,goods_m)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRTMT_R(j,i,t) = sum{r, regions, LRTMT(r,j,i,t)}; 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRTMT_RJ(i,t) = sum{j, goods_m, LRTMT_R(j,i,t)}; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LRTT(i,t) = LRTET_RJ(i,t) + LRTMT_RJ(i,t); 
Variable 
(CHANGE) (all,j,goods) 
# foreign barrier of export hi-tech good#; 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods)(all,t,alltime) 
delBART(j) 
ert(r,j,t) 
rtet(r,j,i,t) 
# R&D embodiedment intensity of Traded good from region r #; 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods_e)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade E good into sector i, from region r 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods_m)(all,i,sectors)(all,t , alltime) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade M good j into sector i, from region 
(all,j,goods_e)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
#; 
rtmt(r,j,i,t) 
r #; 
rtet_r(j,i,t) 
regions #; 
rtmt_r(j,i,t) 
regions #; 
rtet_rj(i,t) 
and j #; 
rtmt_rj(i,t) 
and j #; 
# R&D Transfer via Trade E good into sector i, sum over 
(all,j,goods_m)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade M good into sector i, sum over 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t , alltime) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade E good into sector i, sum over r 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
# R&D Transfer via Trade M good into sector i, sum over r 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) rtt(i,t) 
# totaL R&D transfer via trade in both E and M, used in IPF #; 
Update 
(CHANGE) (all,j,goods) BART(j)= delBART(j); 
Equation 
E_ert # knowledge intensity -in trade# 
(all,r,regions)(all,j , goods)(all,t,alltime) 
ert(r,j,t) = 100/BART(j) *delBART(j) + rnv(r,GOD2SEC(j),t) - ouy(r,j,t); 
E_rtet # ~nowledge embodied E in trade# 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods_e)(all,i,sectors)(all , t ,a lltime) 
rtet(r,j,i,t) = ert (r,j,t) + cenff(r,j,i,t); 
E_rtet_r . # knowledge embodied E in trade, sum over r # 
(all,j,goods_e)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rtet_r(j,i,t) = sum{r, regions, LRTET(r,j,i,t)/LRTET_R(j,i,t) *rtet(r,j,i,t)}; 
E_rtet_r. j # knowledge embodied E in trade, sum over rand j # 
(all , i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rtet_rj(i,t) = sum{j, goods_e,LRTET_R(j,i,t)/LRTET_RJ(i,t) *rtet_r(j,i,t)}; 
E_rtmt # knowledge embodied Min trade# 
(all,r,regions)(all,j,goods_m)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rtmt(r,j,i,t) = ert (r,j,t) + coiff(r,j,i,t); 
E_rtmt_r # knowledge embodied Min trade, sum over r # 
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(all,j,goods_m)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rtmt_r(j,i,t) = sum{r , regions, LRTMT(r,j,i,t)/LRTMT_R(j,i,t)*rtmt(r,j,i,t)}; 
E_rtmt_rj # knowledge embodied Min trade, sum over rand j # 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rtmt_rj(i,t) = sum{j, goods_m, LRTMT_R(j,i,t)/LRTMT_RJ(i,t)*rtmt_r(j,i,t)}; 
E_rtt # total knowledge embodied in trade, both E and M # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
rtt(i,t) = LRTET_RJ(i,t) / LRTT(i,t) * rtet_rj(i,t) 
+ LRTMT_RJ(i,t) / LRTT(i,t) * rtmt_rj(i ,t); 
!================================================================ 
Foreign Tech Transfer into China through 
Knowledge embodied in FDI (the 2nd Channel) 
================================================================! 
Coefficient 
BARF 
# Foreign barrier to FDI #; 
(all,r,regions)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) LERF(r,i,t) 
# R&D intensity in FDI into sector i from region r #; 
(all,r,regions)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) LRTF(r ,i,t) 
# R&D Transfer via FDI into sector i from region r #; 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) LRTF_R(i,t) 
# R&D Transfer via FDI into sector i, sum over region r #; 
Read 
BARF from FILE BASEDATA header "BARF"; 
Formula 
(all,r,regions)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LERF(r,i,t) =BARF * LRNV(r,i,t) / Vl_Y(r,SEC2GOD(i),t); 
(all,r,regions)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRTF(r,i,t) = LERF(r,i,t) * S_CVIFF(r) * S_CVIF * CVK(i,t); 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRTF_R(i,t) = sum{r, regions, LRTF(r,i,t)}; 
Variable 
(CHANGE) delBARF 
# foreign barrier to FDI into China#; 
(all,r,regions)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) erf(r,i,t) 
# R&D intensity in FDI into sector i from region r #; 
(all,r,regions)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) rtf(r,i,t) 
# R&D Transfer via FDI into sector i from region r #; 
(all,i,se~tors)(all,t,alltime) rtf_r(i,t) 
# R&D Transfer via FDI into sector i, sum over region r #; 
Update 
(CHANGE) BARF= delBARF; 
Equc!tion 
E_erf # R&D intensity of FDI into sector i from region r # 
(all,r,regions)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
erf(r,i,t) = 100/BARF*delBARF + rnv(r,i,t) - ouy(r,SEC2GOD(i),t); 
E_rtf # R&D Transfer via FDI into sector i from region r # 
(all,r,regions)(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rtf(r,i,t), = erf(r,i,t) + cinvff(r,i,t); · 
E_rtf_r # R&D Transfer via FDI into sector i, sum over region r# 
(all , i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rtf_r(i,t) = sum {r , regions, LRTF(r,i,t) / LRTF_R(i,t) * rtf(r,i,t)}; 
!==================================================== 
Foreign Tech Transfer into China through 
Disembodied knowledge spillover (the 3rd Channel) 
====================================================== ! 
Variable 
(CHANGE) delBARD 
#" J # foreign barrier to disembodied R&D transfer to China 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) rnv_r(i,t) 
countries#; 
rtd(i,t) 
# aggregate R&D investments of technology frontier 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
# disembodied RAD spillover#; 
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Update 
(CHANGE) BARD= delBARD; 
Equation 
E_rnv_r # aggregate R&D investments of technology frontier countries# 
(all,i , sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rnv_r(i,t) = sum{r, regions, LRNV(r,i,t)/LRNV_R(i,t) * rnv(r , i,t)}; 
E_rtd # disembodied knowledge spillover# 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rtd(i,t) = BARD*LRNV_R(i,t)/LRTD(i,t) *[100/ BARD*delBARD + rnv_r(i,t)] 
- LCRNV(i,t)/LRTD(i , t) * crnv(i , t); 
!============================================== 
China's knowledge Absorptive capacity for 
· assimilating foreign R&D inflows 
===============================================! 
Coefficient 
(all,i,sectors)(all , t,alltime) 
# Absorptive capacity of R&D spillovers#; 
Formula 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
LRTAC(i,t) = LCRNV(i,t) / LRNV_R(i,t); 
Variable 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
# Absorptive capacity of R&D spillovers#; 
Equation 
E_rtac # Absorptive capacity of R&D spillovers# 
(all,i,sectors)(all,t,alltime) 
rtac(i,t) = crnv(i,t) - rnv_r(i,t); 
!========================================================= 
Optimality condition for China's indigenous R&D investment 
==========================================================! 
Coefficient 
LRTAC(i,t) 
rtac(i , t) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) CS_HS(i,t) ; 
Formula 
(all, i , sectors) (all, t , fwdtime) 
CS_HS(i , t) = CALPHA*CAH*(LCRNV(i,t) A(CALPHA-l)) *(LCHCP(i , t) ACBETA) 
/ [CALPHA*CAH*(LCRNV(i,t) A(CALPHA-l)) *(LCHCP(i,t) ACBETA) 
+ BARD - 2*LCRNV(i,t) / LRNV_R(i,t)] ; 
Equation 
E_ct.obr # .Tobin' s-q for R&D investmen·t TOBR # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
ctobr(i,t) = clamr(i,t) - cprrr(t) + 100 / (1-CTRTC(t)) * delCTRTC(t); 
E_crnv # R&D investment RNV# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
0 = ctobr(i,t) + CS_HS(i,t) * [(CALPHA-l) *crnv(i,t) + CBETA*chcp(i,t)] 
+ (1-CS_~S(i,t)) * [2*LCRNV(i,t) / (2*LCRNV(i,t)-BARD*LRNV_R(i,t))] 
* [crnv(i,t) - rnv_r(i,t)] ; 
!====================================================== 
Law of motion of China's knowledge capital accumulation 
(Innovation Possibility Frontier) 
=======================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LCHCP_II(i,t) 
# indigenous innovation (II) in IPF #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LCHCP_T(i , t) 
# available knowledge pool without absorption#; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) LCHCP_TT(i,t) 
# foreign tech transfer (TT) in IPF #; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) CS_Hl(i,t); 
Formula 
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(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LCHCP_II(i,t) = CAH * (LCRNV(i,t)ACALPHA) * (LCHCP(i,t)ACBETA) 
- CDELTAH * LCHCP(i,t); 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LCHCP_T(i,t) = LRTT(i,t) + LRTF_R(i,t) + LRTD(i,t); 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
LCHCP_TT(i,t) = LRTAC(i,t) * LCHCP_T(i,t); 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
CS_Hl(i,t) = CAH * (LCRNV(i,t) ACALPHA) * (LCHCP(i,t) ACBETA) 
/ [CAH * (LCRNV(i,t) ACALPHA) * (LCHCP(i,t) ACBETA) - CDELTAH*LCHCP(i,t)]; 
Variable 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t; alltime) 
Equation 
chcp_ii(i,t); 
chcp_tt(i,t); 
chcp_t(i,t); 
E_chcp # Law of motion for China's knowLedge capitaL stock# 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
chcp(i, t+l) = LCHCP(i,t) / LCHCP(i,t+l) * chcp(i,t) 
+ dt(t) * LCHCP_II(i,t) / LCHCP(i , t+l) * chcp_ii(i,t) 
+ dt(t) * LCHCP_TT(i,t) / LCHCP(i , t+l) * chcp_tt(i,t); 
E_chcp_ii # indigenous innovation in IPF # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
chcp_ii(i,t) = CS_Hl(i,t) * [CALPHA*crnv(i,t) + CBETA*chcp(i,t)] 
+ (1-CS_Hl(i,t)) *c hcp(i,t) ; 
E_chcp_tt # foreign technoLogy diffusion in IPF # 
(all, i, sectors) (all , t, alltime) 
chcp_tt(i,t) rtac(i , t) + chcp_t(i,t); 
E_chcp_t # gLobaL knowLedge pooL # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
chcp_t(i,t) = LRTT(i,t) / LCHCP_T(i,t) * rtt(i,t) 
+ LRTF_R(i,t) / LCHCP_T(i,t) * rtf_r(i,t) 
+ LRTD(i , t) / LCHCP_T(i,t) * rtd(i,t) ; 
!============================================================= 
Law of motion for the shadow price of China's knowLedge capitaL 
==============================================================! 
Coefficient 
(all, i, sectors) 
(all, i, sectors) 
(all, i, sectors) 
Formula 
(all, t , fwdtime) 
(all, t, fwdtime) 
(all, t, endtime) 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
CS_H2(i,t); 
CS_H3(i,t); 
CS_H4(i,t); 
CS_H2(i,t) = [1 + dt(t) *(CINTR + CDELTAH) - dt(t) *CAH*CBETA 
* (LCRNV(i,t) ACALPHA) *( LCHCP ( i,t) A(CBETA-1))] 
* LCLAMR(i,t ) / LCLAMR(i , t+l); 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
CS_H3(i,t) = [- dt(t) *CAH *CBETA*(LCRNV(i,t) ACALPHA)*(LCHCP(i,t)A(CBETA-1))] 
/ [1 + dt(t) *( CINTR + CDELTAH) - dt(t) *CAH*CBETA 
*(LCRNV(i , t) ACALPHA)*(LCHCP(i,t) A(( BETA-1))]; 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, endtime) 
CS_H4(i,t) = [- CAH*CBETA*(LCRNV(i,t)ACALPHA) *(LCHCP(i,t) A((BETA-1))] 
/ [CINTR + CDELTAH - CAH*CBETA*(LCRNV(i,t) A(ALPHA) 
*( LCHCP(i,t) A((BETA-1))]; 
Equation 
E_clamr # Law of motion for shadow price of knowLedge capitaL # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, fwdtime) 
clamr(i,t+l) = 
CS_H2(i , t) * [clamr(i,t) + CS_H3(i,t) *(CALPHA*crnv(i,t)+(CBETA-l) *chcp(i,t))] 
+ (1-CS_H2(i,t)) *[cphc(i,t) - 100/( 1-CTCOR(t)) * delCTCOR(t)] ; 
E_clamrend # boundary condtion for shadow price of knowLedge capitaL # 
(all, i, sectors) (all, t, endtime) 
CS_H4(i,t) * [CALPHA*c rnv(i,t)+(CBETA-l) *chcp(i,t)] + clamr(i,t) 
= cphc(i,t) - 100/ (1-CTCOR(t))* delCTCOR(t) 
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4.D Economic Globalization Policy Shocks 
1) Removal of import tariffs 
China's import tariff rate Economy globalization 
lELEC 5% 0% 
2GAS 5% 0% 
3PETROLEUM 5% 0% 
4COAL 8% 0% 
5 OIL_GAS 5% 0% 
6 MINING 8% 0% 
7 AGRIC 20 % 0% 
8 FORES 5% 0% 
9 DURABLE 12% 0% 
10 NONDURABLE 15% 0% 
11 TRANSPORT 5% 0% 
12SERVICE 5% 0% 
2) Removal of FDI barriers 
China's domestic corporate income tax is 25 %, and the preferable tax rate offered to the 
operation of MNCs is a half of that domestic tax rate. The FDI tax rate is thus equivalent to 
25 % * 50% = 12.5%. The policy shock of economy globalization cut this FDI tax rate from 12.5% 
to 0%. 
Source: WTO (2010), UNCTAD (2010a,b). 
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Chapter 5 
International Knowledge Spillover and Technology 
Externality: Why Multilateral R&D Coordination 
Matters for Global Climate Governance* 
Abstract: Suggestions of complementing an emission-based international climate agreement 
with a technology-oriented one has been placed high upon the policy and research agenda. 
This paper examines the mechanism of international technology coordination and its effect 
on global climate mitigations. We firstly present an analytical framework that describes how 
multilateral R&D coordination works in a climate mitigation context. This mechanism is then 
quantitatively examined in a multi-region global numerical model that explicitly considers 
the technology externality resulting from cross-country knowledge diffusions. Results show 
that: (1) By internalizing the externality of reciprocal knowledge dilfusions, multilateral R&D 
coordination induces more country-specific R&D investment and cross-country knowledge 
diffusions; (2) Innovative efforts enhanced by international R&D coordination facilitate new 
knowledge creation and application, which stimulates economic growths and carbon savings 
in participating nations; (3) Multilateral R&D coordination can synergize with traditional 
emission-based climate agreeme~ts to help lower climate compliance costs, hence raising 
climate mitigation incentives of major carbon emitters and the environmental effectiveness of 
their collective efforts in global climate governance. 
Keywon;is: Knowledge Spillover; Technology Coordination; Climate Policy Model 
• This chapter is based on the paper submitted to Resources and Energy Economics as Jin, W., 
"International knowledge spillover and technology externality: Why multilateral R&D 
coordination matters for global climate governance." 
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5.1 Introduction 
In pursuit of a low-carbon and knowledge-based economy, both developed and developing 
countries have stepped up efforts to boost "green" competitiveness through technological 
innovation. This kind of strategy finds its clearest expression in the massive growth in R&D 
investment. While the U.S., the E.U., and Japan remain leaders in science and technology 
(S&T) innovation, increased competitions from the emerging economies, notably the BRICS 
countries, suggest a changing geography of global innovation (NSB, 2012; OECD, 2012).1 
This new landscape has remarkably transcended the former innovation pattern of the Triad 
regions (U.S., E.U., and Japan), with the emerging economies becoming increasingly engaged 
in the international S&T scene as new hubs of global innovation. 
In an interconnected globalized world, the emergence of multiple hubs of innovation is 
anticipated to create cross-country knowledge diffusions and technology interactions. On the 
one hand, as the traditional aspect of globalization, individual national economies have been 
increasingly integrated into the globalized network of production and distribution through 
multilateral trade and investment (globalization of production), which enables an extensive 
-
dissemination of technologies via cross-border transaction of material, capital, and products 
(UNCTAD, 2010a, b; WTO, 2010). On the other hand, as the modern aspect of globalization, 
internationalization of R&D enhances a tendency for reliance of indigenous innovation on 
external knowledge sources (globalization of innovation), individual countries have taken 
measures to harness international heightened mobility of knowledge for building indigenous 
innovative capacity (OECD, 1997; UNCTAD, 2005). 
The emergence of multiple innovation hubs and their technology interactions provides 
signific.ant implications for climate mitigation strategies. First, as existing emission-based 
international climate agreements ( e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) become increasingly flawed due 
to a lack of mechanism to encourage mitigation incentives, a technology-oriented agreement 
that aims for multilateral innovation cooperation should be regarded as a key building block 
1 This chaning landscape of global innovation is reflected in three aspects: 1) Absolute size: R&D 
spending in Asia surpassed the E.U. levels and is likely to overtake U.S. in the next five years, 
which is due to striking R&D growth in China (the world's third largest R&D investor); 2) 
Growth rate: the current growth pace of R&D in the Asian market, notably China, is considerably 
higher than that in G7 markets; 3) R&D intensity: a flat level remain in the G7 markets, but the 
growth market has nearly doubled its R&D intensity over the last decade. 
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of the post-2012 climate policy architecture. Since the global innovation hubs are also major 
carbon-emitting regions in the world, technology cooperation among the global innovation 
hubs thus provides one option to improve their incentives of participating in global climate 
mitigation (Aldy et al., 2003; Barrett, 2003; Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Newell, 2008) 
Second, the traditional climate technology strategies still put an overly narrow focus on 
the North-South direct technology transfer for climate mitigation and adaptation, which thus 
ignores the potential South-North technology feedback as well as South-South technology 
· cooperation (Brewer, 2008; 2009). However, as the emerging economies increasingly become 
active players in the international R&D race, managing the global issue like climate 
stabilization also requires establishing an enabling framework that facilitates cross-country 
technology cooperation, where the North technology incumbents have a channel to learn the 
experience, expertise and knowledge created by the South new entrants.2 
Third, the current climate technology strategies implemented by individual countries 
are unilateral, fragmented, and uncoordinated, taking no account of the positive technology 
externality resulting from cross-country knowledge diffusion.3 To internalize the externality, 
a framework of multilateral cooperation on climate-related technology should be built by 
particular international organizations to coordinate innovation in individual countries.4 By 
doing that, global collective innovative efforts can be enhanced to provide and share more 
knowledge that favors low-carbon innovation and carbon savings at a global scale. 
Therefore, I am motivated to study how international R&D coordination works and its 
effect on reducing climate mitigation cost. In explicit, I aim to consider the following issues: 1) 
How does cross-country knowledge diffusion create the positive technology externality; 2) 
Why does technology externality provide an opportunity of multilateral R&D coordination 
for clirn~te mitigation; 3) What is the effect of international R&D coordination on economic 
2 For example, to support international energy technology cooperation, the IEA should consider 
measures to more regularly and deeply involve non-OCED countries (e.g., the BRICS countries) 
in IEA programs. By accelerating the accession of such countries to the IEA, international climate 
technology cooperation can be achieved on a large scale (de Coninck et al., 2008; Newell, 2008). 
3 Due to the existence of double externality (environment and technology externality), climate 
technology strategies should thus be formulated to internalize the positive technology externality, 
beyond emission-based climate policy instruments that correct for the environmental externality 
of carbon emissions (Nordhaus, 2011; Popp, 2011). 
4 Some international agreements on climate-friendly technology cooperation are developed in 
recently years, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), 
International Energy Agency Implementing Agreements (IEA-IA). 
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and environmental performance of participating countries; 4) To what extent can technology 
cooperation synergize with emission-based instruments to mitigate climate compliance cost. 
To address these issues, I firstly present a simple analytical framework that describes the 
mechanism of international R&D coordination for climate mitigation. Next, this mechanism 
is incorporated into a multi-region global numerical model, so that the effect of cross-country 
R&D coordination can be quantitatively examined. Based on both analytical and numerical 
studies, I aim to demonstrate the importance of international R&D coordination for global 
· climate governance. 
As a needed complement to the existing literature, this study contributes to climate 
policy analysis in the following three aspects: 1) The "stock of knowledge" approach is used 
to explicitly represent cross-country technology diffusion and the mechanism of 
international climate-related technology cooperation;5 2) A comprehensive framework is 
provided to fully capture the various technology diffusion channels of through trade, FDI, 
and disembodied knowledge spillover; 6 3) A new innovation pattern of cross-country 
technology interaction is explicitly considered, particularly the South-North technology 
feedback and South-South technology cooperation.7 
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 presents a simple framework 
of analyzing international R&D coordination for climate mitigation. Section 5.3 describes the 
basic structure of a multi-region global numerical model, with an emphasis on modeling 
5 In the field of international climate-related technology cooperation, for theoretical expositions, 
see Xepapadeas (1995), Barrett (2006), Kolstad (2007), Golombek and Hoel (2005, 2008, 2011), Heal 
and Tarui (2010), Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010), Mario and Werf (2008), Helm and Wirl (2011), Helm 
and Pichler (2011), Greaker and Hagem (2010); For numerical analysis, see Buchner and Carrara 
(2005); Carrara and Siniscalco (1997); Kemfert (2004); Nagashima and Dellink (2008); Lessmann 
and Edenhofer (2011); De Cian and Tavano (2012). To complement the existing literature, this 
study uses the "stock of knowledge" approach to investigate the mechanism of international 
R&D coordination and its impact on global climate mitigation. 
6 Only one type of TD channel is modeled in existing climate modeling works like Hubler (2011), 
Leimbach and Baumstark (2010), Leimbach and Edenhofer (2007), Leimbach and Eisenack (2009), 
Bosetti et al. (2008, 2011), De Cian and Tavoni (2012), Buonanno et al. (2003). However, some 
empirical studies show that firms do not merely conduct a single type of economic activity 
associated with technology diffusion, but perform several such activities simultaneously (e.g., 
Clerides et al., 1998; Keller, 2004). 
7 Most of existing climate policy modeling works only capture the North-South unidirectional 
knowledge diffusions (e.g., Hubler, 2011; Bosetti et al., 2008, 2011). However, as the emerging 
economies increasingly become key players in global innovation, modeling attempts should 
realistically reflect the new innovation pattern of multidirectional technology interaction. 
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cross-country knowledge diffusions and multilateral R&D coordination. Simulation results 
and discussions are provided in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Analytical Framework 
In this section, a simple analytical framework will be presented to describe the mechanism of 
international R&D coordination and its effect on technical change (TC) and carbon emissions 
reductions. In the spirit of the "stock of knowledge" approach that treats knowledge as a 
· production factor, 8 I model the production technology used in the energy sector as a 
two-tier nested CES function. In producing knowledge-embodied energy service (Y), 
knowledge (H) substitutes for a composite of energy input at the top tier. The energy input 
composite is in turn made up of" dirty" fossil energy ( Eo) and "clean" non-fossil energy (Ee ) 
at the bottom tier. CES parameter crv controls the substitution possibility between energy 
and knowledge input at the top tier, and CJ"E controls the substitution possibility between 
the two energy input varieties. Given this production technology, the energy firm solves a 
cost minimization problem as: 
min Po ·En +Pc- Ee 
Ec,Eo 
1 
s.t. [(EoOE+ EcOE ):+H''Y t =Y; 
(5.1) 
Ee > 0; 
where Po, Pc are the prices of "dirty" and "clean" energy input, respectively. For simplicity, 
I assume that one unit of fossil energy input ( Eo) generates one unit of carbon emission ( K ), 
so that x = Eo . In the presence of carbon constraints, the firm is capped by an emission limit 
K , so the levels of carbon emissions from fossil energy use should be below this emissions 
limit, Eo ~ K. Given the production technology and emission constraints, the firm solves the 
cost minimization problem as outlined in Eq. (5.1), where the corresponding Lagrangian can 
be formulated as: 
(5.2) 
8 The literature models the effect of knowledge application on TC through three routes: a direct 
impact on the carbon emission intensity (Nordhaus, 2002; Buonanno et al., 2003); a reduction in 
the mitigation cost function (Goulder and Mathai, 2000); knowledge substitution for physical 
inputs (Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Sue Wing, 2003; Popp, 2004). 
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where Ay ,Ao,Ac denote the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to the three constraints 
in Eq. (5.1). In the presence of emission caps, the permit constraint reaches the boundary 
condition ( E O = x) where carbon abatement occurs. I hence derive an expression revealing 
the relationship between marginal abatement cost (MAC) and knowledge input as:9 
(5.3) 
where Ao is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with carbon permit constraint. It denotes 
the shadow price of carbon emission permit, with its economic meaning being the additional 
production cost savings from relaxing an extra unit (marginally) of carbon permit. By the 
same token, it also represents the additional production costs incurred from tightening an 
extra unit of emission constraint - the marginal carbon abatement cost. 
For the sake of convenience, I rewrite the Eq. (5.3) to work with a logarithmic 
(percentage change) form as: 
where a hat symbol (") represents the percentage change in corresponding variables. To 
simplify the notations of variables, I assume that energy price (Po , Pc ) and carbon permit 
constraint ( K ) are set exogenously in the partial equilibrium environment, with their 
percentage-change values being equal to zero. Then, the Eq. (5.4) can be simplified as:10 
(5 .5) 
9 For the derivation of Eq. (5.3), see Appendix 5.A. 
1-0E 
10 Here we define a term A=(l/..\o) ·Pc-[(Y'"' - H'"' )~ -ii'"']~ -x"'-1 
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where, for an exogenously given level of output Y ( Y = O ), it is found that the MAC declines 
(Ao< O) when the input of knowledge augments (H > o) as an outcome of R&D investment. 
Next, I introduce a two-country (South-North) knowledge diffusion model. Assume that, 
for the South, both its indigenous R&D (Rs) and absorptions of foreign knowledge diffusion 
(R; ) contribute to the accumulation of knowledge available in that country, which can be 
expressed as: 
• KD Rs ( ) Hs = Rs+Rs= Rs+ys· Rs =Rs+---· Rs+R -Rs 
Rs+ RN (5.6) 
where R~ is foreign knowledge diffusion into the South, expressed as the unexplored gap 
between global R&D (R s+ R N) and the South's indigenous R&D (Rs )- Ys reflects the 
South's knowledge absorptive capacity, expressed as a ratio of the South's indigenous R&D 
relative to global total R&D. The product of Rf 0 and Ys reflects the South's absorptions of 
foreign diffused knowledge R; . Foreign knowledge diffusion ( R~ ), corrected by local 
knowledge absorptive capacity, is a perfect substitute for indigenous R&D (Rs) in building 
the South's knowledge. In symmetry, knowledge creation in the North (H ) depends on 
both indigenous R&D (R N ) and absorptions of foreign knowledge diffusion ( R~) as: 
(5.7) 
Again, it is convenient to rewrite Eqs. (5.6)-(5.7) in a logarithmic form to represent the 
percentage change of variables ( denoted by "/\") as: 
(5 .8) 
(5.9) 
Combine Eqs. (5.8)-(5.9) with Eq. (5.5), I derive an expression that reveals the relationship 
between the MAC reduction and R&D investment in both countries as: 
162 
The South: 
<TE 
( Ys /Jy - Hs /Jy )/Jy Hs(Jy 
As =-As -(1 - aE)· ·Hs 
( )
<TE Ys/Jy -Hs(Jv 
Ys /Jy - Hs /Jy 1JY - Ks <TE 
(5.10) 
~ Rs -(R/+ 2·Rs -RN+ 2·RN2 ) ~ Rs2 ·RN ~ Hs = ----------·Rs +-----·RN 
Hs ·(Rs +RN)2 Hs·(Rs+ RN)2 
The North: 
<TE 
( Yi'\/ /Jy - HN OY ) /Jy HN /Jy 
XN = - AN -(1 - aE)·-------- -----·HN 
<TE YN /Jy - H, /Jy ( YN /Jy - HN /Jy )/Jy - KN l7E 
(5.11) 
~ RN' (RN2 + 2-RN' Rs + 2-R/) ~ RN2 ·Rs ~ 
HN = 2 · RN + 2 • RN 
HN" (RN+ Rs) HN"(RN+ Rs) 
where, for any individual counties, both indigenous and foreign R&D investment contribute 
to domestic knowledge creation. As the newly created knowledge is applied in production to 
substitute for fossil energy input, the MAC will fall with X < o. 
To simplify the notations, I assume that both nations have the same levels of indigenous 
R&D ( R 5 = R N) and hence knowledge input ( H s = H N) in a symmetric two-country model. 
Eqs. (5.10)-(5.11) can thus be simplified as a reduce-form expression showing the relationship 
between the MAC reduction and R&D investment in both countries as: 
~ ~ ~ 
As =-Rs -t: ·RN (5.12) 
~ ~ ~ 
AN = - RN - t:·Rs (5.13) 
where . E is the foreign innovation elasticity of domestic MAC reduction, reflecting the effect 
of foreign R&D on domestic MAC reduction. Its value can be estimated by normalizing the 
coefficients associated with variables the RN,Rs: E= Rs2 ·RN/(Rs3 + 2·Rs2 ·RN+ 2·Rs ·RN2 )= 0.2, 
given Rs= RN in a symmetric two-country model. This implies that foreign R&D, through 
cross-country knowledge diffusion, has a positive externality effect to reduce domestic MAC. 
But this effect is secondary to indigenous R&D, since the indigenous innovation elasticity of 
domestic MAC reduction equals 1. 
Assume that, the South firm attempts to undertake indigenous R&D for MAC reduction 
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(getting the absolute level of MAC reduction -X as close as possible to some desirable level 
of MAC reduction target, 1 > o) without, however, spending more R&D expenditure (for the 
purpose of profit maximization). The South firm hence faces a problem of minimizing some 
cost function Ls, subject to the Eq. (5.12) as: 
min 
1 ~ - 2 e ~ 2 Ls= -· (-As - A) +-· Rs 2 2 (5.14) 
~ ~ ~ 
s.t. As =-Rs-E ·RN 
in a similar fashion, the North firm faces a problem of minimizing some cost function LN, 
subject to the Eq. (5.13) as: 
min (5.15) 
~ ~ ~ 
s.t. AN= - RN - E· Rs 
Suppose that, both countries choose the levels of R&D spending independently, taking 
no account of the possible repercussions of cross-country knowledge diffusions. In this case, 
each country chooses R&D spending levels conditional upon the other's R&D plan - the 
so-called uncoordinated innovation. In explicit, the South firm solves the problem in Eq. (5.14) 
and yield its best response function, RFs, as follows: 
8Ls (~ ~ _ , ~ 
~ = Rs +E· RN - A) + B-Rs = 0 
8Rs 
⇒ 
~ A-E- RN Rs=---
1+ 8 
(5.16) 
where the best response function Rfs relates the South's optimal (non-coordinated) level of 
R&D spending to the MAC reduction target and the R&D spending levels of the North. 
Similarly, the North firm has its best response function, RFN, as follows: 
⇒ 
- ~ 
~ A-E· Rs RN=---
1+ 8 
(5.17) 
In a non-coordinated innovation equilibrium, one country sets its R&D spending levels 
according to the other country's R&D plan (as characterized by the best response functions). 
The non-coordinated levels of R&D spending can hence be obtained by finding the 
intersection of RFs and RFN as: 
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~Ne ~Ne A 
Rs =RN (5.18) 
where the superscript "NC" refers to the non-coordinated innovation. As Fig. 5.1 shows, the 
two best response functions are drawn as RFs and RFN, respectively. The non- coordinated 
innovation is at point "NC", where the two best response functions intersect. 
By comparison, both countries in a coordinated innovation take into account the 
positive externality resulting from cross-country knowledge diffusion - the so-called 
coordinated innovation. One way to analyze the innovation coordination is to assume that both 
countries relinquish controls over R&D to an international coordinating body that enforces 
multilateral technology cooperation.11 This coordinating body is instructed to minimize total 
loss function, L, + &J, by choosing R&D spending levels in both individual countries as: 
min 
1 ~ - 2 e ~ 2 1 ~ - 2 e ~ 2 
Ls + LN =-·(- As -A) + -·Rs + -·(-AN - A) + -·RN 
2 2 2 2 (5.19) 
,,..._ -- - ,,...,_ -- --
s.t. As= -Rs -E· RN, AN= - RN- E·Rs 
Solving the problem yields the F.O.C.: 
a (Ls + LN) ~ ~ - ~ ~ -~ = (Rs +E ·RN -A) + E· (RN +E ·Rs -A) + 8-Rs = 0 
8Rs South- to- North R&D Spillover (5.20) 
a(Ls + LN) ~ ~ - ~ ~ - ~ ~ = (RN + E · Rs - A) + E · (Rs + E · RN - A) + 8 · RN = 0 
8RN North - to-South R&D Spillover 
Compare the F.O.C. in the coordinated innovation (see Eq. (5.20)) with the ones in the 
non-coordinated innovation (see Eqs. (5.16)-(5.17)), we find in innovation coordination R&D 
spending plan set in one country would take into account its positive externality effect on 
facilitating innovation in the other country, as characterized by the terms premultiplied by E . 
Solving the Eq. (5.20) for Rs and RN yields the coordinated levels of R&D spending as: 
A 
e l +E +--
l +E 
(5.21) 
11 The OECD is generally perceived as such an international coordinating body that influences 
innovation policy making in its member countries. Meanwhile, given the centrality of the IEA in 
global energy and climate governance, the IEA may be an appropriate body for managing 
international energy technology cooperation. 
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Figure 5.1: Mechanism ofinternational R&D coordination 
in a symmetric two-country model 
Rs 
45E 
_l__ 
1+8 RFs 
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Note: The points "NC" and "C" denote non-coordinated and coordinated innovation 
equilibrium, respectively. By internalizing the positive externality of cross-country 
technology diffusion, individual countries in the coordinated- innovation equilibrium 
are committed to undertake higher levels of R&D spending. 
where the superscript "C" refers to the coordinated innovation. The relative size of R&D 
spending in coordinated and non- coordinated cases can be judged by comparing Eq. (5.18) 
with Eq. (5.21). With E > 0 , say 0.2, the coordinated innovation involves a higher level of 
R&D spending in both countries. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.1, where point "C" designates 
the coordinated innovation equilibrium. 
The analytical results provide a following intuition: In the absence of R&D coordination, 
individual countries undertake independent innovative activities but ignore the technology 
externality of cross-country knowledge diffusions. Accordingly, they underestimate the 
beneficial effect of indigenous R&D on reducing foreign MAC, and hence set R&D spending 
levels that are relatively low. In contrast, in the presence of R&D coordination, individual 
countries are instructed by a coordinating body to undertake higher levels of R&D spending 
for internalizing the positive technology externality. As a result, global collective innovative 
efforts would be enhanced, with more provisions of public knowledge that favors innovation 
and MAC reductions in participating countries. 
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5.3 Numerical Model 
5.3.1 Basic Framework 
In this section, I attempt to incorporate the mechanism of international R&D coordination 
into a multi-sector, multi-region intertemporal CGE numerical model.12 It distinguishes six 
world countries/regions, including: USA, Western Europe (EUW), the rest of the OECD 
(ROECD), China (CHN), the rest of the BRICS countries (BRIS), and the rest of the world 
(ROW).13 As a departure from existing models that only capture North-South unidirectional 
technology transfer, our modeling structure explicitly considers multidirectional technology 
diffusions among the six world regions (see Fig. 5.2), based on which the issues of 
international technology coordination for global climate governance can be investigated. 
Economic system within each world region is represented by multiple agents, including: 
Twelve production sectors, an investment sector (producing physical capital goods), a R&D 
sector (producing R&D good), a representative household and a government. To be relevant 
to climate policy studies, the twelve production sectors consist of five energy sectors and 
seven non-energy sectors.14 Carbon emissions are calculated based on carbon intensities of 
fossil fuel inputs (coal, oil and natural gas) used in intermediate production and final use. 
Economic behaviors of multiple agents within each region are modeled in line with the 
general equilibrium structure, which outlines input-output (IO) circular flows of multiple 
commodities and primary factors within the economy (see Fig. 3.1 in Chapter 3). There are 12 
produced commodities and corresponding production sectors, indexed by the row subscript 
j (j = 1, 2, ... , 12) and the column subscript i (i = 1, 2, ... , 12), respectively; 3 types of primary 
factors (labor, physical capital, knowledge capital), indexed by the subscript f (f = L,K,H); 5 
types of final use (consumption, investment, R&D, government, export), indexed by the 
subscript d (d = C,I,R,G,X) . Intersectoral transactions in intermediate productions are 
represented by the jxi matrix; Inputs of primary factors in production are indicated by the 
f x i matrix; Final uses of produced commodities are represented by the j x d matrix. 
12 The intertemporal optimization CGE models is in the spirit of the seminal works by Jorgenson 
and Wilcoxen (1990), Malakellis (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
(1998), Dixon et al. (2005). 
13 For the country composition of regions, see Appendix 5.B. 
14 For the model sectoral classification and mapping by reference to the GTAP, see Appendix 5.B. 
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Figure 5.2: International technology regimes for global climate governance 
(a) 
(b) 
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North-South unidirectional 
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technology diffusion 
Note: (a) North-South unidirectional technology transfers; 
(b) Global multidirectional technology diffusion 
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From this IO framework to a numerical CGE model, I describe the decision problems 
facing these economic agents and characterize their behaviors in a decentralized equilibrium. 
To endogenously represent TC, our model broadens the traditional CGE structure by adding 
R&D investment and knowledge input. This will be articulated in the following sections. 
5.3.2 Endogenous Technical Change 
In the spirit of Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Sue Wing (2001; 2003), the "stock of 
knowledge" method is used to represent the endogenous process of TC. In explicit, I model 
the production technology as a separable KLEM-H nested CES function. For the firm in a 
given sector i in country n that produces output Qi,n , knowledge H ,n substitutes for a 
composite of physical inputs Z ,n, which is in turn made up of primary factor inputs of 
physical capital K,n and labor XL.n , as well as the intermediate inputs of energy bundle 
Xrn ,n and material bundle XiM,n. x iE,n comprises five energy goods Xfn, and xiM,n is 
composed of seven non-energy goods X~n. Given this production technology, the 
producer problem can be formulated as: 
max v; ,n (t) = J
00 
exp [- J 'rn (s' )-ds' ]· fL ,n(s)-ds 
S.t. fL ,n (t) = (1 - TQ,n ) · Pi,n (t) · Qi,n (t) - PiL,n (t) -XiL,n (t) - (1 + Tc,n) · g E,n (t) -XiE,n (t) 
- PiM ,n (t) . x iM ,n (t) - (l-T1,n )· Pu,n (t) · L,n (t) - (1 - TR,n ). PiR,n (t) · Ri,n (t) 
1<,n (t) = Ln (t) -oK,n · Ki,n (t) 
h n(t} = ({J (Ji,n (t), Ki,n (t)) = L,n (t) · I 1 + ; · t :~n~?) I 
• _ a ~ [T F D] H ,n (t) - 77· Ri,n (t) · H ,n (t) -0H,n · H ,n (t) + yi,n (t) · Ri,n (t) + Ri,n (t) + Ri,n(t) 
Indigenous innovation International techno logy diffusion 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
(5 .24) 
(5.25) 
(5.26) 
where the objective of the producer in sector i, country n is to choose the inputs of labor XL,n, 
energy Xm,11 , material Xw1,n , capital investment t ,n , and R&D investment R ,n to maximize 
an intertemporal profit stream v;,n, subject to the technology constraints. In Eq. (5.22), v;,n 
is expressed as the discounted present value of future profit streams from time t to an 
infinite future. In Eq. (5.23), current profit flow IL equals output revenues minus input 
costs, with 1'Qn, Ten, 1'1,n, 1'R.n being corporate income tax, carbon tax on fossil energy inputs, 
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investment tax credit, and R&D tax credit, respectively. 
Eq. (5.24) specifies the law of motion of physical capital stock K,n , its accumulation 
depends on fixed capital investment L,n and the rate of capital depreciation ◊ K,n . Eq. (5.25) 
models the capital investment process that is subject to imperfect capital mobility and 
investment adjustment cost (Goulder and Schneider, 1999; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999). 
Eq. (5.26) is the innovation possibility frontier (IPF) that explicitly represents the process of 
· knowledge creation, where accumulation of domestic knowledge stock It,n are driven by 
dual forces: (1) Indigenous innovation: Both indigenous R&D investment (R,n) and existing 
knowledge stock (H,0 ) contribute to in-house knowledge creation. 77 denotes the efficiency 
of knowledge creation. bti,n is the rate of knowledge obsolescence. The conditions O < 1J < 1, 
O<a+P <l implies diminishing returns to R&D in innovation; (2) International technology 
diffusion: Foreign knowledge diffusion occurs through three channels: imports (R[ 0 ), FDI 
(Ri,n ), and disembodied spillovers ( Rfn ). A fraction of diffused knowledge is absorbed for 
building domestic knowledge according to local knowledge absorption capacity (Yi,n). 
5.3.3 International Technology Diffusion 
As described in Section 5.2, the purpose of international R&D coordination is to internalize 
the positive externality resulting from cross-country technology diffusion (TD). This section 
thus aims to articulate how to model the various channels of international TD. 
Drawing on the insights of Griliches (1979) on two types of R&D spillovers, I identify 
two principal mechanisms of foreign TD: 1) Embodied knowledge diffusion through 
indirectly employing knowledge-embodied intermediate and capital goods; 2) Disembodied 
knowledge diffusion through directly learning disembodied knowledge spillover. 
Embodied knowledge diffusion occurs when domestic firms indirectly benefit from 
external innovation by using knowledge-embodied foreign intermediate commodity (via 
impor.t) or capital goods (via FDI). Embodied TD has its theoretical and empirical origins in 
the work by Coe and Helpman (1995), indicating that international TD should be embodied 
in the flows of physical commodity transactions through the channels of international trade 
and investment 
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In parallel, disembodied knowledge diffusion involves direct learning and absorption of 
the disembodied forms of technologies (e.g., formulas, blueprints, patents), not necessarily 
linking to economic transactions of tangible physical goods. Disembodied TD is rooted in the 
seminal works by Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) that suggests the key role of disembodied 
knowledge spillover externality in the process of international TD. 
To describe both TD mechanisms, Sections 5.3.3.1-5.3.3.3 provide a framework to model 
three channels, including: TD embodied in trade, TD embodied in FDI, and disembodied TD. 
Moreover, while knowledge can diffuse from abroad through these three channels, the 
efficiencies of assimilating the diffused knowledge of the recipient countries are determined 
by local knowledge absorptive capacity, which will be described in Section 5.3.3.4. 
5.3.3.1 Technology Diffusion Embodied in Trade 
TD embodied in trade refers to the mechanism where domestic firms benefit from external 
knowledge by using knowledge-embodied foreign intermediate commodity via import.15 In 
other words, if we think of commodity import as a vehicle of TD, then foreign knowledge is 
embodied in intermediate commodity imports, with embodied knowledge being assimilated 
by the recipient country for domestic knowledge accumulation. To represent this mechanism, 
we model China's import flows in line with the Armington structure, with the Armington 
composite of intermediate goods modeled as a CES aggregate of domestically-produced and 
imported component of that commodity as: 
(5.27) 
where X i,n is the composite of intermediate input goods j used by production sector i in 
region n, expressed as a CES aggregate of domestic X[n and imported component XJ,n of 
that intermediate goods. Substitution between domestic and import component is governed 
15 Empirical evidences of this TD pattern is recorded in the pioneering work by Coe and 
Helpman (1995) who found a statistically significant effect of bilateral trade on international TD. 
Other empirical studies also find the significant and positive link between a country's factor 
productivity and knowledge created by its trading partners (e.g., Coe et al., 1997; Keller, 1998; Xu 
and Wang, 1999; Pavcnik, 2002; Madsen, 2007; Eaton and Kortum, 2001, 2002; Amiti and Konings, 
2007; Acharya and Keller, 2009). 
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by the Armington elasticity a{. Within this multi-country model that distinguishes multiple 
sources of imports, the import composite is further modeled as a CES aggregate of imports 
from all sources of foreign exporting regions as: 
(5.28) 
where X J,nr is the import of intermediate input goods j into sector i in destination region n 
from source region r. Substitution among foreign regions is governed by the elasticity arr. 
By solving the producer problem we can characterize the import of intermediate input 
commodity j into destination region n from source region r (XJ,nr) as: 
TI TI T 
XJ,nr( t) = I P{n (t) T lo; -XJ,n(t) = I P{n (t) T lo; ·IP\n (t) lo, •Xij,n(t) 
Pj,r( t)·(l + Tj) Pj,r(t)·(l+Tj) Pj,n(t) 
(529) 
where Pj,11 is the market price of intermediate goods composite j in destination country n, 
P{11 is the ideal price index of imported component of that intermediate goods j, Pj,, is the 
price of intermediate goods j in source country r, r; is the rate of import tariff imposed on 
commodity j. Pi,r . (1 + r;) is the import price of commodity j in destination region n from 
source country r. 
As argued above, both import flows and knowledge embodiment intensity determine 
the amount of knowledge diffused through trade. So far Eq, (5.29) has estimated the imports 
of intermediate commodity from source to destination countries, We further introduce the 
other factor: intensity of knowledge embodied in imports, which is the amount of knowledge 
that is embodied in each unit of import flows, In line with the embodied technology 
hypothesis, this intensity can be estimated as:16 
(5,30) 
16 "Embodied technology hypothesis" claims that intangible knowledge has to be embodied in 
specific physical products in order to embody economically useful characteristics (Schmookler, 
1966; Terleckyj, 1974; Scherer, 1982; Papaconstantinou et aL, 1998; Hauknes and Knell, 2009), 
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where RI[, denotes the intensity of knowledge embodied in intermediate goods j imported 
from source country r. This intensity is measured as a ratio between R&D expenditure ( R i,r ) 
and production output ( lj,r) in source country r. eT is an exogenous parameter that 
indicates foreign restrictions on exporting knowledge-intensive hi-tech products. 
Given the two determinants of TD through trade, we model the diffusion of knowledge 
embodied in trade as a product of import flows ( X J,n, ) and embodied knowledge intensity 
.(RI[ ,) as: 
RJ,nr (t) = XJ,nr(t)-RI[ r(t) (5.31) 
where R J,nr denotes knowledge embodied in the import of intermediate commodity j from 
source country r into the sector i of destination country n. Next, I estimate the total amount 
of knowledge embodied in import flows as follows: 
Rfn (t) = LjRJ,n(t) = LjLrRij,nr (t) (5.32) 
where, by summing over foreign countries r and intermediate input varieties j, I estimate the 
total amount of knowledge embodied in imports into destination country n (RTn ), which is 
incorporated into the IPF in Eq. (5.26) to represent embodied knowledge diffusion via trade. 
5.3.3.2 Technology Diffusion Embodied in FDI 
TD embodied in FDI refers to the mechanism where domestic firms benefit from external 
knowledge by using knowledge-embodied foreign capital goods via FDI. In this sense, if we 
think of FDI as a vehicle of TD, then foreign knowledge is embodied in foreign invested 
capital, with the embodied knowledge absorbed by the recipient country for knowledge 
accumulation.17 To describe this mechanism, we assume that capitals installed by domestic 
and foreign investors are imperfect substitutes in physical capital formation (Markusen, 2002; 
17 Empirical evidence for this kind of TD is recorded in the work by Blomstrom and Persson 
(1983) who found a statistically significant influence of FDI inflows on international TD. Other 
empirical studies also suggest that host countries benefit from knowledge diffused from MNC 
foreign affiliates, with FDI being a robust diffusion channel (e.g., Haddad and Harrison, 1993; 
Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Keller and Yeaple, 2009; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Blomstrom and 
Kokko, 1998; Javorcik, 2004; Lin and Saggi, 2007; Haskel et al., 2007; Blalock and Gertler, 2008). 
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Lejour et al., 2008). Physical capitals invested in China are thus modeled as a CES aggregate 
of domestic and foreign components of that capital goods as: 
(5.33) 
where L,n is the composite of physical capital invested in sector i of destination country n, 
expressed as a CES aggregate of domestic IP and foreign components I; of that capital 
goods composite. Substitution between the two components is governed by the elasticity crl, 
indicating joint venture requirement in foreign investments entry. Within the multi-region 
model that distinguishes multiple FDI sources, the composite of foreign-invested capital is 
further modeled as a CES aggregate of FDI from all foreign source countries as: 
(5.34) 
where If.nr is the FDI inflows from foreign origin country r into sector i in the recipient 
country n . Substitution between foreign countries is governed by the CES elasticity ( afF). 
By solving the producer problem, we can characterize the levels of FDI invested by each 
source country r in destination country n ( Ii,nr ) as: 
OFF a FF aF 
If.nr (t) = I Pr\ (t) F ] ' · l i.n (t) = I P/n (t) F Ir ·[ Pr/( t) I r · L,n(t) (5.35) 
P1 ,,(t) · (l + r1) P1,, (t)·(l +rr ) P1,n (t) 
where Pr ,n is the price of capital good in destination country n. Ptn is the ideal price index 
of FDI composite in destination country n. Pr,r is the price of capital goods invested by 
source country r. rf is the rate of preferable tax (fiscal incentive) offered to MNC affiliates. 
Pi,, ( t) · (1 + r f ) is the after-tax price of capital goods invested by foreign source country r. 
As argued above, both the level of FDI and knowledge embodiment intensity determine 
the amount of knowledge diffused through FDI. So far the level of FDI has been estimated 
by Eq. (5.35), I further model the knowledge intensity of FDI (the amount of knowledge 
embodied in each unit of FDI inflows) as follows: 
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(5.36) 
where Rif,r denotes the intensity of knowledge embodied in physical capital goods invested 
by source country r, measured as a ratio between R&D expenditure ( R i,r ) and production 
output ( Xr) in source country r. BF is an exogenous parameter indicating foreign restriction 
on transferring technologies through FDI. 
Given the two determinants of TD through FDI, we model the diffusion of knowledge 
embodied in FDI as a product of FDI flows ( I f,nr) and embodied knowledge intensity ( Ri f, r) 
as: 
Rf,nr (t) = Ii,ru (t)·RIL (t) (5.37) 
where Ri,nr denotes knowledge embodied in FDI in sector i from foreign source country r. 
By summing over source countries r, I estimate knowledge embodied in FDI as follows: 
R ;,n (t) = I: rR i,nr (t) (5 .38) 
where Rfn denotes the total amount of knowledge that is embodied in FDI into sector i in 
destination country n, which is added into the IPF in Eq. (5.26) to represent the embodied 
knowledge diffusion through the channel of international investment. 
5.3.3.3 Disembodied Technology Diffusion 
Disembodied TD occurs when disembodied pure knowledge (as a public good) spill over 
from technology frontier countries to the laggards due to an imperfect appropriability of 
knowledge, which does not necessarily link to the economic transactions of physical goods. 
Learning and absorption of disembodied knowledge thus favors innovation in places 
different from where originally created (Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg, 1998; Eaton and Kortum, 1999; Lee, 2006) . 
In this context, I draw on the insights of Bosetti et al. (2008) and postulate that each 
individual region is exposed to an international disembodied knowledge pool created by the 
whole set of world regions. On the one hand, due to the path dependence of innovation and 
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technology differentiation, individual regions create heterogeneous knowledge specific to 
local socio-technological circurnstances.18 As a result, the international knowledge pool is 
constituted by the overall amount of R&D invested by individual regions. On the other hand, 
when innovation paths tend to diverge across regions, the difference between region-specific 
R&D and world-wide R&D constitutes the potential source of foreign knowledge spillover 
that can be absorbed for building domestic knowledge. Thus, the disembodied knowledge 
that may spill over into a given region n can be modeled as 
. D D ~ R i , n ( t) = 8 · L.,; r R i , r ( t) - R i , n ( t) (5.39) 
where L , Ri,r is the global R&D as a sum of region-specific R&D ( R,r) over all individual 
regions r . Kn is indigenous R&D invested by the considered region n. The gap between 
world-wide R&D and region-specific R&D thus constitutes foreign disembodied knowledge 
that may spill over to the region n. 8° is an exogenous parameter indicating the externality 
of disembodied knowledge spillovers, of which the value is regulated by patent policy in 
foreign countries. Rfn is then incorporated into IPF in Eq. (5.26) to represent international 
knowledge diffusion through the disembodied channel. 
5.3.3.4 Knowledge Absorptive Capacity 
So far we have captured all three channels of international TD, the diffused knowledge, 
however, are not the "manna from heaven" that indiscriminately falls on the host country, 
only a fraction can be effectively absorbed according to local socio-technological condition.19 
The benefits of knowledge diffusion can be realized only if the recipient country builds an 
indige1:ous capacity of knowledge absorption. 
Basically, knowledge absorptive capacity reflects the technology distance of one region 
relative to the global technology frontier, which is measured as the ratio of R&D investment 
18 This coincides with the so-called path dependence of innovation. That is, technology progress 
within each technology frontier country tends to follow a specific trajectory that is embedded in 
local socio-technological context, creating differentiated and heterogeneous technology varieties 
(Nelson, 1993; Rosenberg, 1994) .. 
19 This "localness" is reflected by the mismatch between transferred technology and locality in 
developing countries. For an articulation on the inappropriateness of technologies and its effect 
on productivity difference across nations, see Acemoglu (2009). 
176 
between one specific region (Ri,n) and the whole world (L rRi ,r ) as follows: 
. (t) - R i,n(t) 
y, ,n - L rRi,r(t) 
(5.40) 
where the lower the value of the ratio for a given region n, the further its technology distance 
relative to the global frontier. With a backward position in the global technology ladder, this 
region has weaker indigenous capacity to absorb external knowledge. Put differently, a lack 
of R&D commitment translates into a weaker indigenous capacity of knowledge absorption, 
which further becomes a barrier to assimilate knowledge diffused from abroad. 
5.3.4 International R&D Coordination 
So far international knowledge diffusions via various channels have been fully described in 
the numerical model, based on which I attempt to articulate the mechanism of international 
R&D coordination in this section. In explicit, two alternative equilibria w ill be considered: 
non-coordinated innovation equilibrium (in Section 5.3.4.1) and coordinated innovation 
equilibrium (in Section 5.3.4.2). The numerical model will be simulated in Section 5.4 to 
quantitatively examine economic and environmental performances in both innovation 
equilibria, so that the effect of international R&D coordination can be captured. 
5.3.4.1 Non-coordinated Innovation Equilibrium 
In a non-cooperative innovation equilibrium, each country chooses the levels of indigenous 
R&D spending independently, with the purpose of advancing country-specific innovation 
and TC. This unilateral R&D plan takes no account of the positive effect of cross-country 
knowledge diffusions that favor innovation and TC in other countries. In this case, the 
single-country producer problem (see Eqs. (5.22)-(5.26)) can be solved to characterize the 
behavior of R&D spending by any individual country n in a decentralized non-coordinated 
innovation equilibrium as: 
a-1 ~ a [y i,n(t)· (R[ n(t) + R;,n (t) + RPn(t) )] (1 - TR,n) ·PiR,n (t) = AiH,n (t) · a-17 -Ri,n(t) ·H;,n (t) + ~ - --- ---- -~ 8Ri,n (t) (5.41) 
where Eq. (5.41) is the optimality condition that characterizes the levels of indigenous R&D 
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investment undertaken by country n ( Ri,n ). It instructs the R&D investment of that country 
to reach a level where the marginal cost (LHS) is equal to the marginal benefit (RHS). The 
marginal cost comes from expenditures on purchasing an extra unit of R&D goods. The 
marginal benefits include the shadow price of knowledge capitals AiH and innovation 
possibility gain. In particular, the innovation possibility gains from R&D investment can be 
harvested from two sources: Indigenous R&D not only directly create in-house knowledge, 
but also enhance indigenous capacity to assimilate foreign knowledge diffusion - the dual 
faces of R&D in innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Keller, 1996; Griffith et al., 2000). 
Note that, the purpose of R&D investment is for domestic innovation possibility gains 
that include twofold: 1) creation of in-house new knowledge; 2) improvement of indigenous 
capacity to absorb foreign knowledge diffusion. However, this process of R&D decision pays 
no attention to the positive externality of technology: knowledge created by indigenous R&D 
in one country may spill over into other countries to favor innovation there. As shown later, 
it is the underestimation of the beneficial effect of indigenous R&D on foreign innovation 
that makes individual countries choose R&D spending levels that are comparatively lower. 
5.3.4.2 Coordinated Innovation Equilibrium 
In the coordinated innovation equilibrium, the levels of R&D spending set by individual 
countries are coordinated by an international coordinating body which enforces multilateral 
technology cooperation. In setting the country composition of global R&D spending, the 
coordinating body aims for an internalization of the technology externality resulting from 
cross-country reciprocal knowledge diffusion, which can be characterized as: 
n o[yi n(t)- (RTn(t) + R; n(t) + RPn(t))] 
(1- )·P (t) = A· (t)· · -R (t)"-1 -H· (t)~+ , , , ' TR,n . ,R,n iH,n a 11 1,n ,,n 8Ri,n(t) 
~ . a [vi., (t)- (RL(t) + R;,, (t) + RP, (t))] 
+ 6 ,"'n Ai!-1,,(t) · oR ,n (t) 
(5.42) 
R&D spillover from country n to all other countries r7= n 
where in the optimality condition, the coordinating body instructs any individual country n 
to spend R&D expenditure levels where the LHS marginal cost equals to the RHS marginal 
benefit. By comparing the optimality conditions between Eq. (5.42) and Eq. (5.41), I find that 
in the coordinated innovation equilibrium, the coordinating body would allow for both 
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within-country and cross-country benefits of R&D investment: 1) Within-country benefit: 
indigenous R&D directly benefits knowledge creation in the innovating country (the first 
term on the RHS), which is the same as in the non-coordinated case; 2) Cross-country benefit: 
indigenous R&D also generates cross-country knowledge diffusion that favors innovation in 
other countries (the second term on the RHS), which is the new feature in the coordinated 
innovation. 
Turn to the deep structure of the cross-country benefit resulting from international 
knowledge diffusion, I rewrite the second term on the RHS in Eq. (5.42) as: 
~ i\ H , (t) · a [yi,r (t) ·(RT, (t) + R;,,(t) + Rf, (t))] 
u ,,,,n · 8R - (t) 1,n 
= ~ 'A (t)· (RT (t) + RF (t) + RD (t) )· 8yi,,(t) + _ (t)· 8(RL (t) + RL (t) + RP, (t)) 
L.., ,,,,n LH,r I,r t,r t,r c)R i,n (t) Y1,r c)R i,n (t) 
(5.43) 
where Dyi,r / 8R;,n denotes the effect of indigenous R&D in a given country n on knowledge 
absorptive capacity of another country r += n . Recall that, knowledge absorptive capacity is 
modeled as a ratio of country-specific R&D relative to global total_R&D, Yi,, = Ri,, /L n Ri,n , 
with the derivative Dyi,, /c% ,n = - Ri,, · (L n Ri,n ( . Consider that, the global technology frontier 
is constituted by a whole set of world countries rather than a single one country, R&D 
invested by any single country is thus sufficiently small relative to global totals, with 
Ri,r « L n Ri,n « (L n Ri,n )2 and Dyi,r /8Ri,n ~ O. The Eq. (5.43) can hereby be simplified as: 
L a
 [ Yi,r (t). (RL (t) + Ri,r (t) + Rf,(t) )] 
'A il--! ,(t)· ~---------
'"'" ' 8Ri,n ( t) 
= ~ 'A (t)- _ (t) · a (RL (t) + Ri,, (t) + RP,(t)) 
Urocn ,H,r Y1,r fJR i,n(t) 
(5.44) 
where a(RL + Rf,, + RP, )/8R,n represents the effect of indigenous R&D investment on 
international knowledge diffusion. That is, the amount of additional knowledge diffusion 
into another country r (via trade, FDI, and disembodied spillover) from investing an extra 
unit of indigenous R&D in country n. The deep structure of Eq. (5.44) can be expressed as: 
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~ AiH,, (t) , a[ yi,,(t)-(RL(t) + RL(t) + RP, (t) )] 
D r,on 8R (t) 1,n 
= ~ AiH ,(t)· i , (t) · 8(RL(t) + Rf,, (t) + RP, (t)) 
Dr,on , Y , OR (t) 1,n (5.45) 
= ~ Aitt,,(t) · i , (t) -[eT. X[nr (t) +BF. If,nr (t) + eo] 
D,,,n y ' y (t) y (t) 1,n 1,n 
where BT . X!nr / Yi,n , eF. If,nr / Yi,n denote the effect of indigenous R&D in one country n on 
embodied knowledge diffusion into another country r -+- n through trade and FDI, 
respectively,20 The ratio of export (from source country n to destination country r) relative to 
production output in the source country n, Xfnr/Yi,n, represents the intensity of commodity 
export from source to destination country. It suggests that a higher level of export intensity 
and trade linkage is more likely to create cross-country knowledge diffusions through the 
channel of trade. Meanwhile, If,nr/Yi,n denotes the intensity of foreign capital investment by 
source country n into destination country r, suggesting that a higher level of international 
investment linkage tends to create more knowledge diffusions through the channel of FDI. 
Parameters BT ,BF denote restrictions of technology transfer that govern the intensity of 
knowledge embodied in international trade and FDI. Finally, p-arameter e0 denotes the 
effect of indigenous R&D on disembodied knowledge spillover, which is normally regulated 
by patent policy. A lax intellectual property protection system is more likely to generate the 
externality of disembodied pure knowledge spillover. 
I thus find that, as compared to the non-coordinated case, innovation coordination can 
create an additional benefit of R&D investment: cross-country knowledge diffusion through 
the embodied and disembodied channels. According to the optimality conditions that 
characterize R&D spending (see Eqs. (5.41)-(5.42)), we further find that, with the same levels 
of marginal cost, an innovation equilibrium that creates a higher level of marginal benefit 
would have more R&D investment. Therefore, the coordinated innovation would stimulate a 
higher level of R&D invested by individual countries and collective provision of knowledge. 
· 
2° Commonly, knowledge diffusion is dealt with as an externality that can' t be anticipated by 
private agents in a decentralized context. However, while this view may be true for disembodied 
knowledge spillover, it is debatable to embodied technology diffusion that links economic 
transaction of physical products. Empirical studies have suggested that, given the significantly 
positive link between productivity gain and international trade (also FDI) foresighted private 
agents in their decision making will take into account this potential technology spillover when 
trading their superior technology in foreign markets (e.g., Dechezlepretre et al., 2009) . 
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5.4 Results and Discussions 
5.4.1 Alternative Scenario Settings 
Recall that, the primary purpose of this research is to show the importance of international 
R&D coordination as a technology strategy to global climate mitigation. To achieve this goal, 
I simulate the numerical model under three innovation scenarios (see Fig. 5.3), including: 
(a) Indigenous innovation scenario: TC in any individual country (say A) only relies on 
indigenous R&D as the single source of knowledge creation, ignoring the potential role 
of foreign knowledge inflows from other countries (say B) to complement indigenous 
R&D for building domestic knowledge stock. 
(b) Non-coordinated innovation scenario: TC in any individual country A relies on both 
indigenous R&D and foreign knowledge diffusion as dual sources of knowledge creation. 
In setting the R&D spending levels, country A only considers enhancing indigenous 
capacity to assimilate foreign knowledge inflows (from B to A), taking no account of 
providing beneficial knowledge feedback (from A to B). _Since the externality of 
knowledge spillover is not fully internalized, R&D investments by individual countries 
are non-coordinated - a non- coordinated innovation equilibrium (see Section 5.3.4.1). 
(c) Coordinated innovation scenario: In setting the R&D spending levels, country A not only 
considers enhancing indigenous capacity of absorbing foreign knowledge inflows (from 
B to A), but also is instructed by an international coordinating body to provide beneficial 
knowledge feedback (from A to B). Since the externality of knowledge spillover is fully 
internalized, R&D investments by individual countries are coordinated - a coordinated 
innovation equilibrium (see Section 5.3.4.2). 
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Figure 5.3: Settings of three alternative innovation scenarios 
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Note: (a) Indigenous innovation scenario, where individual regions are treated as 
an isolated island with ouly indigenous R&D; (b) Non-coordinated innovation 
scenario, where individual regions can absorb unidirectional knowledge inflows; 
(c) Coordinated innovation scenario, where individual regions are instructed to 
provide beneficial knowledge feedback to other regions 
Intuitively, comparison between Scenario (b) and (a) reflects foreign knowledge inflow 
and its effect on stimulating indigenous R&D investment. That is, indigenous innovation can 
be induced by foreign knowledge inflows, because absorption of foreign diffused knowledge 
requires building local knowledge absorptive capacity through indigenous R&D investment 
according to the theory of the dual faces of indigenous R&D in innovation. In addition, 
comparison between Scenario (c) and (b) reflects international R&D coordination and its 
effect on boosting indigenous R&D of individual countries. That is, by internalizing the 
positive . externality of cross-country knowledge diffusion, multilateral R&D coordination 
can stimulate country-specific R&D commitment and global collective efforts of innovation. 
To quantitatively examine these arguments, I simulate the numerical model following 
the implementation and calibration procedure as described in Chapter 4. Various parameters 
used in the model are listed in Tabs. 5.1-5.2. The CGE modeling software GEMPACK is used 
to solve the numerical model and simulate the three aforementioned innovation scenarios, to 
which I now turn. 
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Table 5.1: Substitution elasticity 
U Q u z U E U M U T U Tr U F 
Production sectors 
Electric utility 1.0 0.8 0.2 1.0 2.8 5.6 4.0 
Gas utilities 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.2 2.8 5.6 4.0 
Petro refining 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 2.1 4.2 4.0 
Coal mining 1.0 1.7 0.2 0.5 3.0 6.1 4.0 
Crude oil & gas 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.2 7.6 14.4 4.0 
Mineral mining 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.8 0.9 1.8 4.0 
Agriculture 1.0 1.3 0.6 1.7 2.4 4.8 4.0 
Forestry 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.2 3.2 6.7 4.0 
Durable 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.2 3.7 7.6 4.0 
Non-durable 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 3.0 6.4 4.0 
Transportation 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.9 3.8 4.0 
Services 1.0 0.3 0.3 3.0 1.9 3.8 4.0 
u Q: Elasticity of substitution between knowledge input and physical input composite. 
u z : Elasticity of substitution among the physical inputs of capital, labor, energy, and material. 
u E: Elasticity of substitution among intermediate energy goods. 
u M: Elasticity of substitution among intermediate material goods. 
U FF 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
u T: Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported variety of intermediate 
commodities. 
u n : CES elasticity of substitution for regional composition of import bundles. 
u F: CES elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign-invested physical capital goods. 
u FF : CES elasticity of substitution for regional composition of FDI. 
Note: Physical capital goods invested in industrial sectors are assumed to have a substantial 
degree of homogeneity,! hereby impose a restriction that the substitution elasticities of physical 
capital investment are equal across sectors. I also assume that substitution elasticities within 
individual sectors are equal across world regions. This assumption does not mean, however, that 
the elasticities are the same across sectors within a given world region. 
Source: Goulder and Schneider (1999), McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999), Sue Wing (2001; 2003), 
Loschel and Otto (2009), Narayanan and Walmsley (2008), Springer (1998), Mai (2005), Lejour et 
al. (2008). 
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Table 5.2: Parameter values 
USA 
T Q 0.40 
T r 0.12 
LR 0.06 
a 0.18 
p 0.53 
I] 0.02 
r 0.03 
◊K 0.05 
◊H 0.1 
lj1 4 
TQ: Corporate profit tax rate 
1: r : Investment tax credit 
T R : R&D tax credit 
EUW 
0.30 
0.15 
0.08 
0.18 
0.53 
0.02 
0.03 
0.05 
0.1 
4 
ROECD 
0.30 
0.15 
0.10 
0.18 
0.53 
0.02 
0.05 
0.05 
0.1 
4 
a : Elasticity of knowledge creation to R&D investment 
CHN 
0.25 
0.20 
0.10 
0.18 
0.53 
0.02 
0.01 
0.05 
0.1 
4 
~: Elasticity of knowledge creation to existing knowledge stock 
f] : Efficiency of knowledge creation 
r : Real interest rate 
◊K : Depreciation rate of physical capital 
◊ H : Depreciation rate of knowledge capital 
1V : Investment adjustment cost coefficient 
BRIS ROW 
0.30 0.15 
0.15 0.20 
0.10 0.10 
0.18 0.18 
0.53 0.53 
0.02 0.02 
0.02 0.05 
0.05 0.05 
0.1 0.1 
4 4 
Source: Goulder and Schneider (1999), McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999), Popp (2004), Bosetti 
et al. (2008), OECD (2010), World Bank (2011). 
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5.4.2 Technology Coordination without Emissions Control Policies 
In this section, I firstly examine the effect of international R&D coordination in the absence of 
emissions control policies. The analysis in the next section will give insights into how R&D 
coordination can synergize with emission control policies to help lower climate mitigation 
cost. As Fig. 5.4 reveals, the temporal profile of global R&D spending is on a rising trend in 
all three innovation scenarios. The growing global R&D are spread across individual nations, 
with the OECD accounting for the bulk (80%) of total spending in the short run (2005-2020). 
This share, however, is likely to fall in the long run (2020-2030), which is largely offset by the 
share gains of the emerging economies (20-30% of global R&D by 2030). 
It is also notable that among the three innovation scenarios, coordinated innovation 
creates the highest levels of R&D spending (both worldwide and country-specific), followed 
by non-coordinated innovation, and finally indigenous innovation. The reasons are two-fold. 
Firstly, non-coordinated innovation allows for the potential of foreign knowledge inflows to 
complement indigenous R&D in innovation. To absorb the diffused knowledge, individual 
countries would enhance indigenous R&D for building local knowledge absorptive capacity. 
Accordingly, a higher level of R&D will be stimulated in the non-coordinated innovation 
scenario as compared to the indigenous innovation scenario. 
Secondly, the coordinated innovation explicitly considers an internalization of positive 
technology externality, where individual countries are instructed to undertake more R&D 
investment for providing beneficial knowledge spillover to others. Accordingly, coordinated 
innovation, as compared to non-coordinated one, can stimulate a higher level of R&D efforts 
of individual countries and hence the global provision of knowledge. 
In particular, I investigate the effect of international R&D coordination on cross-country 
knowledge diffusion, measured as a percentage change of cumulative knowledge diffusion 
in the coordinated innovation relative to that in the non-coordinated innovation. As Tab. 5.3 
shows, R&D coordination has a positive effect to stimulate foreign knowledge diffusion into 
individual countries. This is because with the technology externality internalized, individual 
countries are instructed to enhance country-specific R&D commitment, which brings about 
more global provisions of public knowledge that is more likely to spill over into individual 
countries through various diffusion channels. 
185 
Figure 5.4: Intertemporal profiles of global R&D spending and the 
country composition in three innovation scenarios 
4000 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------
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Note: At each time point, the first column refers to the indigenous innovation scenario, the 
second .column refers to the non-coordinated innovation scenario, and the third column 
refers to the coordinated innovation scenario 
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■ USA 
■ EUW 
■ ROECl 
■ CHN 
■ BRIS 
■ ROW 
USA 
EUW 
Table 5.3: Effect of international R&D coordination on 
cross-country knowledge diffusions 
USA EUW ROECD CHN BRIS 
8.2% 7.5 % 5.2% 4.9% 
12.5% 8.5 % 4.7% 5.2% 
ROECD 16.7% 10.2% 7.3 % 6.8% 
CHN 18.4% 15.6% 20.1 % 9.3% 
BRIS 19.1 % 15.3% 14.9% 17.4% 
ROW 8.3% 7.5 % 5.8% 7.2% 4.3% 
ROW 
4.2% 
3.8% 
5,1 % 
5.4% 
4.9% 
Note: To distinguish the destination and source of particular bilateral knowledge diffusion, 
the row country index denotes destination region that receives foreign knowledge inflows, 
while the column index represents the source region from which the knowledge diffuse. 
All values listed in the table are measured as percentage changes of cumulative knowledge 
diffusions in the coordinated innovation scenario relative to that in the non-coordinated 
innovation scenario. 
However, the magnitude of this positive effect varies significantly across countries. As 
Tab. 5.3 shows, R&D coordination slightly raises foreign knowledge inflows into the U.S., 
because the innovation pattern of the world largest R&D investor is largely driven by 
indigenous R&D, with the complementary effect of foreign knowledge being relatively small. 
Under· multilateral R&D coordination, the EUW and ROECD mostly benefit from foreign 
knowledge diffused from the U.S., suggesting a close relationship among technologically 
advanced OECD countries in knowledge sharing and technology cooperation. On the one 
hand, the OECD countries have intensive linkages of multilateral trade and investment in 
research-intensive industries, which facilitates the embodied knowledge diffusion through 
high-tech product transactions. On the other hand, less restriction is imposed on technology 
transfers among the OECD member countries, which favors the spillovers of disembodied 
knowledge. Furthermore, technologically advanced countries have existing high levels of 
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knowledge bases and absorptive capacities that favor assimilations of diffused knowledge. 
In addition to the North-North technology interaction, Tab. 5.3 also shows the evidence 
of South-North knowledge diffusion in the process of R&D coordination. The technologically 
advanced countries (USA, EUW, and ROECD) tend to learn more knowledge created by the 
BRICS countries, because international technology cooperation also induces the R&D 
commitments of the emerging countries, which creates differentiated technology varieties 
that may diffuse into the developed world to complement innovation there. 
Turning to China, due to a rapid improvement of its knowledge absorptive capacity, this 
largest emerging country can harness international R&D cooperation to learn and absorb 
more knowledge diffused from the OECD advanced countries (USA, EUW, and ROECD). As 
Tab. 5.3 shows, this is particularly notable for the OECD countries located in the Asia-Pacific 
region, suggesting that China largely benefits from knowledge diffusions from this region 
through the established economic linkages, particularly the operation of multinational firms 
from the USA, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. As these advanced nations enhance 
innovative efforts under the multilateral R&D collaboration, the Asia-Pacific economic 
network may facilitate technological diffusion into the recipient country China. 
Tab. 5.3 also shows that other emerging economies like the BRIS are induced to absorb 
more knowledge diffusions from two global innovation hubs. One is from the traditional 
technology incumbents located in the OECD, and the other is from China (the world's third 
largest R&D investor). As knowledge and information sharing become increasingly frequent 
among the emerging economies, these is also a large potential of the South-South technology 
cooperation, where the BRIS have an opportunity of learning the knowledge and technology 
created by China. Meanwhile, similar sophistication levels of production techniques favor 
mutual adoption and adaptation of technology among the emerging countries. 
Having examined the effects of R&D coordination on country-specific R&D investment 
and cross-country knowledge diffusion, I turn to the effects on economic and environmental 
performance. As shown above, international R&D coordination can accelerate innovation by 
boosting indigenous R&D investment and cross-country knowledge diffusion. As a result, 
the enhanced indigenous R&D, with the complement of foreign knowledge inflow, facilitates 
accumulations of knowledge in each individual country. 
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The augmented knowledge is then applied in production to induce a reconfiguration of 
production inputs for productivity gain and output growth (the rate of TC). This is revealed 
in Fig. 5.5 that displays the GDP growth paths of the six world regions/ countries in three 
innovation scenarios. A common trend is notable: each economy gains the highest growth 
momentum in coordinated innovation, following by non-coordinated innovation, and finally 
indigenous innovation. It suggests that international technology cooperation has a positive 
effect to stimulate economic growth in all participating countries. 
Simultaneously, applications of new knowledge in production can lead to knowledge 
substitution for physical inputs including fossil fuels. Production technique would hence be 
restructured with a declining use of physical inputs and a rising input of knowledge (the 
bias of TC). The declining use of fossil energy finally gives rise to a reduction in carbon 
emissions. This is demonstrated in Fig. 5.6 that shows the carbon emission growth paths of 
the six world regions/ countries in three innovation scenarios. As is to be expected, the 
coordinated innovation generates an emission path with the lowest growth rate, well below 
that in both non-coordinated and indigenous innovation. This suggests that international 
technology cooperation can help restructure economic composition by raising the input of 
knowledge, which hence lowers carbon emissions in all participating countries. 
In addition to the economy-wide effect, I further use the multi-sector model structure to 
capture the sector-level effect of R&D coordination on carbon abatement, which is measured 
as the percentage reductions of cumulative carbon emissions levels in both uncoordinated 
and coordinated innovation relative to that in indigenous innovation. As Fig. 5.7 shows, on 
top of non-coordinated innovation, R&D coordination generates sizable additional increases 
in carbon abatement in twelve production sectors. In particular, the sectors of electric utility, 
manufacturing, and transport have higher carbon saving potential, because production 
technologies in these sectors have an intensive use of fossil energy inputs, and thus have a 
large room of applying new knowledge (induced by R&D coordination) to substitute for 
fossil energy. Meanwhile, USA, China, and other emerging countries achieve comparatively 
higher carbon-saving benefits from technology cooperation with the economies that are 
relatively "green" like Germany in EUW and Japan in ROECD. 
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Figure 5.5: Economic growth paths (measured as GDP) of the six world regions in three innovation scenarios 
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Figure 5.6: Carbon emissions growth paths of the six world regions in three innovation scenarios 
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Figure 5.7: Effect of international R&D coordination on sector-level carbon abatements in the six world regions 
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Note: The effect is measured as percentage reductions of sector-specific cumulative emissions driven 
by international R&D coordination relative to the emission levels without R&D coordination 
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5.4.3 Technology Coordination with Emissions Control Policies 
Section 5.4.2 discusses international R&D coordination and its beneficial effect on economic 
growth and carbon savings in an environment of no-emission control policies. However, real 
implementation of climate strategy should put in place particular types of emission control 
policies, because without an emission-based instrument to correct for pollution externality, a 
sole dependence on innovation and technology cooperation is insufficient to achieve the goal 
of climate stabilization - the so-called environmental ineffectiveness of climate technology 
strategies (Buchner and Carrara, 2005; Popp, 2011). Therefore, the purpose of this section is 
to investigate the effect of R&D coordination on environmental and economic performance 
in the presence of an emissions control policy, with an emphasis on how international R&D 
coordination helps achieve more carbon saving potential and offset climate compliance cost. 
To do that, the simulations impose two types of emission control instruments - carbon 
tax and emission cap - on the three innovation scenarios as described in Section 5.4.1, and 
examine how emission reductions and climate compliance costs vary in these innovation 
scenarios. For the first type of mitigation policy, I impose a common carbon tax, $20 dollar 
per ton of carbon dioxide from the year 2012 onward, on all six world regions. Fig. 5.8(a) 
shows the effects of this carbon tax on emission reductions in six regions under three 
innovation scenarios, measured as percentage reductions of cumulative emissions levels 
with carbon tax relative to that without tax distortion. 
Two points are worth noting. First, in terms of cross-country comparisons, the emerging 
countries (CHN, BRIS), as compared to the OECD, have more carbon emissions reductions. 
This is because the rapid growths in the emerging economies are basically driven by massive 
inputs of fossil energy into energy-intensive production system, putting a carbon price signal 
is more likely to induce a technological alternative that lowers the uses of fossil energy and 
carbon emissions. The non-OECD countries also have less innovative capacity to undertake 
R&D and TC for reducing fossil energy inputs, so production reductions become the only 
rational option to avoid higher cost burden under carbon tax distortion. Second, in terms of 
cross-scenario comparisons, carbon taxation generates the highest levels of carbon savings in 
coordinated innovation, followed by non-coordinated innovation, and finally indigenous 
innovation. It implies that technology cooperation can serve to complement emission control 
instruments to help improve the effectiveness of emission-based climate policies. 
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Figure 5.8: (a) Effect of carbon tax to lower cumulative emission levels in six countries under three innovation scenarios; 
(b) Effect of carbon tax to incur cumulative production output losses in six countries under three innovation scenarios; 
(c) Effect of introducing three innovation mechanisms to partially offset climate compliance ·costs (incurred by carbon 
tax) in reference (no-innovation) scenario. 
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Meanwhile, it is notable that the environmental benefit of carbon savings achieved by 
carbon taxation is at an economic cost (climate compliance cost). Fig. 5.8 (b) shows the effect 
of carbon taxation on production output losses in six world regions under three innovation 
scenarios, measured as percentage reductions of cumulative output levels with carbon tax 
relative to that without tax distortion. 
A cross-country comparison shows that non-OECD countries are expected to suffer from 
more output losses under the carbon tax burden, while the OECD nations have relatively 
lower levels of climate compliance costs. This is primarily because the non-OECD countries 
have less capacity and commitment to undertake R&D and technical upgrading for reducing 
fossil energy inputs, so production capacity reduction become the only rational option to 
avoid higher cost burden under carbon tax distortion. 
Meanwhile, a cross-scenario comparison reveals that carbon tax incurs the lowest levels 
of climate compliance costs on individual countries in the coordinated innovation, followed 
by non-coordinated innovation, and finally indigenous innovation. This suggests that R&D 
coordination can help offset the economic costs of emission control instruments. Therefore, 
through cross-country technology cooperation, emission-based climate policies can generate 
the highest levels of carbon savings, yet incurring the lowest levels of economic costs. 
From a different perspective, I put comparison across the three innovation scenarios on a 
common basis: relative to a reference (no-innovation) scenario where R&D investment and 
knowledge stocks are set to null in simulation without the mechanism of endogenous TC. 
Due to· the absence of the endogenous TC mechanism to help avoid higher cost burden 
incurred by the carbon tax, the reference (no-innovation) scenario would have the highest 
levels of climate compliance costs (deadweight losses incurred by tax distortion). Next, I in 
turn incorporate the mechanisms of indigenous, non-coordinated, and coordinated 
innovation, and examine how the climate compliance cost in the reference scenario would 
change in response to introducing these three innovation mechanisms. 
As Fig. 5.S(c) reveals, incorporating the three innovation mechanisms all have a notable 
effect to reduce climate compliance costs in the reference (no-innovation) scenario, with the 
highest levels of reductions occurring in the coordinated innovation. This suggests that 
international technology cooperation can maximize the potential of reducing the economic 
195 
costs incurred by emission control policies. In particular, the emerging economies like CHN 
and BRIS can harness international technology cooperation to reduce more domestic climate 
compliance costs. This suggests that R&D cooperation should be introduced to synergize an 
emission-based agreement for offsetting climate compliance costs. By doing that, the major 
carbon emitters could have incentives to participate in international climate agreement. 
Consider the second type of emission control policy - emission cap. I set an emission cap 
that reduces the year 2030 (end year of simulation) carbon emission levels by 20% relative to 
the year 2005 (base year) levels in each of the six world regions.21 To impose this particular 
type of emission caps, I assume that a shadow carbon price is put on each of the six world 
regions in year 2012 (the expiring year of the Kyoto Protocol compliance period) and then 
rises at 5% growth rate by 2030 (reflecting a rising marginal abatement cost), so that all 
individual countries can domestically achieve their year 2030 emission cap targets. 
The economic consequences of this emission cap vary significantly across countries and 
innovation scenarios. Fig. 5.9(a) provides a measure of the economic costs of complying with 
the emission caps (marginal abatement cost when emission binding occurs). It represents the 
shadow carbon price imposed on each economy in the year 2012 so that the year 2030 
emission cap target can be achieved Measured in this term, climate compliance cost is the 
highest in China, which has its 2012 shadow carbon price about $40 per ton. Next in order of 
climate mitigation burden is E.U. and BRIS, with a 2012 carbon price of $30. Somewhat lower 
are the U.S. and ROECD, both of which have 2012 carbon prices about $20 per ton. 
The reason for higher climate compliance costs in China is that, as the world's largest 
carbon emitter, this country has taken strong efforts to cut its carbon emissions, making its 
year 2005 emission levels already at a relatively lower level. Thus, cutting such a lower base 
year emission level by 20% by 2030 will become a relatively stringent target, which translates 
into higher compliance costs suffered by China for achieving this emissions reduction target. 
21 Note that, as compared to the carbon tax that is uniformly imposed on individual countries, the 
setting of emission caps is in nature not uniform. That is, although the settings of 20% relative 
emissions reductions (year 2030 relative to year 2005) are the same, the corresponding absolute 
levels of reductions are different across countries due to different base year emission levels 
( McKibbin et al., 2011). 
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Figure 5.9: (a) Shadow carbon prices generated by emission caps in the six world regions under three innovation scenarios; 
(b) Effect of emission caps on cumulative production output losses in the six world regionsunder three innovation scenarios; 
(c) Effect of three innovation mechanisms_ to offset economic costs (incurred by emission cap) in reference (no-innovation) scenario 
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A cross-scenario comparison shows that the shadow carbon price imposed to reach the 
year 2030 emission cap target is the lowest in coordinated innovation, followed by 
non-coordinated innovation, and finally indigenous innovation. This suggests that R&D 
coordination enables the economic cost (in terms of shadow carbon price) to be largely offset 
in the process of complying with certain emission cap targets. 
Moreover, Fig. 5.9(b) provides an alternative measure of the economic costs associated 
with the achievement of the emission caps targets. It shows the effect of emission caps on 
production output losses, measured as percentage reductions of discounted cumulative GDP 
levels with emission cap relative to the levels without emission caps. By this measure, 
production outputs fall in all countries with the largest declines in the emerging countries 
(-2.5%~ -3%), followed by slightly smaller losses in E.U. (-2%), then U.S. and ROECD (-1.5%). 
Meanwhile, a cross-scenario comparison shows that the cost burden imposed by emission 
caps are the lowest in coordinated innovation, followed by non-coordinated innovation, and 
finally indigenous innovation. This suggests that, by international technology cooperation, a 
particular emission cap target can be achieved with the lowest levels of economic costs. 
Finally, the cross-scenario comparison is undertaken on a c6mmon basis (relative to the 
reference scenario), I simulate the economic costs incurred by emission cap in the reference 
(no-innovation) scenario, and then compare how the reference climate compliance costs 
would change in response to introducing three innovation mechanisms. As Fig. 5.9(c) shows, 
three innovation mechanisms all have a positive effect to mitigate climate compliance costs 
in the reference scenario, with the coordinated innovation reducing the highest levels. This 
implies that technology cooperation should be introduced to complement international 
agreements on emission caps, so that the emission targets can be achieved with the least 
economic costs. 
It is also worth noting from Fig. 5.9(c) that the emerging economies, as compared to the 
OECD countries, can substantially reduce their climate compliance cost in R&D coordination. 
This provides important implications for the designs of the post-Kyoto climate architecture. 
On the one hand, existing emission-based climate agreements (e.g., emission caps, carbon tax) 
emphasizes mandatory emission reduction targets, which gives rise to insufficient climate 
commitments of major carbon-emitting countries due to the substantial economic costs of 
complying with emission reduction targets. On the other hand, given the large potential of 
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international technology cooperation in facilitating innovation and technology progress, an 
international climate architecture combining both emission-based and technology-oriented 
agreements may create a synergic effect to lower the costs of climate compliance. By doing 
that, climate commitment made by individual countries can be strengthened, which further 
improve the environmental effectiveness of their collective climate mitigation efforts. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Beyond the rapid economic growth, the stories in the emerging countries like the BRICS 
countries are increasingly about technological innovation, which has remarkably changed 
the former Triad-region (USA, EU, and Japan) innovation pattern into a new landscape of 
global innovation with multiple hubs of R&D. As the emergence of multiple hubs of 
innovation is anticipated to facilitate cross-country knowledge sharing and multilateral 
technology cooperation, climate strategies should introduce particular international 
technology-oriented agreements to complement existing emission-based one in formulating 
the post-2012 climate architecture. 
This chapter provides a new attempt to investigate the mechanism of international 
technology cooperation and its effect on global climate mitigation. I firstly present a simple 
framework that analyzes the mechanism of international R&D coordination and its effect on 
reducing climate mitigation costs. This mechanism is then quantitatively investigated in a 
multi-region numerical model that explicitly represents the positive technology externality 
resulting from cross-country knowledge diffusions. 
Simulation results show that: (1) By internalizing the positive externality of reciprocal 
knowledge diffusions, multilateral R&D coordination can induce more R&D efforts made by 
individual countries and hence the global provisions of knowledge that favor innovation 
across countries; (2) Innovative efforts enhanced by international R&D coordination facilitate 
new knowledge creation and application, which can stimulate the potential of economic 
growth and carbon savings in all participating countries (3) Multilateral R&D coordination 
(technology-oriented agreements) can synergize with traditional emission-based climate 
agreements to help lower the economic costs of emission control policies, hence improving 
the participation incentives of major carbon-emitting countries and the environmental 
effectiveness of their collective mitigation efforts in global climate governance. 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
5.A Derivation of the Relationship between MAC and Knowledge Input 
The producer problem can be formulated as follows: 
min Po· Eo+ Pc- Ec 
1 
s. t. [(E oaE + EcaE ):: + H ay ];; = Y; Ee> O; K 2". Eo > 0 
where the corresponding Lagrangian can be expressed as follows: 
The first order condition (F.O.C) with respect to two endogenous control variables yields: 
where the complementary slackness condition with respect to three costate variables 
(shadow price of the corresponding constraint) are as: 
8L = (E OE + E OE ):: + Hay - Y"Y > 0 · Ay >_ 0 ,· 
8Av O c - ' 
fJL - fJL 
-- = E-Eo > 0· Ao >_0,· --·Ao = 0 
8Ao - ' 8Ao 
fJL ~ E > O· 
8Ac c - ' Ac 2 0; 
8L 
- ·Ac = 0 
8Ac 
8L 
-·Av= 0 
8Av 
Given that emission abatement occurs in the presence of carbon emission caps, then 
abatement boundary condition should be satisfied with x: - Eo = 0, Eo > 0, and the K-T 
condition becomes: 
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8L ( <YE OE )ay - l OE-1 
--=-Po+ Ay ·ay · Eo + Ee aE ·Eo - Ao=O 
8Eo 
8L ( UE OE )ay - l <YE-1 
- - = - Pc + A y · ay · Eo + Ee aE · Ee + Ac = 0 
8Ec 
8L av 
- = (E <YE+ E UE ) ;,;- + Hay - y av = O· Ay > 0 8Ay o c , 
aL = x - E = O · Ao > 0 
8Ao O ' 
8L 
- = Ee > O · Ac = 0 8Ac ' 
From Eq. (5.A.4), we have E0 = K, substitute into Eq. (5.A.3), yields 
Substitute Eq. (5.A.6), E0 = K, Ac = 0 into Eq. (5.A.2), yields 
1-ac 
:::}Ay=Pc-ay-1-(Yay -Hayt~ay .[(y av - Hay )~ -x<YE]----;;;-
Substitute Eqs. (5.A.6)-(5.A.7), Eo = K into Eq. (5.A.1), yields 
Ao - -P0 + A, •a,. [ ii"" +(Y"' - H"' ):: - K"' r;;"' · K"'-' 
av-aE 
. =-Po+ Ay•ay·(Yay - Hoy)~- KUE-1 
- ~Po+ Pc[(Y"' - H~ ):: -K"f :' K"'-' 
• 
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(5.A.1) 
(5.A.2) 
(5.A.3) 
(5.A.4) 
(5.A.5) 
(5.A.6) 
(5.A.7) 
5.B Country Composition of Regions 
Region Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Western Europe: 
Region Name 
USA 
EUW 
ROECD 
CHN 
BRIS 
ROW 
Region Description 
United States of America 
Western Europe 
Rest of the OECD 
China 
Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa 
Rest of the World 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Rest of the OECD: 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
Rest of the World: 
All countries not included in other region groups 
Model sectoral classification and mapping by reference to the GTAP and 
OECEANBERD 
Sector number/ name GTAP OECDANBERD 
in our mode sector numbers sector number 
1. Electric utilities 43 40 
2. Gas utilities 44 41 
3. Pefroleum refining 32 23 
4. Coa~ mining 15 10 
5. Crude oil & gas extraction 16-17 11 
6. Mineral mining 18 12-14 
7. Agriculture 01-12, 14 01, 03-05 
8. Forestry & wood products 13,30 02,20 
9. Durable manufacturing 34-42 26-37 
10. Nondurable manufacturing 19-29, 31, 33 15-19, 21-22, 24-25 
11. Transportation 48-50 60-64 
12. Services 45-47, 51-57 45, 50-59, 70-99 
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5.C GEMP ACK TABLO Model Codes 
The Chapter 5 model focuses on representing multilateral R&D spillovers among the six 
world regions (e.g., USA, EUW, ROECD, CHN, BRIS, ROW). That is, innovation in each 
region depends on both indigenous R&D and international TD, and the model explicitly 
describes international knowledge diffusion into each world region through three diffusion 
channels. Hence, in a decentralized non-cooperative R&D equilibrium, the modeling 
structure for each world region is similar to the China part in the Chapter 4 model (as 
outlined in Chapter 4 Appendix 4.C). As the other alternative equilibrium, the centralized 
cooperative innovation case can be characterized by the following TABLO codes. 
!==================================================================== 
GEMPACK TABLO code for implementing the centralized coopearative innovation 
equilibrium as outlined in the thesis Chapter 5 
====================================================================! 
!================================================================ 
R&D spending Level in a fuLLy cooperative innovation equilibrium 
================================================================ ! 
SET regions # 6 world regions in cross-region technology interaction# 
(USA, EUW, ROECD, CHN, BRIS, ROW); 
SET origin# origin regions providing knowledge outflows#= regions; 
SET destination# destination regions receiving knowledge inflows#= regions; 
Variable 
prrr(n,t) 
delTRTC(n,t) 
wcbr( i,n,t ) 
ccbr(i,n,t) 
lamr(n,i,t ) 
rnv(n,i,t) 
hcp(n,i,t) 
rnv_r(i,t) 
rtac(r,i,t) 
enff(n,r,i,t) 
# price of raw R&D good#; 
# rate of R&D tax credit #; 
# within-country benefit from indigenous R&D investment#; 
# cross -country benefit from knowledge spiLLover #; 
# shadow price of knowledge capital#; 
# R&D investment#; 
# knowledge capital stock#; 
# gLobaL R&D investment as a sum of invididuaL country R&D #; 
# knoLwedge absorptive capacity for assimilating R&D spiLLover #; 
# intermediate input import flows from origin country n to 
destination country r #; 
invff(n,r,i,t) # FDI investment inflows from origin country n to destination country 
r #; 
ouy(n,i,t) 
delBART 
delBARF 
delBARD 
# output of commodity i produced in origin country n #; 
# foreign barrier of international trade#; 
# foreign barrier of international investment#; 
# foreign restriction of knowledge spiLLover #; 
Coefficient 
(all,n ,origin) (all ,i,sectors) (all, t,alltime) 
(all,n,origin) (all ,i,sectors) (all ,t,alltime) 
(all,n,origin) (all ,i,sectors) (all,t,alltime ) 
(all,n,origin ) (all ,i,sectors) (all,t ,alltime) 
(all,n,origin ) (all,i, sectors) (all ,t,alltime) 
Formula 
(all,n,origin ) (all,i, sectors) ( all,t,alltime ) 
S_Hl(n,i,t); 
S_H2(n,i,t); 
S_H3(n,i,t); 
S_H4(n,i,t); 
S_HS(n, i, t); 
S_Hl(n,i,t) = LLAMR(n,i,t) * [ALPHA*AH*( LRNV(n , i,t) A( ALPHA-l))*(LHCP(n,i,t) ABETA) 
+ BARD - 2*LRNV(n,i,t) / LRNV_R(i,t)] 
/ {LLAMR(n,i,t)* [ALPHA*AH*( LRNV(n,i,t) A(ALPHA-l))*(LHCP(n,i,t) ABETA) 
+ BARD - 2*LRNV(n,i,t) / LRNV_R (i ,t)] 
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+ sum{r,destination,LLAMR(r,i,t) *LRTAC(r,i,t) 
* [BART*Vl(n,r,i,t)/Vl_Y(n,i,t) +BARF * LRNV (n,r,i,t)/Vl_Y(n,i,t) + 
BARD] }}; 
(all,n,origin)(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
S_H2(n,i,t) ALPHA*AH*(LRNV(n,i,t) A(ALPHA-l)) *(LHCP(n,i,t) ABETA) 
/ [ALPHA*AH *(LRNV(n,i,t) A(ALPHA-l)) *(LHCP(n,i,t) ABETA) 
+ BARD - 2*LRNV(n,i,t) / LRNV_R(i,t)]; 
(all,n,origin)(all,r,destination)(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
S_H3(n,r,i,t) = LLAMR(r,i,t) *LRTAC(r,i,t) *[BART*Vl(n,r,i,t) / Vl_Y(n,i,t) 
+ BARF*LRNV (n,r,i,t) / Vl_Y(n , i,t) + BARD] 
/ sum{r, destination, LLAMR(r,i,t) *LRTAC(r,i,t) 
* [BART*Vl(n,r,i,t)/Vl_Y(n,i,t) + BARF *LRNV (n,r,i,t) / Vl_Y(n,i,t) + 
BARD]}; 
(all,n,origin)(all,r,destination)(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
S_H4(n,r,i,t) = BART*Vl(n,r,i,t)/Vl_Y(n,i,t) 
/ [BART*Vl(n,r,i,t) / Vl_Y(n,i,t) + BARF*LRNV (n,r,i,t) / Vl_Y(n , i,t) + 
BARD]; 
(all,n,origin)(all , r,destination)(all, i, sectors) (all, t, alltime) 
S_HS(n,r,i,t) = BARF*LRNV (n,r,i,t) / Vl_Y(n,i,t) 
Equation 
/ [BART*Vl(n,r,i,t) / Vl_Y(n,i,t) + BARF*LRNV (n,r,i,t) / Vl_Y(n , i,t) + 
BARD]; 
E_prrr # R&D spending in the presence of within-country and cross-country benefit# 
(all,n,origin) (all,i,sectors) (all,t,alltime) 
prrr(n,t) - 100 / (1-TRTC(n,t)) * delTRTC(n,t) 
= S_Hl(n,i,t) *wcbr(n,i,t) + (1-S_Hl(n,i,t)) *ccbr(n,i,t); 
E_wcbr # within-country benefit from indigenous R&D spending# 
(all,n,origin) (all,i,sectors) (all,t,alltime) 
wcbr(n,i,t) = lamr(n,i,t) 
+ S_H2(n,i,t) * [(ALPHA-l)*rnv(n,i,t) + BETA*hcp(n,i,t)] 
+ (1 -S_H2(n , i,t)) 
* [2*LRNV(n , i,t) / (2*LRNV(n,i , t)-BARD*LRNV_R(i,t))] 
* [rnv(n,i,t)-rnv_r(i,t)]; 
E_wcbr # cross-country spillover benefit from indigenous R&D spending# 
(all,n,origin) (all,i, sectors) (all,t,alltime) 
ccbr(n,i , t) = sum {r , destination, S_H3(n,r,i,t) * [lamr(r,i,t) + rtac(r,i,t) 
+ S_H4(n , r,i,t) *(100/ BARF *delBART + enff(n,r,i,t) - ouy(n,i,t)) 
+ S_H5(n,r,i,t) *(100/ BARF *delBARF + invff(n,r,i,t) - ouy(n , i,t)) 
+ (1 -S_H4(n,r,i,t)-S_H5(n,r,i,t)) *(100/ BARD*delBARD)]}; 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
6.1 Major Findings 
The overarching focus of climate policies to avert the threat of dangerous global warming is 
mitigation, i.e., carbon emissions reduction. Carbon abatement has profound implications for 
the use of fossil energy . On the one hand, fossil fuels are indispensable energy inputs into 
virtually every industry in an economy. On the other hand, there are currently no effective 
substitutes for fossil fuels as energy carriers. For these reasons climate economic analysis 
generally predicts that carbon emission controls will precipitate large increases in fossil 
energy prices, and result in significant reductions in economic production. Of all the factors 
that influence the prediction of the likely costs of carbon abatement, technology plays the 
most important role. Designing an economically optimal strategy of carbon abatements thus 
requires a deep understanding of the mechanism of technological innovation and its 
interaction with climate mitigation policies. 
. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual framework that unveils the endogenous mechanism 
through which TC is induced by climate policies. The central finding is that, according to the 
microeconomic foundation of innovation, profit-seeking private firms, to avoid the higher 
cost burden imposed by climate regulation, will undertake purposeful innovative activities 
as a response to increases in fossil energy prices. This underlying mechanism can be further 
represented as three consecutive endogenous processes: 1) R&D inducement: emissions 
control policies raise the cost of using fossil energy, with the signal of a higher energy price 
inducing private firms to undertake purposeful innovative activities in the form of R&D 
investment; 2) Knowledge creation: the stock of productive knowledge asset is augmented 
by the purposeful R&D investment. 3) Production TC: the accumulated knowledge capital is 
applied in a production process for TC, with an outcome of shifting out production possibility 
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frontier and substituting knowledge for costly energy inputs. 
In the process of R&D inducement, the principal finding is that whether the purposeful 
R&D investment of private firms can be induced by raising fossil energy price (through 
government regulation on emissions control) depends on the interaction of four effects in 
equilibrium: 1) Input cost effect; 2) Output price effect; 3) Market demand effect; and 4) 
Innovation uncertainty effect. The second and fourth effects are positive on inducing R&D 
investment, while the first and third effects being negative. 
In the process of knowledge creation, it is found that there are two different views about 
the characteristics of knowledge: the excludability of innovation vis-a-vis the non-rivalry of 
idea. With a view of science, it is appropriate to regard the non-rivalry and non-excludability 
as the general attributes of knowledge. Meanwhile, in an economic sense, it is plausible to 
think of the idea as an economically useful knowledge that is largely excludable to 
competitors within an intellectual property protection system in the real - world economy. 
To reconcile both alternative views, I describe an innovation process that features both 
sector-specific R&D and external knowledge spillover as the dual sources of knowledge 
creation. This kind of treatment is particularly relevant to modeling innovation within a 
multi-sector economic framework, where intersectoral R&D spillovers are most likely to 
occur through multi-sector economic transactions. 
In the process of production TC, the main finding is that, by applying new knowledge 
(created in the innovation process) in a production process, the production possibility frontier 
would shift out, with an increase in the Hicks-neutral total factor productivity (the rate of 
production TC). Meanwhile, there is a decline in the cost share of each physical input and a 
rise of knowledge input (the bias of production TC) . The effect of knowledge application on 
production TC can thus be characterized as knowledge substitution for physical inputs with 
a saving of them (including fossil energy). 
Chapter 3 develops an intertemporal optimization CGE model of the Chinese economy 
to analyze the effect of technological innovation on the timing and cost of carbon abatement. 
I find that an intertemporal framework, as compared to a myopic recursive-dynamic one, is 
better suitable for incorporating the mechanism of endogenous TC into a traditional CGE 
model, because representing R&D-induced TC in an intertemporal model is more consistent 
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with the microeconomic foundation of innovation, with R&D investment and knowledge use 
being modeled as the endogenous economic behaviors of profit-seeking firms. 
It is also found that in a disaggregated framework like a multi-sector CGE model, it is 
necessary to explicitly consider and represent the positive technology externality resulting 
from intersectoral knowledge spillovers. That is, due to the imperfect appropriability of 
knowledge, physical good~ produced by individual sector could partially embody intangible 
knowledge created by sector-specific R&D investment. Other sectors, in the multi-sector 
economic transaction, can benefit from external knowledge spillover through the sectoral 
linkages along the supply chains - the so-called intersectoral knowledge spillovers. 
The procedure of model calibration shows that a stylized input-output (IO) dataset is 
not well suited to calibrate a CGE model featuring the R&D-induced TC, because it does not 
separately record economic flows associated with R&D investment and knowledge inputs. In 
a more theoretically consistent way, the technique of knowledge accounting, in line with the 
embodied technology hypothesis, can be used to construct a modified IO dataset with an 
explicit representation of R&D investments and knowledge inputs, based on which the CGE 
model with R&D-induced TC is calibrated. 
The results of numerical simulation indicate that 1) Technological progress induced by 
R&D commitment has a notable effect to curb China's carbon emissions levels, with the 
sectors of manufacturing, electricity, and transport having the highest carbon abatement 
potential from innovation; 2) Indigenous R&D investments are important as the technology 
strategies to address climate change mitigation, but the sole dependence on R&D is far from 
sufficient to achieve the pledged climate target, because China's innovation pattern is 
basically "normal" with a focus on productivity improvement rather than carbon saving; 3) 
Innovation policies (public R&D subsidy and stringent IPR) can strengthen R&D investment 
and further reduce carbon emissions, but this complementary effect is still minor and 
insufficient to meet the stipulated climate target. This is primarily because continued growth 
in public R&D may suffer from diminishing return in innovation, and stringent IPR system 
only serves to protect the ex post excludability of innovation, which may be ancillary to the ex 
ante incentive of R&D investment as an inventive response to price signal; 4) Emission-based 
climate regulation through carbon taxation are necessary to fulfill the emission reduction 
target, but achieving this carbon-saving benefit is at the cost of sizable production output 
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losses; 5) Stringent climate regulation induces the incentive of private firms to innovate and 
technical upgrading, which can partially mitigate the deadweight losses incurred by carbon 
tax distortion. 
Chapter 4 extends the single-country model into a multi-region global framework, into 
which the mechanism of international technology diffusion is incorporated. The implications 
are two-fold. First, due to a backward position in the global technology ladder, innovations 
in developing nations can benefit from knowledge diffusion from technologically advanced 
countries. International knowledge diffusion thus plays an important role to complement 
indigenous R&D in fostering innovation and TC in developing countries. Second, domestic 
economy can acquire external foreign knowledge through two mechanisms: 1) Embodied 
knowledge diffusion through indirectly employing knowledge-embodied intermediate and 
capital goods; 2) Disembodied knowledge diffusion through directly learning disembodied 
knowledge spillover. 
Embodied knowledge diffusion (passive knowledge diffusion) occurs when domestic 
firms indirectly benefit from external innovation by using knowledge-embodied foreign 
intermediate commodity (via import) or capital goods (via FDI). In parallel, disembodied 
knowledge diffusion (active knowledge diffusion) involves direct learning and absorption of 
the disembodied forms of technologies (e.g., formulas, blueprints, patents), not necessarily 
linking to the economic transactions of tangible physical goods in international trade and 
investment. Therefore, international technology diffusion occurs via three channels: trade, 
FDI, and disembodied knowledge spillover. Meanwhile, while knowledge can diffuse from 
abroad through three diffusion channels, the efficiencies of assimilating the diffused 
knowledge of the recipient developing countries are localized due to their differentiated 
indigenous capacities of knowledge absorption. 
The multi-region numerical model is used to investigate the effect of foreign knowledge 
diffusion on domestic innovation and carbon savings in China. Simulation results show that 
foreign knowledge diffusion plays a crucial role to complement China's indigenous R&D to 
help stimulate technology innovation and reduce carbon emissions, contributing to about a 
quarter of domestic carbon savings resulting from endogenous TC. Foreign knowledge 
diffuses into China via three diffusion channels. In the short run, disembodied knowledge 
spillover is the leading diffusion channel, because there is a huge international disembodied 
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knowledge pool (created by China's knowledge gap relative to technology frontier countries) 
accessible to China for learning and absorption. In the long run, China is anticipated to boost 
imports of knowledge-intensive high-tech products, and market-seeking MNCs seek to 
undertake more R&D-related FDI for new product development in the emerging markets. As 
an outcome, embodied knowledge diffusion through international trade and investment 
flows would become the leading pattern of international technology diffusion. 
The results of globalization policy analysis also show that trade and FDI liberalization, 
as an indication of economic globalization policy, facilitates a transition to economic 
integration, which accelerates the growth momentum of production. However, without 
improving the intensity of knowledge embodied in import and FDI inflows, this expanding 
production size necessarily requires more uses of fossil energy without saving carbon 
emissions, reflecting the scale effect of globalization on the environment. Albeit this 
unfavorable effect, the multidimensional process of globalization also involves a favorable 
aspect: technique effect. That is, the growing globalization of innovation can be harnessed to 
acquire the benefit of domestic carbon saving, which depends on two conditions: 1) Removal 
of TD restrictions by technologically advanced nations to increasE: the intensity of knowledge 
embodied in foreign trade and investment; 2) Enhancement of indigenous R&D of the host 
developing countries to improve their capacities of knowledge absorption and adaptation. 
Finally, it is indicated that a tightening of domestic climate regulation through carbon 
taxation can induce domestic firms to create new knowledge through indigenous R&D and 
foreign knowledge inflows. This innovation inducement thus plays an important role to help 
restructure domestic economic composition into a knowledge-based system (composition 
effect), which hence partially mitigate the economic cost of climate mitigation policies. 
Chapter 5 employs both analytical and numerical methods to analyze the mechanism of 
international technology cooperation and its effect on global climate mitigation, with a focus 
on how multilateral R&D coordination (technology-oriented agreements) can synergize with 
traditional emission-based climate agreements to help lower the economic costs of emission 
control policies. 
The central implication of the analytical results is that, in the absence of multilateral 
R&D coordination, individual countries undertake independent innovative activities but 
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ignore the technology externality of cross-country knowledge diffusions. Accordingly, they 
underestimate the beneficial effect of indigenous R&D on fostering foreign innovation and 
emission reductions, and hence set R&D spending levels that are relatively low. In contrast, 
in the presence of multilateral R&D coordination, individual countries are instructed by a 
coordinating body to undertake higher levels of R&D spending for internalizing the positive 
technology externality. As a result, global collective innovative efforts would be enhanced, 
with more provisions of public knowledge that favors innovation and emissions reductions 
in participating countries. 
The numerical simulation results are basically consistent with the analytical one. It is 
shown that: (1) By internalizing the positive externality of reciprocal knowledge diffusions, 
multilateral R&D coordination can induce more R&D efforts made by individual countries 
and hence the global provisions of knowledge that favor innovation across countries; (2) 
Innovative efforts enhanced by international R&D coordination facilitate new knowledge 
creation and application, which can stimulate the potential of economic growth and carbon 
savings in all participating countries (3) Multilateral R&D coordination (technology-oriented 
agreements) can synergize with traditional emission-based clima!e agreements to help lower 
the economic costs of emission control policies, hence improving the participation incentives 
of major carbon-emitting countries and the environmental effectiveness of their collective 
mitigation efforts in global climate governance. 
6.2 Future work 
So far my study in current work has articulated three key aspects associated with modelling 
endogenous TC in climate policy analysis, e.g., indigenous R&D investment (Chapter 3), 
international knowledge diffusion (Chapter 4), and international technology coordination 
(Chapter 5). Although the theoretical structure and modeling framework presented in this 
thesis is comprehensive, it is still needed to improve the empirical basis in future work. 
First, while the collected benchmark dataset (e.g., multi-sector input-output transaction 
data, sector-level R&D data) provides a unique point for calibrating the theoretical model 
that features R&D-induced TC, it is common that there are more free parameters than there 
are model equations or observations of benchmark data. To pin down a solvable equilibrium, 
it is thus necessary to make assumptions about these free parameters (e.g., elasticity of 
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substitutions, innovation possibility frontier parameters). This then raises the question of 
how precisely to determine the values of these exogenous parameters, which turn out to be a 
thorny issue. This difficulty is magnified in multi-sector, multi-region CGE modeling like in 
this study, where production technologies are specified using hierarchical CES functions, 
each of which has multiple elasticities of substitution. Basically, it is not possible to either 
estimate or compute theses elasticities without a host of auxiliary information. Faced with 
these data constraints, current works resort to selecting values for these parameters from the 
empirical literature based on judgment and assumptions. The ad-hoc nature of this process 
has been criticized by mainstream empirical economists who advocate an econometric 
approach to CGE modeling and parameterization (Jorgenson, 1984; McK.itrick, 1998; 
McK.ibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999; Fisher-Vanden and Ho, 2007; van der Werf, 2008) . Therefore, 
future efforts should be made to econometrically estimate the values of parameters. 
Second, the other empirical weakness of the current model is about uncertair1ty. In a 
real-world economy with uncertainty, the possibility of substitution among production 
inputs may vary significantly among levels of the nested CES structure and across sectors. 
The parameters associated with the innovation possibility fronti~r (e.g., knowledge creation 
efficiency and elasticity) are also uncertain and heterogeneous across sectors. In this context, 
a model with determirristic parameter values thus ignores the inter-sectoral heterogeneity in 
substitution and innovation possibilities and the resulting uncertainty of policy simulation 
results. When faced with these sorts of issues, my current work typically undertakes a 
traditional sensitivity analysis to compare simulation results with different combinations of 
values for the various parameters in the model. However, given the arbitrarily chosen values 
for these parameters, this typical ad-hoc sensitivity analysis is far from sufficient to reflect the 
randomness (probability distribution) of these exogenous parameters. Hence, further efforts 
should be put on carrying out systematic sensitivity analysis using the techniques like Monte 
Carlo analysis and Gaussian Quadrature (e.g., Arndt, 1996; Liu, 1997; Pearson and Arndt, 
2000; DeVuyst and Preckel, 1997; Webster and Cho, 2006). Applications of these structured 
uncertainty analysis (which employ empirically-derived probability distributions over input 
parameters) have the potential to enhance our understanding of the scope of uncertainties 
associated with the modeling results, and thereby help generate robust insights into the 
environmental, economic, and technological consequences in climate policy analysis. 
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